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I argue that Aristotle in Phys. I believes that the pre-existing matter a natu-
ral being is made from persists through this making. Some have denied this
claim. They have argued that Aristotle there claims that (i) each persisting
subject has a diachronic criterion of identity, and, so, (ii) the matter a natu-
ral being is produced from persists only if there is a diachronic criterion of
identity for it, but (iii) there cannot be such a criterion of identity for mat-
ter given how Aristotle construes it. I argue, in contrast, that Aristotle is
neutral with respect to (i), and so focus on whether matter, as he construes
it, could have a diachronic criterion of identity offers no means of deciding
whether he is committed to its persistence in Phys. I. If I am right, Aristotle’s
views of persistence in Phys. I have been misunderstood. He remains neu-
tral there about the metaphysics of persistence. Nevertheless, he does claim
that each subject persists through that change it is subject for, and so does
believe that the pre-existing matter that a natural being is produced from
persists through this making. While Aristotle does not focus on the meta-
physics of persistence, I argue that he does focus on the scientific question
of how things persist as they are being acted upon and changed—which is a
different question, I argue, from the question of what the identity through
time of any being consists in.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
1.1 Introduction
When you make a blue dolphin from Play-Doh, you press on parts of a blue
piece of putty, pull on others, lengthen some bit for a fin and shorten some
others for the eyes. You work on and change that bit of Play-Doh and the
result of your labour is a nice blue dolphin, a dolphin which is made out of
that worked-upon Play-Doh piece.
Real dolphins are also produced from some pre-existing material, mate-
rial that is worked upon and changed to produce a new dolphin. Does this
material persist and make up the new dolphin just as a Play-Doh piece per-
sists and makes up the blue Play-Doh dolphin? Aristotle’s answer according
to the standard reading of Physics I is ‘yes’.
My dissertation concerns a challenge to this reading. Some have argued
that, for Aristotle, (i) each persisting subject has a diachronic criterion of
identity, and, so, (ii) the matter a natural being is produced from persists
only if there is a diachronic criterion of identity for it, but (iii) there cannot
be such a criterion of identity for matter given how Aristotle construes it.
Thus (iv) the pre-existing matter a dolphin is made from is destroyed in the
process.
Few interpreters believe that Aristotle accepts (iv). But we will see that
most agree that not only does Aristotle claim that each persisting subject has
a diachronic criterion of identity, but they also think that this claim struc-
tures and organizes his search for the principles of nature. Nevertheless,
those who think that, for Aristotle, the pre-existing matter natural beings
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are produced from persists, struggle to understand how matter, as Aristotle
construes it, could have a diachronic criterion of identity. They either think
he is wrong to claim that there is such a criterion or try gallantly to supply
one on his behalf.
I think this debate is founded on a mistake. A person can be committed
to the persistence of a being without being committed to any particular view
about how that being persists. A wine maker, for instance, can believe that
some wine persists as they pour it from a casket into a bottle without at
the same time having any beliefs about how that wine persists. Similarly,
Aristotle really does believe that the pre-existing material a natural being
is made from persists through this making. But I argue that, for the pur-
poses of Phys. I, he has no commitments about how matter, or any persisting
subject, persists. He remains neutral there as to whether matter, or any per-
sisting subject, has a diachronic criterion of identity. So, on my reading, the
claim that each subject has a diachronic criterion of identity neither struc-
tures his search for the principles of nature nor is assumed by any of the
arguments in Phys. I. Nevertheless, I argue that the claim that the subject
of each change persists does play a central role in Phys. I and does structure
his search for the principles.
1.2 The Challenge
In the first book of the Physics, Aristotle searches for what he calls the prin-
ciples (ἀρχαὶ) of nature (184a1–16). He argues that these principles are sub-
ject (ὑpiοκείμενον), form (εἶδος), and privation (στέρησις). Most interpret this
claim as a claim about the various kinds of entities involved in any change.1
1See below for citations and discussion.
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Aristotle is understood as claiming that (i) for any change, some subject ac-
quires a form that it previously lacked; (ii) for different changes, there are
different entities which play these roles of subject, form, and privation. For
instance, when a stone becomes warm from being cold, the stone is the sub-
ject, the hot is the form, and the cold is the privation. In contrast, when a
person becomes musical from being unmusical, the person is the subject, the
musical is the form, and the unmusical is the privation.
Disagreement has arisen over how Aristotle applies his general claim
about every change to two distinct kinds of changes; unqualified change and
qualified change (190a31ff ). During an unqualified change, a natural being
comes into or goes out of existence, e.g. a tree rots and dies. During a qual-
ified change, no new natural being comes into or goes out of existence, e.g.
Socrates grows taller.
Interpreters of Phys. I have disagreed about Aristotle’s various remarks
about the subjects of these two kinds of changes. The subjects of qualified
changes are individual substances, things like men, dogs, trees, and so on.
The subject of an unqualified change is what Aristotle calls ‘matter’ (ὕλη;
192a31–32).2 While interpreters agree that the subjects of qualified changes
persist through these changes, there has been disagreement about whether
Aristotle believes the same for matter in Phys. I.
Unfortunately, there is no easy way of presenting the dialectic between
these different interpretations. Some framing device is needed. As such a
device, I use a problem David Bostock raises with the persistence of Aris-
totelian matter, a problem which he thinks points to an inherent flaw in
Aristotle’s views of the principle of nature. I first outline it, and then char-
2For the purposes of what follows, I use ‘matter’ for only the subjects of unqualified
changes. However, Aristotle does say that, in a sense, the subject of every change is matter.
See, for instance, GC 320a2–5.
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acterize the various interpretations of persistence in Phys. I as responses to
this problem.3
Before I do so, I want to emphasize two things. First, not all of these in-
terpretations were developed or defended as responses to Bostock’s problem.
Nevertheless, presenting them as responses to this problem is illuminating
and useful, so I will present them as such. Second, my primary interest is
not with this puzzle itself. I won’t try to defend Bostock’s claim that Aris-
totle’s view is inherently flawed, nor will I offer a response on Aristotle’s
behalf. My interest is in what Aristotle himself commits himself to in Phys.
I irrespective of the veracity of those commitments. I use Bostock’s problem
and the various responses merely to articulate commitments interpreters
have found in Phys. I, and also to explain why identifying these commit-
ments is both interesting and important.
Here’s the problem. Aristotle has been taken to commit himself to the
following claims in Phys. I:
1. The subject of every change persists through that change it is subject
for.
2. The subjects of some changes are gooey.
3. There is a diachronic criterion of identity for each persisting subject.
4. There is a diachronic criterion of identity for each persisting gooey sub-
ject (from 1–3).
I first explain each of 1–3, then explain why Bostock thinks that 4 is false,
why he thinks that there cannot be a diachronic criterion of identity for goos.
3Bostock {12, p. 30ff}. A version of the same problem is raised by Jones {51}.
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1.3 Gooey Subjects
Aristotle has a particular view about those entities which play the role of
matter. Premise 2 says that these entities are gooey. I first explain what I
mean by ‘the role of matter’, then explain this notion of goo.
For Aristotle, matter is always the matter of something or other (194b8–
9). However, he recognizes two distinct ways for something to be the mat-
ter of another thing, to be ultimate matter or to be proximate matter, e.g.
Socrates has both ultimate and proximate matter. While both ultimate and
proximate matter are the matter for something else, ultimate matter does
not itself have anything which is matter for it. In contrast, proximate mat-
ter itself can have something which is matter for it. Clay, for instance, is
the proximate matter of a clay statue. But clay itself has as its proximate
matter earth and water. If earth and water have nothing as their proximate
matter, then earth and water are both the ultimate and proximate matter of
the clay, but only the ultimate matter of the clay statue.
The entities which play both the roles of ultimate and proximate matter,
according to Aristotle, are stuffs like water, air, bronze, and so on. Stuffs are
prima face different kinds of entities from individual objects like Socrates,
Fido, an oak tree, an atom, etc. This difference is reflected in a difference
between the terms we use to refer to stuffs and to individual objects. We re-
fer to stuffs with mass nouns, and we refer to individuals with count nouns.
There are syntactic differences between these nouns. Count nouns take the
plural and they can be preceded with some number, e.g. ‘one dolphin’, ‘two
dolphins’. In contrast, mass nouns do not take the plural and cannot be
preceded with some number. We can see the difference by noticing these
nonsensical expressions: ‘one air’, ‘two airs’, ‘three airs’. This is a point
5
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about English and not about Greek. Nevertheless, the point applies to stuffs
irrespective of what language we use to describe them: we count objects but
measure stuffs—10 liters of water vs. 10 dolphins. In Met. 1020a9, Aristotle
marks this distinction as one between enumerable quantities (objects) and
continuous measurable quantities (stuffs). Air, water, fire, and earth are
measurable quantities, i.e. stuffs. Dolphins, people, and trees are enumer-
able quantities, i.e. individual objects.
So stuffs are prima facie different kinds of entities from individuals. So
what are stuffs? There are several different conflicting views about the na-
ture of stuffs, about what stuffs are and how they differ from individuals.4
One might, for instance, think that each portion of stuff is ultimately built
out of individuals, that some portion of water is ultimately built out of atoms
of hydrogen and oxygen, atoms that are themselves individuals.
Aristotle’s view is radically different. As Bostock says, Aristotle “does not
believe in any kind of atomism.”5 He does not believe that a portion of stuff
is composed of some individuals. Rather, Aristotle believes that stuffs are
both homoiomerous and infinitely divisible.
Homoiomers are entities whose parts are of the same kind as the wholes
they make up. For instance, Aristotle thinks that lines are homoiomerous.
A 1 meter line is divisible into parts, each of which is itself a line. This is
different from a view which says that lines are composed of points. Similarly,
Aristotle thinks that water is homoiomerous—each portion of water is made
up of only water parts. This is a very different view from the one that says
that (a molecule of) water is composed of hydrogen and oxygen atoms. On
Aristotle’s view, no portion of water, no matter how small it is, has anything
4For discussion, see Cartwright {19, 18}, Chappell {20}, Zimmerman {89}.
5Bostock {12, p. 32}.
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other than water parts.
Now we could hold two different views about the divisibility of ho-
moiomers. The first says that there is some smallest part of a homoiomer.
On this view, a line is divisible into some smallest line parts, parts which
themselves have no further parts. Similarly, on this view, a portion of water
is divisible into some smallest water parts, parts which themselves have no
further parts. The second view says that homoiomers are infinitely divisible
into ever smaller and smaller parts. On this view, a line is divisible into ever
smaller line parts ad infinitum. Similarly, a portion of water is divisible into
ever smaller and smaller water parts ad infinitum.
Aristotle holds the latter view. He thinks that stuffs are both homoiomer-
ous and infinitely divisible. For ease of presentation, I will use the noun ‘goo’
and adjective ‘gooey’ to describe such a view of stuffs. For instance, I will say
that water is a goo or that watery is gooey rather than saying that water is
homoiomerous and infinitely divisible.6
So according to Aristotle, stuffs like water are goo.7 On this view, any
portion of water is infinitely divisible into smaller and smaller water parts
ad infinitum. This is a radical view and likely false. Portions of water seem
composed of water molecules which in turn are composed of hydrogen and
oxygen atoms, atoms which are themselves composed further of sub-atomic
particles. These atoms and sub-atomic particles are not themselves water.
6Goo is different from what Lewis {62, p. 20} calls atomless gunk. Atomless gunk con-
tains an infinite number of actual parts. For Aristotle, goo is potentially infinitely divisible
(206a18–19). On one reading, this means goo contains an infinite number of potential parts.
On another reading, goo has an infinite number of neither potential parts nor actual parts,
but, nevertheless, can still be divided into ever smaller parts ad infinitum. On this view, a
water part of water exists only after that water has been divided out, i.e. the part is “called
into being by an act of division.” (Ross {74, p. 555}) See also Bostock {10}, Coope {27}, Hin-
tikka {43}, Lear {59}. I remain neutral about this larger debate as nothing I say will turn
on deciding it.
7See Phys. 206a9ff and GC 315a26ff.
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So portions of water seem composed of some non-water parts. Nevertheless,
this is not Aristotle’s view. He thinks of water as gooey, and this raises
questions about how he thinks that water can persist through change.
1.4 Diachronic Criteria of Identity
Premise 3 says that, for Aristotle, each persisting subject has a diachronic
criterion of identity. For instance, David Bostock reads Aristotle in Phys. I
as claiming:
...any such thing [a persisting subject] must be of a definite sort,
so that there is some sortal noun ‘A’, which in someway embodies
its criterion of identity over time. The item can then be referred
to as ‘this A’, and later as ‘the same A’, where we do understand
what it is for this A and that A to be (over time) the same A.8
Bostock goes on to argue that there is difficulty applying this point to Aris-
totelian matter, and ultimately claims that Aristotle’s view of matter is in-
herently flawed. Before I explain the worry, let me tease apart the various
features of Bostock’s interpretation.
Bostock thinks that, for Aristotle, each persisting subject has a di-
achronic criterion of identity. Such a criterion tells us what the identity
through time of an object consists in. What exactly does this mean? Eli
Hirsch explains as follows:
When we ask with regard to physical objects what their iden-
tity through time consists in, we are asking for an account of
the unity of a physical object’s career. Any physical object has
a career which stretches over a period of time, a career which we
can think of as comprised of a temporal succession of momentary
stages. The successive parts, or stages, of an object’s career hang
together in some distinctive way; otherwise there would be noth-
ing to prevent us from arbitrarily combining into a single career
8Bostock {12, p. 35}.
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the early stages of one object with the later stages of a different
object. Evidently not just any succession of object-stages corre-
sponds to a single persisting object; some do and some do not. So
in order for object-stages to add up to a single persisting object
they must be related in some special way.9
Here is an example: Arion’s life involved various stages. A young Arion
graduated from a music academy. Call this stage R1. A slightly older Arion
gained critical acclaim. Call this stage R2. An even older Arion was washed
ashore on a foreign beach. Call this stage R3. R1–R3 are each stages in the
career of one and the same persisting person, Arion. They are not stages
in the career of other persisting persons like Socrates and Plato. One stage
of Socrates’s career talked to Euthyphro about piety outside a courthouse.
Call this stage C1. Another stage drank hemlock in a prison cell. Call this
stage C2. Why are R1 and R2 together stages of one and the same persisting
person while R1 and C2 are not? What relation does R1 and R2 stand in
that R1 and C2 do not, a relation which binds R1 and R2 into one single
persisting object? An answer to this question will tell us what the identity
through time of objects consists in.
Philosophers choose to frame debates about diachronic criteria of identity
in this way because it allows them to remain neutral about the ontology of
persisting objects, about the ontology of these stages.10 Some philosophers,
perdurantists, argue that these stages are temporal parts of temporally ex-
tended objects, e.g. R1–R3 are numerically distinct parts of a temporally
extended entity, an entity which does not at each moment that it exists pos-
sess all its parts.11 Others, endurantists, think that these stages are stages
in the career or history of one persisting object, an object which does at each
9Hirsch {44, p. 3–4}.
10See Perry {72}.
11See Heller {41}, Lewis {61}, Quine {73}, Sider {82}.
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moment that it exists possess all its parts. One way of understanding a ca-
reer and its stages is offered by Sydney Shoemaker: if C is a continuant
existing at time t, and P is the set of properties possessed by C at t, then
C’s stage at t will be the set consisting of the instantiations in C at t of the
properties in P.12 Some commentators have claimed that Aristotle’s focus in
Phys. I is the ontology of persisting objects.13 This dissertation will not ad-
dress that debate, and using Hirsch’s way of explaining diachronic criteria
of identity allows me to circumnavigate it.
Let us consider one view of what the identity through time of an object
consists in. Call this SQ:
A succession S of object-stages corresponds to stages in the career of a single
persisting object if and only if:
S is spatiotemporally continuous; and
S is qualitatively continuous.14
SQ tells us that R1–R3 are stages of the one persisting object just because
they are parts of a succession of object stages that are spatiotemporally and
qualitatively continuous, i.e. there is a succession of stages in Arion’s ca-
reer from when he graduated music school to when he washed ashore on
a foreign beach, a succession of stages that are spatiotemporally and qual-
itatively continuous.15 On the other hand, if R1 and C2 are not stages of
one persisting object, then they should not both be parts of one succession of
spatiotemporally and qualitatively continuous object stages.
12Shoemaker {81, p. 337–338}.
13Code {24, 25} interprets Aristotle as a perdurantist. Matthews {67, 68} sees Aristotle as
claiming that objects persist by being parts of different kooky objects, or what Shields {77,
p. 156} has labelled ‘hyper-finely-individuated-objects’.
14Hirsch {44, p. 8}.
15See Hirsch for a full discussion of spatiotemporal and qualitative continuity.
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SQ can be used to formulate a criterion of identity for persisting objects.
A criterion of identity states individually necessary and jointly sufficient
conditions for an identity to hold, both at a particular time and across times.
They are most associated with Frege who claimed, “[i]f we are to use the
symbol a to signify an object, we must have a criterion for deciding in all
cases whether b is the same as a, even if it is not always in our power to
apply this criterion.”16 An example of such a criterion is the following: the
direction of line a is identical to the direction of line b iff line a is parallel to
line b. Here we have a criterion of identity for directions of lines—they must
be parallel.
A diachronic criterion of identity states individually necessary and jointly
sufficient conditions for an identity to hold between entities existing at dif-
ferent times. For instance, the boy who graduated the music academy is the
man sitting on beach iff φ, where the value of φ states individually neces-
sary and jointly sufficient conditions for the graduate to be the man on the
beach. SQ can be used to formulate such a criterion as follows: the boy who
graduated music school is the man who washed ashore on a foreign beach
iff there is a succession S of spatiotemporally and qualitatively continuous
object stages such that S contains both.17
Bostock thinks that, for Aristotle, persisting objects require more than
being appropriately related to a succession of spatiotemporally and qualita-
tively continuous object stages. Why? Consider a problem raised by Hirsch
for SQ: Suppose we crush an old car in a car crusher and turn it into a cube
of crushed metal and plastic. The car that entered the crusher and the cube
that leaves the crusher are each part of a succession of object stages that are
16Frege {35, §. 62, p. 73}.
17Hirsch {44, p. 9}.
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spatiotemporally and qualitatively continuous. Nevertheless, the car did not
persist as it was crushed. It was destroyed. But if SQ were sufficient, then
the car should have persisted. To put the point slightly differently, if you
trace the career of the car and only consider qualitative and spatiotemporal
continuity, you would have no reason to think that the car perished rather
than altered.18
In general, considerations like these lead philosophers to argue that the
object stages that combine into one persisting object must also be of the
same sort. Consider the car which is crushed. There is a spatiotemporally
and qualitatively continuous succession of object stages that has car stages
and cube stages as parts. But the cube stages—the stages formed after the
crushing—are not cars. So Hirsch, for instance, claims that we must add to
SQ the condition: “there is a sortal term F such that S is a succession of F-
stages.”19 If ‘car’ is a sortal, then this explains why the car did not persist:20
The Mustang entering the crusher and the cube leaving it are not connected
by a spatiotemporally and qualitatively continuous sequence of car-stages.
Philosophers who appeal to sortals owe us an account of what terms are
sortals. Philosophers like Hirsch, though, tend to distinguish sortals from
non-sortals by stipulating that sortals are just those that do provide a cri-
terion of identity. So he claims that a sortal is a term ‘F’ of English such
that it is a conceptual (or “analytic”) truth that any continuous succession
of F-stages (i.e. object stages to which F applies) corresponds to stages of a
single persisting F-thing. So also David Wiggins claims that a sortal is “cor-
18Hirsch {44, p. 25–33}.
19Hirsch {44, p. 36}.
20I say that ‘car’ is a sortal, rather than car is a sortal. We can disagree whether we should
dub as sortals properties, concepts, or terms. Since the outcome of such a disagreement will
not affect anything I say below, I will speak of both properties and terms that denote them
as sortals, i.e. I assume that Bostock believes that both the kind human and the term
‘human’ are sortals.
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relative with or associated with a principle by which entities of a particular
kind may be traced or kept track of and re-identified as one and the same.”21
1.5 The Persistence of Goo
Bostock thinks that, for Aristotle, each persisting subject has a diachronic
criterion of identity. But he asks:
If matter is to persist over time, then it seems that there must
be some appropriate criterion of identity for it. But what is this
criterion?22
Bostock thinks that Aristotle provides no criterion of identity for matter, and
argues that we cannot fill this lacuna on his behalf. Why does Bostock think
that no criterion will be forthcoming? He claims that,“[t]he root cause of
the difficulty is just the assumption that a stuff (such as water) is strictly
homoiomerous."23
I will explain the difficulty that concerns Bostock by discussing two pu-
tative criteria of identity for goo. The first says that goo persists under a
sortal, a sortal which embodies a diachronic criterion of identity for it. The
second says that a portion of goo persists only if each of its parts persists.
1.5.1 First candidate criterion
Let us focus again on Hirsch’s claim that the object stages which combine
into one persisting object must fall under the same sortal. So we may think
that for a portion of goo to persist, the stages of a persisting goo must fall
21Wiggins {87, p. 22} Note that some have argued that the existence of a succession of
qualitatively and spatially continuous F-stages is not sufficient for the existence of a per-
sisting F. See, for instance, Shoemaker {79}.
22Bostock {12, p. 36}.
23Bostock {12, p. 43}.
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under some same sortal, i.e. that the stages of some persisting portion of
water must each themselves be water.
Bostock, in effect, thinks that a necessary condition for a term ‘F’ to be
a sortal is that it be non-dispersive.24 This means that if ‘F’ is a sortal, and
‘F’ refers to an object o, then ‘F’ does not refer to any part of o. Consider
the sortal ‘car’. The sortal ‘car’ refers to a Mustang in the parking lot, but it
does not refer to any part of that Mustang. In contrast, a noun like ‘clay’ is
dispersive. It both refers to the total piece of clay in the potter’s hands, and
to parts of that piece in the potter’s hands.
We may worry that Bostock is merely stipulating that mass nouns, since
they are dispersive, cannot embody diachronic criteria of identity. However,
Bostock does have an argument for why dispersive terms cannot embody
diachronic criteria of identity. Consider an oak tree and its trunk. A con-
tinuous succession of oak tree stages corresponds to one persisting tree. A
continuous succession of trunk stages corresponds to one persisting trunk.
Both oak trees and their trunks are wooden.
Now ‘wood’ is dispersive, i.e. parts of wooden things are themselves wood.
Thus different wood stages combine in all sorts of different ways. The vari-
ous successive stages of both the oak tree and the stages of its trunk combine
into one persisting wooden object. To see this, call wooden stage at t1 W1.
W1 combines together with wood stages at times other than t1 into one con-
tinuous wooden object. The problem is that there are too many continuous
wooden objects. Each trunk stage combines with W1 into one persisting
wooden object. So also each oak stage combines with W1 into one persisting
wooden object. There are even combinations of trunk stages and oak stages
that combine with W1 into one persisting wooden object.
24The next three paragraphs follow Hirsch {44, p. 37–42}.
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This seem counter-intuitive. We want to know if W1 persists through
time. It persists only if it is part of a suitable succession of wood stages. But
there are too many of these successions! Allow that at t2 there is an oak
tree, O2, and its trunk, R2. Is W1 identical to O2 or R2? W1 is identical to
O1 if there is a succession of wood stages that contains both. W1 identical
to R2 there is a succession of wood stages that contains both. So which of
these successions exist? Both! W1 is part of both such successions. So W1
is identical to O2 and identical to R2, identical to both an oak tree and that
tree’s trunk. Identity is transitive. Since W1 is identical to O2 and identical
to R2, then O2 is identical to R2; the oak tree is identical to its trunk, one of
its several parts.
1.5.2 Second candidate criterion
Our second candidate criterion for goo is that a portion of goo persists only if
its parts persist. To understand this candidate, consider a view which says
that stuffs are summations. This view has two basic principles:
Fusion Any two non-overlapping portions of a stuff S have a fusion.
Mereological essentialism (ME) Any sub-portion of a portion of S is es-
sential to it.
Fusion says that some water in the river Liffey and some water in my glass
have a fusion, a fusion which is itself a portion of water. Irrespective of how
spatially apart two portions of water are they still have a fusion. ME says
that you cannot add or subtract a sub-portion from a portion. The fusion
(itself a portion of water) which has water from the Liffey and water from
my glass as sub-portions has these sub-portions essentially. If you were to
15
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destroy either sub-portion, you would destroy the fusion outright. Let us
note that adding water to my glass or pouring what was in my glass into the
Liffey does not destroy the fusion. (I have used ‘water in my glass’ to refer to
a portion of water, but it is not essential to that water that it be in my glass).
On this summation view of stuffs, the persistence conditions for a portion
of any stuff is strict and clear-cut: a portion of stuff S persists only if each of
its sub-portion persists. The portion of water that has Liffey water and glass
water as sub-portions persists only if both of these sub-portions persists. A
portion of bronze persists only if each of its sub-portions persists.
The success of the summation view depends on the persistence of the
sub-portions. These sub-portions have diachronic criteria of identity or they
do not. If they have such criteria, these will be specified in terms of their
sub-portions or in some other way.
Here let us recall that Aristotle believes that stuffs are gooey. The sum-
mation view cannot accommodate goo. Suppose that water is gooey. The
summation view says that the portion of water in my glass will persist
only if each of its sub-portions persists. But each of these sub-portions
are themselves water. Since water is gooey, each of these sub-portions has
sub-portions which are themselves water. So each sub-portion of the origi-
nal portion will persist only if each sub-portion of the sub-portion persists.
These further sub-portions will be themselves water. Since goo is both ho-
moiomerous and infinitely divisible, there is no leveling out. We never get to
a sub-portion of water that has persistence conditions that are determined
by anything other than further sub-portions of water.
Of course, one might respond that the persistence conditions for a portion
of water need never level out. On this view, we may think that criteria of
16
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identity need never level out, i.e. a criterion of identity can be specified
for As in terms of Bs, and a criterion for Bs can be specified in terms of
Cs, and so on ad infinitum.25 But even if this were true, there is still a
problem: when we specify the persistence conditions of water in terms of
its sub-portions, sub-portions which are themselves water, we are specifying
the persistence conditions of some water in terms of some water. But why
think that the sub-portions enjoy some special privilege over whatever they
are sub-portions of? If water is gooey, there is no salient difference between
a portion of water and its water sub-portions, a difference which would make
the sub-portions more fundamental than the portions they are sub-portions
of. 26
1.6 Three Responses
Recall these four claims:
1. The subject of every change persists through that change it is subject
for.
2. The subjects of some changes are gooey.
3. There is a diachronic criterion of identity for each persisting subject.
4. There is a diachronic criterion of identity for each persisting gooey sub-
ject (from 1–3).
I here present interpretations of how persistence plays a role in Aristotle’s
search for the principles of nature by discussing whether they accept 1–4.
25See Lowe {65, 64} for discussion about whether each thing has a criterion of identity,
whether such criteria can be circular, and whether they must level out.
26Zimmerman {89, 90}.
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1.6.1 First Response
Our first response says that Aristotle commits himself to each of 1–3 in Phys.
I. On this view, it is particularly helpful to read Phys. I as being concerned
with diachronic criteria of identity and as making the claim that matter too
has such a criterion. Bostock is the most notable defender of this interpreta-
tion. We have seen that he thinks that Aristotle accepts 1–4, and also that 4
is false. So, according to Bostock, Aristotle is mistaken to think that matter
has a diachronic criterion of identity.
1.6.2 Second Response
Our second response denies that Aristotle commits himself to 1 in Phys. I.
Notably, Barrington Jones claims that, for Aristotle, while at each moment
of an unqualified change, there exists some portion of goo or other, there is
no one portion of goo that persists through the change.27 For instance, at
each moment of a sculpting, there exist some portion of clay in the sculptor’s
hand. However, Jones denies that any one portion of clay persists through
the sculpting.
This second response is radical. It denies that persistence has anything
at all do with Aristotle’s search for the principles of nature. Aristotle does,
on this reading, think that each change requires a subject of change. But,
on this reading, the subject is whatever can be said to become so-and-so. For
instance, the subject of a sculpting is just whatever can be said to become a
statue. However, according to this reading, in order for a subject to become
so-and-so it need not persist through the becoming, in order for a portion of
bronze to become a statue, it need not persist through the sculpting.
27Jones {51}.
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Our second response comes in both a strong and a weak version. The
strong version defended by Barrington Jones and William Charlton takes
Aristotle in Phys. I to deny that matter persists through an unqualified
change.28 The weak version defended by Sean Kelsey and David Ebrey
claims that Phys. I is neutral with respect to 1.29 Even if Aristotle com-
mits himself to this claim elsewhere, Kelsey and Ebrey claim that Aristotle
doesn’t say anything to commit himself to it in Phys. I.
What’s vital about both versions of this response is that persistence plays
no role in Aristotle’s search for the principles of nature. It neither organizes
that search nor does it feature in any of the central arguments therein.
1.6.3 Third Response
A third possible response denies 2, denies that gooey subjects are the sub-
jects of unqualified change. The core move in this response is to claim that
goo is different from bits or pieces of some goo. For instance, a portion of
water is different from a pool of water. A portion of bronze is different from
a bit of bronze. A portion of clay is different from a piece of clay. This third
response says that, for Aristotle, it is these pools, bits, and pieces that are
subject of unqualified changes, and it is these things and not gooey things
that have diachronic criteria of identity.
To see this solution, let us recall that count nouns refer to individuals
and mass nouns refer to stuffs. If Aristotle thinks that the reference of mass
nouns are the subjects of unqualified changes, then we may infer that he
accepts 2. But this inference may not be licensed. For we may think that
mass nouns can serve as a kind of stand in for count nouns. Consider the
28Charlton {23}, Jones {51}.
29Ebrey {31}, Kelsey {55, 54}.
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sentence, ‘the water in my glass is the same water as the water that was in
the jug’. We may think that the three occurrences of ‘the water’ refer to some
one portion of water that could be referred to by some count noun, e.g. ‘the
10 ounce portion of water’.
‘The 10 ounce portion of water’ is non-dispersive. No part of this 10 ounce
portion of water is itself a 10 ounce portion of water. So Bostock’s concerns
with supplying a diachronic criterion of identity for goo will no longer apply
to the subjects of unqualified changes. Of course, we will still need a crite-
rion for the particular 10 ounce portion of water, the particular 1lb piece of
bronze, this particular pool of water, and so on. But it is more likely that
Aristotle could supply diachronic criteria of identity for these things than
for goo.
So, on this response, goos are not the subjects of unqualified changes.
Rather it is something that portions of goo make up, e.g. it is not the bronze
which makes up this very piece of bronze here that is the subject of a sculpt-
ing, but the very piece itself; a piece distinct from the gooey bronze that
composes it.
1.7 Locating Criteria of Identity in Phys. I
Interpreters have thought that diachronic criteria of identity are important
to Aristotle’s search for the principles of nature. But why? There are two
reasons:
First, in Phys. I.7 Aristotle describes the subject in various ways and priv-
ileges certain descriptions over others. For instance, he tells us that when
a person becomes musical, the man remains, but the unmusical does not
(189b32ff ). Sarah Waterlow argues that Aristotle privileges these descrip-
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tions because he thinks the description embodies a diachronic criterion of
identity for that persisting subject.30 This is also how Bostock understands
these descriptions. We have seen that he thinks that, according to Aristotle,
“...any such thing [a persisting subject] must be of a definite sort, so that
there is some sortal noun ‘A’, which in someway embodies its criterion of
identity over time. The item can then be referred to as ‘this A’, and later as
‘the same A’, where we do understand what it is for this A and that A to be
(over time) the same A.”31
Aristotle claims not merely that the subject persists. He also claims that
each subject persists under a sortal. Bostock and Waterlow think that since
he claims that each subject persists under a sortal, he must think that this
sortal embodies a diachronic criterion of identity for that persisting subject.
If this were correct, the claim that each persisting subject has a diachronic
criterion of identity would be central to Aristotle’s view of the principles of
nature.
Second, Waterlow thinks that Aristotle claims that each subject persists
under a sortal because she thinks this claim is vital to his proposed solution
to a puzzle at the heart of Phys. I. In Phys. I.8, Aristotle discusses an Eleatic
argument against the possibility of change. Call this ‘The Eleatic Challenge’.
The Eleatic Challenge claims that if what-is comes to be, then it comes from
what-is (ἐξ ὄντος) or from what-is-not (ἐκ μὴ ὄντος). But, it claims, neither
option is possible (191a27-33).
Many interpret the Eleatic Challenge as making two distinct claims:
First, sheer replacements are impossible. Second, if changes were to ex-
ist, changes must be sheer replacements. Aristotle is then understood as
30Waterlow {84, p. 21}
31Bostock {12, p. 35}.
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meeting the challenge by rejecting the second claim. According to him, a
subject persists through each change but nothing persists through a sheer
replacement. Mary Louise Gill explains:
Parmenides denied the possibility of change because, on his view,
for coming-to-be to occur, something must come to be from noth-
ing. Aristotle agrees with his predecessor in excluding such ab-
solute emergence, yet accommodates change by insisting that
coming-to-be, although involving replacement, and also involves
continuity. He thus avoids the charge that, when a change takes
place, the pre-existing entity simply perishes into nothing and is
replaced by a product that emerges out of nothing.32
Let us grant that the Eleatic Challenge turns on the claim that we can-
not distinguish sheer replacements (which are impossible) from genuine
changes.33 Let us also grant that Aristotle claims that change differs from
mere replacement because something, the subject, persists through a change
while nothing persists through sheer replacements. According to Waterlow,
Aristotle must defend his claim that a subject persists through each change.
And, according to Waterlow, this defense consists in claiming that the sub-
ject persists under a sortal.
Why? Waterlow is not so clear here. But suppose that there are no
diachronic criteria of identity for persisting subjects. Perhaps Waterlow’s
concern is that it would be indeterminate whether something has persisted
through a change or whether it has been replaced. For instance, suppose we
take two snap shots of guards outside Buckingham Palace one hour apart
from one another. Perhaps Waterlow thinks that if there is no diachronic
criterion of identity for people, then it will be indeterminate whether these
two guards are identical, i.e. it is indeterminate whether the latter guard
32Gill {38, p. 7}, Waterlow {84, p. 8}, Irwin {48, p. 84-87}.
33See Ch.5 for details.
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replaced the former guard, or whether one guard merely continued stand-
ing for the one hour duration. So since Waterlow thinks Aristotle’s solution
requires distinguishing sheer replacements from genuine changes, it is rea-
sonable of her to think that diachronic criteria of identity play a role in his
solution.
1.8 A New Reading of Persistence in Phys. I
I think the import of Aristotle’s remarks about persistence in Phys. I have
been misunderstood. He does not claim that there is a diachronic criterion of
identity for each persisting subject, and reading Phys. I as being particularly
concerned with these criteria is at best unhelpful and at worst misleading;
misleading because it obscures the proper import of his claims about persis-
tence. This is not to say that Aristotle nowhere has anything to say about
these issues. Nor is it to say that Aristotle need not say something about
these issues. But he doesn’t say anything about the issues in Phys. I.
This is important. We have seen just how questions about diachronic
criteria of identity have shaped some interpreters understanding of Phys. I.
Bostock thinks that Aristotle is there committed to the claim that matter
persists, and to the claim that there is a diachronic criterion of identity for
matter. He then argues that Aristotle does not have the resources to provide
such a criterion, and so concludes that there is an inherent flaw in Aris-
totle’s views about the principles of nature. Others, like Jones, deny that,
for Aristotle, matter persists. He thinks that Aristotle does commit himself
to there being a diachronic criterion of identity for each persisting subject.
Since Jones thinks Aristotle cannot provide such a criterion for matter, he
concludes that Aristotle is not committed to its persistence.
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On the new reading I develop here, Aristotle does not claim that each
persisting subject has a diachronic criterion of identity. So we cannot use
that claim to interpret his search for the principles of nature, e.g. decide
whether he thinks that matter persists or not. On the view that I develop
here, Phys. I is neutral with respect to the question of whether persisting
subjects have diachronic criteria of identity. To put it another way, Phys. I
is compatible with the claim that, say, some persisting matter has no such
criterion of identity. Such a view says that the persistence of matter is prim-
itive, that there are no reductive criteria in virtue of which some matter M1
existing at one time is identical to some matter M2 existing at some other
time. This is not to say that M1 and M2 are distinct. On this view, M1 and
M2 are identical. But there being identical is not in anyway explained by or
constituted by anything further.
I do not claim that Aristotle defends a primitive view about the persis-
tence of matter. But if interpreters like Waterlow and Bostock are right, then
this cannot be Aristotle’s view in Phys. I. They think that a central claim of
Aristotle’s is that each persisting subject has a diachronic criterion of iden-
tity. In contrast, on my reading, Phys. I is compatible both with the view
that each persisting subject has a diachronic criterion of identity and with
the view that some persisting subjects have no such criterion. The point is
that Phys. I takes no stand on the issue.
Instead of arguing that individual passages cannot be read as concerned
with diachronic criteria of identity, I offer an alternative and new reading of
Aristotle’s views about persistence in Phys. I that I think best characterizes
the role persistence plays in his search for the principles of nature. I argue
that Aristotle does claim that each subject persists, and I argue that this
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claim figures prominently in his search for his principles of nature.
To explain how I understand Aristotle’s remarks about persistence in
Phys. I, let me explain how I understand his overall goals and argumenta-
tive strategy in this book. Most interpret Aristotle as searching for the most
general features of changes. Robert Bolton is one example. He compares
changes with two-dimensional magnitudes and uses Aristotle’s discussion
of two-dimensional magnitudes elsewhere to clarify how subject, privation,
and form are principles. In An. Post 76a31–6, Aristotle claims that a geome-
ter must assume that two-dimensional magnitudes exist. Bolton claims that
this assumption can be clarified and filled out with the claim that points and
lines exist.
This fills out the content of the principle that two-dimensional
magnitude exists because these are the basic objects which make
all geometrical magnitude possible. All geometrical objects are
constructible out of points and line, but the latter are not con-
structible out of, or otherwise reducible to, each other or to any
more fundamental entities.34
According to Bolton, Aristotle believes that geometrical objects exist because
points and lines exist; geometrical objects are in some way constructible out
of points and lines. In a similar way, Bolton suggests that changes are in
some way constructible out of subject, form, and privation.35 Here is an
example: warming exists. It is a process of change that has temporal du-
ration. This claim can be filled out with with the claim that, say, a stone
(the subject), the hot (the form), and the cold (the privation) exists. In other
words, we can say that a warming exists just because a stone is coming to be
warm.36
34Bolton {9, p. 22}.
35It is unclear what kind of construction Bolton means here. But, for our purposes, we
can set the issue aside.
36Bostock {12, p. 1} articulates this view fairly clearly. See also Bolton {9}, Wieland {86}.
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On this reading, Aristotle’s goal in Phys. I is to identify the most general
kind of entities that changes are constructible out of: for any change C, C in-
volves some subject, some form, and some privation. Debates about whether
Aristotle thinks that the subject of each change persists are debates about
whether he thinks each change involves a persisting subject or not.
I agree that Aristotle does seek out those entities that changes are some-
how constructible out of (though I offer no view about what kind of construc-
tion this requires). However, this is only one of Aristotle’s goals. Aristotle
also tries to identify those entities that natural beings are constructible out
of. Consider how in Phys. I.7 Aristotle draws the following conclusion about
the principles of nature:
Plainly, then, if there are causes and principles of natural beings,
from which they primarily are and have come to be—have come
to be, I mean, what each is said to be in its essential nature, not
what each is in respect of a concomitant attribute—plainly, I say,
everything comes to be from both subject and form. For musical
man is composed, in a way, of man and musical, since you will
analyze it into their accounts. It is clear then that what comes
to be does so from these things [causes and principles] (190b17–
23).37
Here Aristotle tells us that he has been searching for the principles of nat-
ural beings, beings like Arion, dolphins, dogs, cats, and so on. He concludes
that each of these beings is composed (σύγκειται) of a subject and a form, e.g.
Arion is composed of some subject and some form.38 The subject and form
37φανερὸν οὖν ὡς, εἴpiερ εἰσὶν αἰτίαι καὶ ἀρχαὶ τῶν φύσει ὄντων, ἐξ ὧν piρώτων εἰσὶ καὶ γεγόνασι μὴ
κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς ἀλλ’ ἕκαστον ὃ λέγεται κατὰ τὴν οὐσίαν, ὅτι γίγνεται piᾶν ἔκ τε τοῦ ὑpiοκειμένου καὶ
τῆς μορφῆς· σύγκειται γὰρ ὁ μουσικὸς ἄνθρωpiος ἐξ ἀνθρώpiου καὶ μουσικοῦ τρόpiον τινά· διαλύσεις
γὰρ [τοὺς λόγους] εἰς τοὺς λόγους τοὺς ἐκείνων. δῆλον οὖν ὡς γίγνοιτ’ ἂν τὰ γιγνόμενα ἐκ τούτων.
Unless otherwise stated, all translations are based on Hardie and Gaye. I do not discuss
modifications unless they directly bare on my arguments. I have also consulted Charlton
{23}, Irwin and Fine {49}, Waterfield and Bostock {83}.
38I translate ‘σύγκειται’ as ‘composed’. I do not mean anything technical by ‘composed’, e.g.
that the subject and form stand to the natural being as parts to whole. We can use ‘σύγκειται’
for any kind of combination of various things, e.g. ‘there was a combination of difficulties
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are two of the three principles of nature. While he thinks that these are
two of the general kinds of entities involved in every change, Aristotle adds
something extra: these two principles compose natural beings. So Aristotle
moves from a claim about what changes are constructible out of to a claim
about what natural beings are constructible out of. Identifying how Aristotle
reaches this conclusion will allow us identify just how persistence figures in
his search for the principles of nature.
In what follows, I argue that he reaches this conclusion by considering
the causal processes involved in any change. Let me introduce this point
with an example. Suppose that you decide to build a sail boat. Building a sail
boat is difficult. You need the right materials, and you need the right tools
and expertise to turn those materials into a sail boat. How do you decide
which materials to use? In order to answer this question, you must attend
to two distinct things. First, you must learn what sail boats are; that they
are vessels that people use to travel across the water; that they are powered
by the wind; and so on. This itself will require learning about the winds, the
water, and about the various people who will use the boat. Second, you must
learn about the different tools and processes that you could use to turn some
materials into a boat, e.g. hammering, nailing, casting, melting, sculpting,
sewing, and so on.
What you learn about both will determine which materials you pick to
build the boat. Since boats must travel across water, their hulls must be
made from some buoyant material. But not any old buoyant material can
be made into the hull of the boat. Suppose that the only tools available to
that caused Odysseus to spend so long from Ithaca.’ Aristotle does not tell us how he uses
the word, and I will avoid interpreting him having some specific relation in mind. Also note
here that ‘σύγκειται’ is frequently used as the passive of ‘συντίθημι’. In Phys. I, Aristotle uses
cognates of this verb, ‘σύνθεσις’ and ‘σύνθετος’. For instance, he tells us at 190b8 that a
house is something that comes into being by a process of combination (‘σύνθεσις’).
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you are a hammer and a saw. This will limit the kinds of buoyant material
that could be turned into the hull of boat. For instance, even though plastic
is buoyant, you could never turn that plastic into the hull of a boat with
just a hammer and a saw: nailing bits of plastic together will never create a
watertight firm hull.
So you cannot turn just any material into a sail boat. Rather, after
learning what boats are and identifying the tools available to you, you must
search out those materials which can be turned into a sail boat by your avail-
able tools. There is nothing you can do to cheese, chocolate, and wine to turn
them into a sail boat. But, if you know some carpentry and something about
the art of fabrication, you can turn wood and fiberglass into the hull of your
boat.
Here’s the point of the analogy: Aristotle is interested in the products of
changes. He wants to identify what makes up these products. He concludes
that the product of every change is a complex of two distinct contributions, a
passive and active contribution. The product of a musical lesson is a musical
man, an entity which was made by imposing musicality on to a man. The
product of sculpting is, say, a statue, a product that was made by imposing a
shape upon some bronze.
I think that Aristotle’s focus on production shapes his interest in per-
sistence in Phys. I, shapes it in a way that has not been noticed by other
interpreters. The subject is the patient that the actor acts upon, and this
places constraints on what entities can be the subject of certain changes, i.e.
a subject must be able to be acted upon and changed by the actor. So, for
instance, glass cannot be subject of that change that produces a boat: since
surviving a hammer blow requires absorbing the force of the hammer, and
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since glass cannot absorb such a force, glass cannot be turned into the hull
of a boat. Wood, though, can absorb such a blow and be turned into the hull
of a boat. So wood can be the subject of that change that produces a boat.39
For Aristotle, the subject must be able to undergo that process of being
acted upon and changed by some actor. I argue that, for Aristotle, to be able
to undergo a process of being acted upon requires being able to survive as it
is being acted upon. The stone survives as it is being warmed up, survives
as heat is being imposed upon it. This is why, I argue, he privileges certain
descriptions of the subject over others.
Recall that Waterlow and Broadie think that Aristotle privileges these
descriptions because they embody diachronic criteria of identity, i.e. he says
that Arion remains a man as he learns music because ‘man’ embodies a
diachronic criterion of identity for persisting men. I disagree. I argue that
Aristotle thinks that being a man explains how Arion can survive as music
is being imposed him, and, I argue, this is different from explaining what
the identity through time of Arion consists in.
To explain this, let us suppose that the famous Terpander taught Arion
how to play the lyre. He will expect two things of Arion. First, he will expect
that Arion can complete the intensive music lessons. Arion won’t complete
the lessons if he is weak-willed, sickly, distractable, and so on. He is likely
to quit half way through even if he was able to begin the lessons. Second,
he will expect that Arion is ready and able to start learning how to play the
lyre. After all, Arion won’t be able to start learning if he is still a child, so
young he has yet to sufficiently develop cognitively and physically to begin
learning anything at all. Similarly, if Arion has suffered some catastrophic
39Many others think that action and passion play key and central roles in Phys. I, most
notably Waterlow {84} and more recently Ebrey {31}. I discuss their interpretations in Ch.3
and explain just how mine differs from theirs.
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injury in his life, there is little that Terpander can do to teach him music.
So Terpander needs Arion to be able to both begin and complete a music
education.
If Terpander believes Aristotle, he will think that it is only unmusical
men who are able to do both. First, not every man can learn music. It is only
those who are in the appropriate state that can do so, i.e. they are unmusical.
Second, Aristotle thinks that it is by remaining a man that Arion survives
as his music teacher imposes their knowledge of music upon him. Being
a human is a reasonable explanation for how Arion could be acted upon
in this way: being a human involves possessing those cognitive capacities
required to assimilate the relevant information as it is being passed down
by the teacher, also involves the appropriate physical features and capacities
to support music learning, e.g. being strong enough to hold the lyre, not
exploding at a certain frequency of pitch, and so on.
Being a human may not be a suitable explanation for how Arion can
undergo other changes. For instance, when Arion swims into cold water on
a hot day, he cools down. On the reading I develop, Aristotle thinks that
there is some explanation as to why Arion can survive as his body is being
acted upon and cooled down by the cold water. This will involve complex
facts about Arion’s physiology. The explanation, though, may be something
more general than the fact that Arion is a man. Perhaps the explanation is
that Arion is an animal, something entailed by Arion’s being a man. This
is not a problem for my account. After all, being an animal cannot explain
how Arion can survive a music lesson. It is being a man that is relevant. So
my account predicts that Aristotle will cite ‘man’ as opposed to something
more general like ‘animal’ when he explains why Arion can survive as he
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assimilates his teacher’s music lesson.
1.9 Outline
In what follows, I elaborate and defend this reading. In Ch.2, I focus on
Phys. I.5. There Aristotle argues that of all the pairs of opposites, some of
these pairs are the principles of nature. I show that Aristotle’s argument
relies on a background theory of production, a theory that I think shapes
the rest of Phys. I. While Phys. I.5 says little about persistence, the goal of
Ch.2 is both to argue that this background theory is operative and to clarify
it.
In Ch.3 I argue that the question of how a being can survive a process of
being acted upon is different from the question of what the identity through
time of that being consists in. For instance, in order to survive the force
of a hammer blow, a piece of bronze must be both malleable and retain its
malleability as I continue to hammer it. Explaining how bronze can survive
hammering in this way differs from providing a diachronic criterion of iden-
tity for that persisting bronze. Further, one can explain how bronze retains
its ability to survive a hammer blow while remaining neutral on what ex-
actly the diachronic criterion of identity for bronze is. Thus Aristotle need
not offer any such criteria for bronze for the purposes of Phys. I, and so it
is not surprising that he does not say anything about such criteria there
(though he may have views about such criteria elsewhere).
In Ch.4 I discuss Phys. I.7 and a classic problem about the persisting
subject of natural generations: Aristotle seems to tell us he will make some
general claims about the subject of each change, and he seems to say that
the subject persists (190a9–10). Thus it seems that Aristotle believes that
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the subject of an unqualified change, matter, persists through an unquali-
fied change.40 However, Aristotle claims that plants and animals come into
being from sperma (ἐκ σpiέρματος)(190b4–5).41 This suggests that sperma is
the subject, i.e. matter, of those unqualified changes in which plants and an-
imals come into being. If the subject of every change persists, and if sperma
is the subject of the generation of plants and animals, then sperma persists.
But this is peculiar. Let us assume that the unfertilized egg is a sperma. If
you dissect Socrates, you find a heart, a liver, blood, and tissues. Nowhere
do you find in him the unfertilized egg that he came into being from. So
the claim that plants come into being from sperma seems to entail that the
subject of some unqualified change does not seem to persist through them.
This is a clear difficulty. In the very same chapter, Aristotle seems to
make one claim that entails that matter persists through an unqualified
change, and make another claim that entails that matter does not persist
through an unqualified change. I think that we can ease this tension by fo-
cusing on Aristotle’s biological works. I show that, for Aristotle, when prop-
erly understood, one kind of sperma is blood. So understood, sperma does
persist through a natural generation and is present in the newly generated
animal. Nevertheless, sperma on this reading is blood and blood is a goo.
The general difficulty about supplying diachronic criteria of identity for goo
applies also to blood. But, I argue, since Aristotle says nothing about such
criteria in Phys. I it should not concern us that his Phys. I account offers us
no diachronic criterion of identity for blood.
In Ch.5 I offer a new interpretation of the Eleatic Challenge. Unlike
many interpreters, I deny that the Challenge turns on issues of replacement.
40Bostock {12, p. 6}.
41I translate ‘ἐκ σpiέρματος’ as ‘from sperma’. We could also translate it as ‘from seed’. See
Ch. 4.
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Instead, I argue that the Challenge turns on issues of production. Both
the Eleatic Challenger and Aristotle assume that it is a requirement for
the existence of a change C that there exists a subject which can persist
through C. However, the Challenge argues that this requirement cannot be
met. Aristotle’s solution, in turn, is to show that, on the correct view of
the principles of nature, this requirement can be met. Persistence does play
a prominent role, then, in the Eleatic Challenge and Aristotle’s response.
Nevertheless, I argue that this solution does not rely upon the claim that
each persisting subject has a diachronic criterion of identity. Indeed, on my
reading, Aristotle’s solution is available to him even if he were to claim that
the persistence of each subject is primitive.
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CHAPTER 2
ON OPPOSITES: PHYSICS I.5
2.1 Introduction
In Phys. I.5, Aristotle begins the positive stage of his inquiry into the princi-
ples of nature. In this first stage of his inquiry, he does not speak of persis-
tence nor do his arguments rely on any considerations of persistence. How-
ever, as I claimed in Ch.1, there are certain background assumptions about
change operative in Aristotle’s search for the principles of nature, assump-
tions about how the product of every change comes about by some actor act-
ing upon and changing some patient. This chapter has two goals. The first
is to argue that these assumptions are operative in the arguments of Phys.
I.5. The second is to offer some initial clarification and explanation of them.
In Ch.3, I will elaborate them further and there show how they play a role
in Aristotle’s understanding of persistence in Phys. I.
Phys. I.5 is concerned with showing that the principles of nature are op-
posites.1 Opposites are a pair of beings such that an appropriate subject
must possess one of them (or an intermediate), but can never possess both
together. For instance, the hot and the cold are opposed to one another and
an appropriate subject, like a loaf of bread, must possess one of them (or an
intermediate), but never both together.2 Aristotle’s goal is to show that of all
1I translate the Greek word ‘ἐναντία’ with ‘opposites’. We can also translate it with ‘con-
traries’. Aristotle speaks of opposites in four different ways: “Things are said to be opposed
to each other in four ways, either as relatives, or as contraries, or as privation and posses-
sion, or as affirmation and negation” (Cat. 11b17–19). Λέγεται δὲ ἕτερον ἑτέρῳ ἀντικεῖσθαι
τετραχῶς, ἢ ὡς τὰ piρός τι, ἢ ὡς τὰ ἐναντία, ἢ ὡς στέρησις καὶ ἕξις, ἢ ὡς κατάφασις καὶ ἀpiόφα-
σις. Ackrill {2, p. 109–111} explains how these four differ from one another. In Phys. I.5,
Aristotle speaks only of one opposition, the contraries; though I continue to use ‘opposite’
throughout.
2Note that opposites are not merely contradictories. The opposite of the hot is not the
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the pairs of opposites, some of these pairs are the principles of nature.
Call the claim that the principles of nature are opposites PO. Most in-
terpret PO as a claim about the structure of change. For instance, William
Charlton argues that Aristotle tries to establish “the purely logical doctrine
that change is within definite ranges”.3 By this, he means that for any
change C, there is some pair of opposites F and F-, such that C occurs be-
tween F and F-. What ‘occurs between’ means is best illustrated. Tempera-
ture is a spectrum with the cold at one extreme, the hot at another extreme,
and various intermediate temperatures, like luke warm, falling in between
these two extremes. Suppose that a dolphin swims into some warm water
and so becomes warmer. According to Charlton, PO says that the dolphin
must have changed from being colder to being warmer, i.e. she changes from
one point on the temperature spectrum to another point on that spectrum.
My focus is how Aristotle argues for PO. What are the premises and
structure of this argument? This has been a source of disagreement. When
Charlton calls PO a logical doctrine, he means that Aristotle’s support for
PO lies in how we think and speak about change. In contrast, Sean Kelsey
claims that Aristotle accepts PO because Aristotle holds what Kelsey calls
a destructive view of change.4 On this view, Aristotle has a particular view
of the causal processes involved in every change: each change comes about
when an opposite drives out or destroys its opposite. For instance, suppose
that Arion changes from being cold to being warm. Kelsey sees Aristotle
claiming that this change comes about when heat destroys or drives out
the coldness that was in Arion. So, on Kelsey’s reading, these claims about
mere absence of heat. If the opposite of the hot were the mere absence of heat, then the
number 4 would possess the opposite of heat.
3Charlton {23, p. 66}.
4Kelsey {54, p. 188–190}. See also Ebrey {31}.
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causality feature as premises in Aristotle’s argument for PO. Terence Irwin
too stresses that causal considerations lie behind Aristotle’s argument for
PO:
Aristotle assumes that every becoming is the causal influence of
one thing on another, and that every case of causation involves
something non-random; if x causes y, there is some general law
relating types of which x and y are token.5
In this chapter, I too argue that Aristotle argues for PO from a background
assumption of the causal processes involved in any change, and I offer some
initial characterization of this assumption. Noting this is not itself an inno-
vation. However, the way I see this assumption playing a role in Aristotle’s
understanding of persistence in Phys. I is novel. So my goal here is to clearly
explain this background assumption and to argue in agreement with others
that it is operative in Phys. I.5.
An outline of what’s to come: in Sections 2.2–2.5, I discuss Aristotle’s
claims that his predecessors accept PO. This claim fits poorly with the other
ways Aristotle characterizes his predecessors’ views about the principles in
Phys. I. However, I argue that we can reconcile these different characteriza-
tions by bringing to focus the background causal considerations in Aristotle’s
discussion. In sections 2.5–2.9, I show just how these causal considerations
play a role in Aristotle’s own argument for PO. In 2.10, I step back form
Phys. I.5 and clarify these causal claims further.
2.2 Aristotle’s Predecessors
At the beginning of Phys. I.5, Aristotle claims:
5Irwin {48, p. 70}.
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(a) All thinkers agree in making the opposites principles, (b) both
those who describe the All as one and unmoved, for even Par-
menides treats hot and cold as principles under the names fire
and earth, (c) and those too who use the rare and the dense. (d)
The same is true of Democritus also, which his plenum and the
void, both of which exists, he says, the one as being, the other as
not-being. Again he speaks of differences in postion, shape, and
order, and these are genera of which the species are opposites,
namely, of position, above and below, before and behind; of shape,
angular and angle-less, straight and round (188a19–26).6
In (a) Aristotle says that his predecessors accept PO. In (b)–(d), he discusses
some of his predecessors and says which opposites they think are principles,
e.g. Parmenides thinks that the hot and cold are principles.7 The ‘some’ in
(c) refers to a group of natural philosophers that Aristotle discussed in Phys.
I.4. One group of these philosophers, he says, believe that rarity and density
generate everything out of one underlying body. This one underlying body
is either air (Anaximenes), fire (Heraclitus), water (Thales), or something
more condensed than fire, and less condensed than air (187a11–16).8 So in
(c) Aristotle refers back to these natural philosophers, and he adds that, for
these philosophers, the opposites density and rarity are principles.9
6Πάντες δὴ τἀναντία ἀρχὰς piοιοῦσιν οἵ τε λέγοντες ὅτι ἓν τὸ piᾶν καὶ μὴ κινούμενον (καὶ γὰρ
Παρμενίδης θερμὸν καὶ ψυχρὸν ἀρχὰς piοιεῖ, ταῦτα δὲ piροσαγορεύει piῦρ καὶ γῆν) καὶ οἱ μανὸν καὶ
piυκνόν, καὶ Δημόκριτος τὸ piλῆρες καὶ κενόν, ὧν τὸ μὲν ὡς ὂν τὸ δὲ ὡς οὐκ ὂν εἶναί φησιν· ἔτι
θέσει, σχήματι, τάξει. ταῦτα δὲ γένη ἐναντίων· θέσεως ἄνω κάτω, piρόσθεν ὄpiισθεν, σχήματος
γεγωνιωμένον ἀγώνιον, εὐθὺ piεριφερές. ὅτι μὲν οὖν τἀναντία piως piάντες piοιοῦσι τὰς ἀρχάς, δῆλον.
7For brevity, instead of saying that ‘according to Aristotle, his predecessors say such and
such’, I will say that ‘his predecessors believe such and such’. I will not pause to examine
whether Aristotle correctly understands his predecessors.
8῾Ως δ’ οἱ φυσικοὶ λέγουσι, δύο τρόpiοι εἰσίν. οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἓν piοιήσαντες τὸ [ὂν] σῶμα τὸ ὑpiοκε-
ίμενον, ἢ τῶν τριῶν τι ἢ ἄλλο ὅ ἐστι piυρὸς μὲν piυκνότερον ἀέρος δὲ λεpiτότερον, τἆλλα γεννῶσι
piυκνότητι καὶ μανότητι piολλὰ piοιοῦντες. Ross {74, p. 481–3} discusses why Aristotle excludes
earth. See also Met. 989a6–9. Ross {74, p. 482–483} for this intermediate element, and also
Ross {74, p. 487–488} for Aristotle’s discussion of Parmenides in (b).
9In Phys. I.4, Aristotle also discusses Plato, Anaximander, Empedocles, and Anaxagoras.
He says that each of these philosophers also make opposites principles: Plato makes the
great and small matter and he makes the one form (187a17–20).
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So Aristotle thinks that PO has universal support and so should be taken
seriously in our search for the principles of nature. However, there is some-
thing deeply puzzling about Aristotle’s claim that all his predecessors accept
PO, a puzzle which threatens to undermine his appeal to the universal ac-
ceptance of PO as prima facie evidence of its veracity. Earlier in the work,
Aristotle characterizes his predecessors in a different and apparently con-
flicting way from how he characterizes them in our passage above. He says:
The principles must be either one or more than one. If one, it
must be either motionless, as Parmenides and Melissus assert, or
in motion, as the physicists hold, some declaring air to be the first
principle, others water (184b15–18).10
Here Aristotle says that Parmenides believes that there is just one principle.
He also tells us that a certain natural scientist, Thales, believes that there is
only one principle, water. Yet in the passage above, we see that Aristotle also
characterizes Parmenides as believing that there are two principles, the hot
and the cold. And he also characterizes Thales as believing that rarity and
density are principles. So, according to Aristotle, Parmenides thinks that
there is just one principle and also that there are two principles. Similarly,
Thales thinks that there is both only one principle, water, and also that there
are two principles, rarity and density. These characterizations are in tension
with one another: there cannot be just one principle and also two principles.
This tension is useful for us interpreters because it forces us to think hard
about Aristotle’s use of ‘principle’ in Phys. I. There is good evidence that
Aristotle distinguishes different kinds of principles in this work. First, in
Phys. I.6, he tells us that his predecessors each believe that there are passive
and active principles (189b11–16). By this, he means that his predecessors
10 Α᾿νάγκη δ’ ἤτοι μίαν εἶναι τὴν ἀρχὴν ἢ piλείους, καὶ εἰ μίαν, ἤτοι ἀκίνητον, ὥς φησι Παρμενίδης
καὶ Μέλισσος, ἢ κινουμένην, ὥσpiερ οἱ φυσικοί, οἱ μὲν ἀέρα φάσκοντες εἶναι οἱ δ’ ὕδωρ τὴν piρώτην
ἀρχήν·
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believe that each change occurs when an actor acts upon and so changes
some patient (more below). Barring Plato, his predecessors think that some
pair of opposites are the active principles and the underlying body is the
passive principle. For instance, Thales believes that Socrates comes into
being when density acts upon some water.
Second, Aristotle says that his predecessors do not merely search for prin-
ciples, they also search for elements. This is from Phys. I.5:
Up to this point we have practically had most of the other writers
on the subject with us, as I have said already: for all of them iden-
tify their elements, what are called principles by them, with the
opposites, giving no reason indeed for the theory, but constrained
as it were by the truth itself (188b26–30).11
I will discuss this passage further below. Here note that Aristotle tells us
that his predecessors believe that the elements are opposites. Aristotle’s
mention of elements is no mere anomaly. In Phys. I.2, he tells us that he
will structure his inquiry into the principles by examining his predecessors’
different theories about how many principles there are and what they are
(184a15–22). Yet there he characterizes their inquiry into the principles of
nature as an inquiry into the primary constituents and elements of natural
beings (184b22–25). Again, in Phys. I.6, he claims that his investigation has
so far shown that there are either two or three elements (189b27–30).
So in Phys. I, Aristotle characterizes his predecessors as accepting each
of the following claims about opposites:
1. The principles of nature are opposites.
2. The active principles are opposites.
3. The elements are opposites.
11μέχρι μὲν οὖν ἐpiὶ τοσοῦτον σχεδὸν συνηκολουθήκασι καὶ τῶν ἄλλων οἱ piλεῖστοι, καθάpiερ
εἴpiομεν piρότερον· piάντες γὰρ τὰ στοιχεῖα καὶ τὰς ὑpi’ αὐτῶν καλουμένας ἀρχάς, καίpiερ ἄνευ λόγου
τιθέντες, ὅμως τἀναντία λέγουσιν, ὥσpiερ ὑpi’ αὐτῆς τῆς ἀληθείας ἀναγκασθέντες.
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(1)–(3) are different claims. Seeing this will ultimately allow us to solve the
apparent tension in Aristotle’s various characterizations of his predecessors.
But this will require a few different steps. First, it requires that we step
back and clarify the notions of ‘principle’, ‘element’, and a related notion of
‘cause’.12
2.3 Principles, Causes, and Elements
Element (στοιχεῖον) is the easiest to explain. For Aristotle, an element of a
thing is a basic constituent of that thing. It is indivisible into things that
are the same form of whatever it is an element of. So, for instance, sylla-
bles are the elements of speech. Parts of speech, like words, are divisible
into syllables, but syllables are themselves indivisible into further parts of
speech. Similarly, the elements of a body are indivisible into further bodies
(Met. 1014a26–31).
Aristotle offers little formal characterization of the relation ‘being an el-
ement of ’. However, he seems to use it in cases where we would intuitively
say that one thing is ultimately built out of certain things that are present
in it, e.g. cakes are ultimately built out of the most basic bits of matter.
Aristotle does recognize that his predecessors have radically different views
about what things are ultimately built out of. For instance, he says that
some believe that universal things like genera and differentia are elements
of those things they are genera of, e.g. one might claim that the genus ani-
mal and differentia rational are elements of Socrates (Met. 1014b9–15). In
other words, some might think that the genus animal and differentia ratio-
nal are present in and somehow make up an individual man.
12See Mann {66} for a full discussion.
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Cause (αἴτια) is harder to explain, but a few simplified remarks will suffice
here.13 In Phys. II.3, Aristotle claims that there are four causes, the mate-
rial, the formal, the efficient, and final cause (see also Met. V.2.):
The material cause: “that out of which”, e.g. the bronze of a statue
(194b23–26).
The formal cause: “the form”, “the account of what-it-is-to-be”, e.g. the
shape of a statue (194b26–29).
The efficient cause: “the primary source of the change or rest”. e.g. the
artisan, the art of bronze-casting the statue, the man who gives advice,
the father of the child (194b29–32).
The final cause: “the end, that for the sake of which a thing is done”, e.g.
health is the end of walking (194b32–35).
Aristotle thinks that the scientist must cite each of these causes in order to
explain why certain (but not all) natural phenomena occur. Consider why
a heart pumps blood. The heart pumps blood to all parts of the body, blood
which carries oxygen and nutrients. The final cause for why a heart pumps
blood is the sustaining and nourishing of a body, i.e. a heart pumps blood in
order to sustain and nourish the body.
The efficient cause is the source of this movement, of this pumping.
Hearts pump blood through a process of contraction and expansion, which
in turn are caused by breathing. So the efficient cause for a heart pumping
blood just is the organism who owns this heart.14
13Interpreters debate whether to translate ‘αἴτια’ as ‘cause’, or ‘explanation’, or ‘explana-
tory factor’. See Freeland {34}, Frede {33}, Hocutt {45}, Moravcsik {70}.
14Or perhaps the organism breathing. See Fine {32} for discussion of the efficient cause.
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The formal cause for the heart pumping blood will be the essence of
the heart, i.e.a heart pumps blood because it is precisely that organ which
pumps blood in order to sustain and nourish the body.
Finally, the material cause is the parts which constitute the heart. For
it is these various chambers and blood vessels which contract and expand
during the pumping of blood, i.e. the heart pumps blood because it is made
up of those chambers and vessels which contract and expand when blood is
pumped.
Principle is difficult. In non-technical uses ‘ἀρχή’ can be translated as
‘starting-point’, ‘origin’, ‘beginning’. Fortunately, we need not try to map
Aristotle’s various uses of ‘principle’. For our purposes, we need only note
three things: first, Aristotle thinks that every cause is a principle and vice
versa. For instance, he says in Met. D that “causes can be spoken of in an
equal number of ways [as principle]; for all causes are principles” (1013a16–
17).15 Second, every element is a principle and cause of whatever it is an
element of. The elements are the material cause and, possibly also, the for-
mal cause, i.e. matter is an element of whatever it is matter of, and a form
too could be an element of what it is a form of.16 Third, not every cause is an
element of whatever it is a cause of. For instance, the baker is the efficient
cause of the cake. However, since the baker is not present in the cake, the
baker is not an element of that cake (See Met. 1070b22–26).
15ἰσαχῶς δὲ καὶ τὰ αἴτια λέγεται· piάντα γὰρ τὰ αἴτια ἀρχαί.
16In Met. VII.17, Aristotle argues that form is not an element. Mann {66} claims that
Aristotle diverges from his predecessors here, e.g. while they think that, say, the shape of a
statue is an element of that statue, Aristotle argues that the shape is present in the statue
but is not an element of it. There is no evidence that Aristotle draws such a fine distinction
in Phys. I.
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These few remarks allow us to characterize more clearly our difficulty
in interpreting Aristotle’s reports of his predecessors. Does Aristotle take
his predecessors to claim that opposites are efficient causes, or elements, or
somehow both? Since he claims that opposites are active principles, this sug-
gests that the relevant opposites are efficient causes. But since he character-
izes his predecessors as searching for elements, this suggests that opposites
are material (or formal) causes. What we need is some bridge between ac-
tive causes and elements, some explanation for why Aristotle presents his
predecessors as moving from claims about the former to claims about the
latter.17
2.4 The Bridge
Here’s my suggestion: Aristotle thinks that his predecessors explicitly claim
only that opposites are active principles, i.e. efficient causes, but he thinks
that this entails the claim that opposites are also elements because of some
background assumptions about change.
First, they assume that every change has a product. When we heat up
some cocoa and milk, the product is hot chocolate. When we warm up in the
sun, the product is warm skin. These products come about by something
changing.
Second, they assume that in order for something to change it must be
changed by something or other. In other words, they believe that in every
17In Met. I, Aristotle claims that his predecessors are unaware, or at least unclear, about
the distinctions that Aristotle draws between the various causes, and also between cause,
element, and principle. So we shouldn’t expect him to claim that we can precisely and
consistently formulate their various claims about opposites with his very own apparatus.
Nevertheless, we should and can expect Aristotle to clarify what he himself endorses when
he endorses PO, the claim he attributes to all his predecessors.
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change there is both something that is acted upon, a patient, and something
which acts upon that patient, an actor (More below).
Third, they assume that an actor brings about a change in a patient by
causing that patient to possess that very feature or part that the change
is directed towards, e.g., if a dolphin is becoming hot, this is because some
actor is causing the dolphin to become hot. Similarly, if Socrates is turning
pale, this is because some actor is causing him to become pale.
Fourth, Aristotle’s predecessors assume something about the nature of
that feature the actor causes the patient to possess. Namely, this feature
must be one of a pair of opposites, e.g. the heat some hot water transfers to
a dolphin is one of a pair of opposites.
Fifth, they believe that the active cause ends up as an element of the
product of the change. For instance, Thales thinks that a dolphin is made
from density acting upon water. Aristotle thinks that Thales should also
thereby accept that density is an element of that dolphin. So, according to
Aristotle, Thales must think that by density acting upon a patient, density
ends up as an element of the resulting product, of that dolphin.
Above, I outlined an apparent tension in Aristotle’s characterizations of
his predecessors, and I suggested a reconciliation to that tension: Aristo-
tle sees his predecessors as moving from claims about efficient causation
to claims about the elements of natural beings. I asked what licenses this
move, and outlined the assumptions I think lie behind it. How do these
assumptions help?
Consider how some natural philosophers think that density and rarity
make natural beings out of one underlying body, air, water, or fire (187a11–
16). This claim could mislead us. We may think that it says only that density
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acts upon water to make a dolphin, and so we may also think that density is
in no way an element of that dolphin. Similarly, when a baker makes some
bread out of some dough, the baker constitutes no part of the the resulting
bread. So we may think that if density is the active cause of this change,
then it could not also be an element of the product of this change. However,
Aristotle’s predecessor, Thales, assumes that the resulting product, a dol-
phin, is a product of both the water and density, of both the patient and the
actor.
I do not claim that Aristotle’s predecessors were aware that they were
treating opposites as elements. But I claim that Aristotle thinks that, given
their own commitments, they were treating opposites as elements. Consider
again this passage:
Up to this point we have practically had most of the other writers
on the subject with us, as I have said already: for all of them iden-
tify their elements, what are called principles by them, with the
opposites, giving no reason indeed for the theory, but constrained
as it were by the truth itself (188b26–30).18
Aristotle says that his predecessors suppose that the elements are opposites,
but do so without argument. Perhaps Aristotle means that they were aware
of this supposition, but that they did not argue for it. He may also mean that
they were unaware of this supposition. This is not unlikely. We regularly
do not understand exactly how we make something. For instance, suppose
that I am making a chocolate cake. I might report that the ingredients are
flour, eggs, and chocolate, and I might also report that in order to mix these
ingredients together I had to add water to them. An expert baker watching
me bake will understand that water is an ingredient of my cake. I may not
18μέχρι μὲν οὖν ἐpiὶ τοσοῦτον σχεδὸν συνηκολουθήκασι καὶ τῶν ἄλλων οἱ piλεῖστοι, καθάpiερ
εἴpiομεν piρότερον· piάντες γὰρ τὰ στοιχεῖα καὶ τὰς ὑpi’ αὐτῶν καλουμένας ἀρχάς, καίpiερ ἄνευ λόγου
τιθέντες, ὅμως τἀναντία λέγουσιν, ὥσpiερ ὑpi’ αὐτῆς τῆς ἀληθείας ἀναγκασθέντες.
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have realized that I was using water as an ingredient. Nevertheless, that’s
what I was doing.
Similarly, we can reconcile the tension in Aristotle’s various character-
izations of his predecessors’ views of the principles if we take Aristotle as
offering a diagnosis: his predecessors were unaware that they were treat-
ing opposites as elements, e.g. Thales explicitly claims that water is the
only element, but since he believes that density and rarity are active causes,
he should also, given certain background assumptions, say that rarity and
density are also elements.
Admittedly, I have not shown that mine is the only way of reconciling this
tension. But it does, at least, explain why Aristotle is both keen to empha-
size that his predecessors (except for Plato) think of the opposites as active
principles and why he says that his predecessors also think of these oppo-
sites as elements. Aristotle must be focusing on some relationship between
the causal processes involved in each change and the elements of the product
of each change.
2.5 Changes Occur Between Opposites
After telling us that his predecessors accept PO, Aristotle turns to offer an
independent argument for PO. This argument has three steps. First, Aristo-
tle speaks about causation. Second, he applies what he says about causation
generally to change. Third, he defends this application by discussing some
putative counter-examples. I will discuss each stage of Aristotle’s argument
in turn. Before I do so, it will be useful to sketch Aristotle’s strategy as I
understand it.
Most interpreters recognize that Aristotle believes that all change in-
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volves an actor acting upon some patient.19 Some of these interpreters, like
Sarah Waterlow and David Ebrey, observe that, for Aristotle, actors are lim-
ited in what changes they can bring about in some patient. Hot water can
warm up a dolphin, but hot water cannot teach music to a small child. Sim-
ilarly, they think that patients are limited in the various ways they can be
acted upon. A dolphin can be warmed up by some hot water, but a dol-
phin cannot be taught music by a music teacher. According to Waterlow and
Ebrey, Aristotle thinks that patients have various features which explain
why they can be acted upon and changed in certain ways and not others.
In Phys. I.5, Aristotle argues that these various features must be opposed
to those features an actor causes the patient to possess. He then infers PO
from this claim. Let me illustrate this with an example.
Suppose that you wish to warm up some chocolate brownies. What must
brownies be like if they are to be acted upon in this way? Suppose that we
discover that it is only cold things that can be acted upon by warm things,
that only cold things admit of being acted upon in this way. We may conclude
that it is being cold that explains why the brownie can be acted upon by a
hot actor. This is not primarily a point about what changes occur between,
a point about how a brownie must first be cold before it becomes hot. This is
primarily a point about what an object must be like if it is to be acted upon
by something in a certain way, i.e. about what a brownie must be like if it
is to be acted upon and warmed up by some hot actor. However, this point
is related to a claim about the structure of change. For if a patient must be
cold in order to be heated up by a hot actor, then that patient will become
hot from being previously cold.
The difference between these two claims is perhaps difficult to see. How-
19Waterlow {84, c. 1} and Ebrey {31}. See also Kelsey {54}.
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ever, they do have different structures:
1. Being cold (and only being cold) explains why a cold brownie can be
heated up by a hot actor.
2. A brownie becomes hot from previously being cold.
Claim 1 is a claim about a patient and an actor. It states an explanation
for why a patient can be changed by some actor. Claim 2 makes no mention
of actors at all. Some theorist may accept claim 2 without accepting 1, e.g.
they might think that a brownie can change its temperature without being
caused to change its temperature. However, claim 1 entails claim 2. If only
cold things can be warmed up by hot things, then anything which is warmed
up will become hot from previously being cold. I think this is exactly how
Aristotle argues for PO. He thinks that 1 type claims are fundamental and
explanatory of 2 type claims. I turn now to defend this sketch by examining
the three different stages of the argument.
2.6 The First Stage: Actors and Patients
In the first stage of his argument, Aristotle claims various things about the
actors and patients involved in any change:
(a) We must first assume that nothing is naturally such as to do
or suffer any chance thing by the agency of any chance thing, (b)
nor does anything come from just anything, unless you consider
coincidents (188a31–188a34).20
In (a), Aristotle makes two claims: (i) no actor is such as to do a chance thing,
and (ii) no patient is such as to suffer some chance thing. In (b), Aristotle
20ληpiτέον δὴ piρῶτον ὅτι piάντων τῶν ὄντων οὐθὲν οὔτε piοιεῖν piέφυκεν οὔτε piάσχειν τὸ τυχὸν
ὑpiὸ τοῦ τυχόντος, οὐδὲ γίγνεται ὁτιοῦν ἐξ ὁτουοῦν, ἂν μή τις λαμβάνῃ κατὰ συμβεβηκός·
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connects (i) and (ii) to a claim about the structure of change, a claim which
we will see is PO. So Aristotle thinks that (i) and (ii) are connected to PO, but
he does not state the connection. It is worth dwelling on this omission. Aris-
totle motivates his argument for PO by drawing some intimate connection
between the termini of change and the nature of actors and patients. Indeed
he argues from claims about the latter to some claim about the former.
Some readings of Aristotle’s argument for PO ignore this argumentative
strategy. As I discussed in the introduction, William Charlton thinks that,
for Aristotle, PO is a logical doctrine. By this, Charlton means that Aristotle
argues for PO from claims about how we think and speak about change. This
interpretation ignores how Aristotle supports PO by considering the nature
of actors and patients, which is hardly equivalent to a claim about how we
think and speak about change. Instead of ignoring the fact that Aristotle
draws a connection, we need to identify and correctly characterize it. To
this, I now turn.
In both (i) and (ii), Aristotle mentions a chance thing. By ‘chance thing’,
Aristotle means something which does not occur always or for the most part
(196b10–14).21 For instance, when I walk to the store, I do not always meet
a student who wants to discuss their latest paper. So when I did walk to the
store and met a student who wanted to discuss a paper, this was a chance
occurrence. In contrast, when I teach, there are students who are learning.
This is not a chance occurrence. It happens always or for the most part that
when a teacher teaches, there are students who are learning.
There is much to be said about how Aristotle understands chance occur-
rences, but while a detailed treatment is not needed here, it is important
21Πρῶτον μὲν οὖν, ἐpiειδὴ ὁρῶμεν τὰ μὲν ἀεὶ ὡσαύτως γιγνόμενα τὰ δὲ ὡς ἐpiὶ τὸ piολύ, φανερὸν
ὅτι οὐδετέρου τούτων αἰτία ἡ τύχη λέγεται οὐδὲ τὸ ἀpiὸ τύχης, οὔτε τοῦ ἐξ ἀνάγκης καὶ αἰεὶ οὔτε
τοῦ ὡς ἐpiὶ τὸ piολύ.
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to note the following: the difference between a chance and a non-chance oc-
currence is not merely a statistical one.22 For we may think that it just so
happens that when I walk to the store, I rarely meet students who wish
to discuss their papers. And so we may think that if I did happen to meet
students always or for the most part when I walk to the store, then this
would be a non-chance occurrence. However, Aristotle would still judge the
latter event a chance occurrence. For him, the difference between a chance
occurrence and a non-chance occurrence is not merely a statistical one. He
also thinks that there is some relation between the co-occurring events that
explain their correlation. So, for instance, we can explain why it happens
always or for the most part that there are students who learn from me when
I teach. By its nature, teaching is a relational activity, an activity that re-
quires both a teacher and a student. This explains why it so happens that
when a teacher performs this activity there are students who are learning.
In contrast, even if I met students every time I walked to the store, nothing
about the nature of walking to the store explains this correlation. Hence
the correlation is still a chance occurrence for Aristotle. It is important to
understand this when interpreting (i) and (ii).
In (i), Aristotle claims that actors are not such as to do chance things. By
this, Aristotle does not mean that an actor never does a chance thing. For
instance, doctors do sometimes build houses. But this is only a chance oc-
currence: doctors do not always or for the most part build houses. Aristotle’s
point is that an actor is not such as to do a chance thing. This ‘suchness’
refers to a feature of the actor which explains why actors of that type al-
ways or for the most part perform certain types of actions. Sarah Waterlow
explains this point nicely:
22For discussion, see Meyer {69}.
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By ’any chance thing’ he [Aristotle] means a thing such that its
role in a given situation might just as well have been filled by
anything else. This is precisely what would be true of everything
if nothing had any intrinsic character determining the changes it
undergoes or produces. A given agent or patient can of course be
described in terms denoting properties that are irrelevant (‘acci-
dental’), but there would not be an agent and patient acting and
being acted upon unless they were also truly describable in terms
of characteristics in which the causal relationship is grounded.23
Here is an example: One person, say Galen, can have many skills, he can be
both a doctor and a house-builder. But only one of these skill sets explains
why Galen can build houses, being a house builder. There is no mere sta-
tistical correlation between being a house-builder and having the ability to
build houses: someone is a house-builder because they have the ability to
build houses.
Similarly, in (ii), Aristotle says that patients are not such as to suffer a
chance thing. By this, Aristotle does not mean that a patient never suffers
a chance thing. For instance, doctors do get sick and receive treatment from
other doctors. When a doctor is treated by a colleague, the doctor is treated
as a medical patient. But a doctor being treated as a medical patient is a
chance event: doctors are not always or for the most part treated as medical
patients, i.e. not every medical patient is also a doctor.
What Aristotle does mean is that the patient is not such as to suffer a
chance thing. This means that, say, medical patients possess some features
which explain why they always or for the most part can be healed by a medi-
cal doctor. This feature is not being a medical doctor: while Galen is himself
a medical doctor, it is not this which explains why he can be treated by his
peers. Rather, Galen can be treated because he is, for instance, a sick med-
ical patient. There is no mere statistical correlation between being a sick
23Waterlow {84, p. 6–7} See also Ebrey {31}.
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medical patient and being able to be treated by doctors. One is defined in
terms of the other.
2.7 The Second Stage: Applied to Change
In the second stage of the argument, Aristotle applies these general claims
about causation to change: a changing being is not such as to change in
chance ways.
(a) We must first assume that nothing is naturally such as to do
or suffer any chance thing by the agency of any chance thing, (b)
nor does anything come from just anything, unless you consider
coincidents. (c) For how could the pale come from the musical,
unless the musical were a coincident of the not pale or the dark?
(d) Rather, the pale comes from the not pale, and not from any not
pale, but from the dark or something in between. And the musical
comes from the not-musical, and not from any not-musical, but
from the unmusical, or from something in between (if there is
something in between). (e) Nor, on the other hard, does anything
perish into the first chance thing, for example, (f) the pale does
not perish into the musical, unless it does so coincidentally, for
the pale perishes into the not pale, but not into what happens not
to be pale but into the dark or something in between (188a31–
188b6).24
In (b), Aristotle applies the claim about causation in (a) to change, and in
(c)–(f) he defends this application by discussing some example changes. This
application and its defense raise two questions: how exactly are the causal
claims related to a claim about change, and just how exactly do these exam-
ples support the application?
24ληpiτέον δὴ piρῶτον ὅτι piάντων τῶν ὄντων οὐθὲν οὔτε piοιεῖν piέφυκεν οὔτε piάσχειν τὸ τυχὸν
ὑpiὸ τοῦ τυχόντος, οὐδὲ γίγνεται ὁτιοῦν ἐξ ὁτουοῦν, ἂν μή τις λαμβάνῃ κατὰ συμβεβηκός· piῶς γὰρ
ἂν γένοιτο λευκὸν ἐκ μουσικοῦ, piλὴν εἰ μὴ συμβεβηκὸς εἴη τῷ μὴ λευκῷ ἢ τῷ μέλανι τὸ μουσικόν·
ἀλλὰ λευκὸν μὲν γίγνεται ἐξ οὐ λευκοῦ, καὶ τούτου οὐκ ἐκ piαντὸς ἀλλ’ ἐκ μέλανος ἢ τῶν μεταξύ,
καὶ μουσικὸν οὐκ ἐκ μουσικοῦ, piλὴν οὐκ ἐκ piαντὸς ἀλλ’ ἐξ ἀμούσου ἢ εἴ τι αὐτῶν ἐστι μεταξύ.
οὐδὲ δὴ φθείρεται εἰς τὸ τυχὸν piρῶτον, οἷον τὸ λευκὸν οὐκ εἰς τὸ μουσικόν, piλὴν εἰ μή piοτε κατὰ
συμβεβηκός, ἀλλ’ εἰς τὸ μὴ λευκόν, καὶ οὐκ εἰς τὸ τυχὸν ἀλλ’ εἰς τὸ μέλαν ἢ τὸ μεταξύ.
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2.7.1 From actors and patients to PO
The first question may seem particularly puzzling. Suppose a philosopher
believes that all changes are uncaused, that an object becomes warm without
there being any cause of its becoming warm. Now suppose Aristotle wishes
to convince this philosopher that this object must have been previously cold
before becoming warm. Aristotle could not convince his interlocutor by any
general appeal to causation. However, this is clearly Aristotle’s strategy. He
moves from some general claim about causation to a general claim about
what changes occur between. The question is what relation he sees between
these claims.
We can begin answering this question by considering what Aristotle
means by a chance change. Here is an example: suppose that when a doctor
treats a group of patients, different patients change in many unpredictable
and different ways. One patient becomes musical. Another patient becomes
an architect. Another grows tall. Another becomes hungry. All of these
changes would be instances of a medical patient changing in a chance way.
For it does not happen always or for the most part that a medical patient
becomes an architect, or becomes musical, or becomes hungry, etc. In con-
trast, medical patients always or for the most part become healthy. So when
a medical patient regains her health, this is a non-chance change.
Of course, Aristotle does believe that changing beings can change in
chance ways. For instance, a pale student can learn music. But Aristotle’s
claim is that changing beings are not such as to change in non-chance ways.
By this, he means that there is an explanation as to why certain types of
changing beings can change in certain ways. For instance, there is no mere
correlation between being a musical student and being able to become a mu-
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sician: this correlation is explained by the fact that, by definition, music
students can learn music.
Our answer to our first question, then, is that the claim that changing
beings are not such as to change in chance ways is entailed by the claim that
patients are not such as to be acted upon in chance ways. For instance, a
brownie has various features which explain why it can be acted upon and
affected in non-chance ways. But these various features also explain why it
can change in non-chance ways: the explanation for why a brownie can be
changed in non-chance ways by some actor also explains why that brownie
can change in non-chance ways.25
This is not yet an argument for PO. Aristotle needs to argue from the
claim that changing beings are not such as to change in non-chance ways to
the claim that change always occurs between opposites. According to Gail
Fine and Terence Irwin, his argument turns on a particular view of the prop-
erties which ground the ability of a being to change:
If something that was pale and nonmusical becomes musical, it
does not do so because it was previously pale, or because it was
nonmusical in some other way; in order to become musical, it
must have had the right sort of contrary (or intermediate) prop-
erty that made it capable of the relevant change (in this case it
must have been unmusical).26
Fine and Irwin agree that PO is not some mere logical doctrine. They think
that Aristotle is interested in how a being can come to possess a certain
opposite, how a dolphin can become warm, how Arion can become a musi-
cian. They think that, for Aristotle, the ability of a being to become F is
25Irwin {48, p. 70} explains this as follows: “Aristotle assumes that every becoming is
the causal influence of one thing on another, and that every case of causation involves
something non-random; if x causes y, there is some general law relating types of which x
and y are token.”
26Irwin and Fine {49, p. 85}
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explained by the fact that this being initially possesses the opposite of F
(or some intermediate), being cold explains why a dolphin can be warmed
up, being unmusical explains why Arion can learn music.27 This, of course,
entails PO. I think this reading is on the right track. However, Fine and
Irwin think that the relevant abilities are abilities to become, e.g. hot. This
description of the ability makes no reference of actors or patients, and so
leaves unexplained why Aristotle begins his argument for PO by claiming
that his first assumption is one about actors and patients.
We can modify Fine’s and Irwin’s reading to explain how this assumption
figures in the argument for PO. Aristotle’s focus is not merely on the ability
to become F, but on the ability to be made into an F. For instance, his focus
is not merely on the ability to become warm, but on the ability to be warmed
up. His focus is not merely on the ability to become musical, but on the
ability to be taught music.
On this modified reading, Aristotle makes an assumption about the ex-
planation not merely for why beings can change in various ways, but why
patients can be acted upon in various ways. Namely, Aristotle is assuming
that it is possessing the opposite of F which explains why a patient can be
turned into an F by some actor.
Consider a dolphin. A dolphin can be warmed up by some warm water,
but the number 4 cannot be acted upon in this way. Why can a dolphin be
heated up while the number 4 cannot? The suggestion that I’ve developed
here is that, according to Aristotle, it’s being cold that explains why the
27Irwin once held a different view. He says, “Aristotle might insist that only those un-
musical things that are also capable of becoming musical are suitable termini of a change
resulting in something’s being musical; the demand for contraries and intermediates will
then be simply a symptom of the demand for reference to the appropriate potentialities. But
though potentiality and actuality are prominent in later books of the Physics (cf 191b27,
193a31-b8), he omits them here. He simply appeals to common sense, citing ordinary ways
of speaking about contraries and intermediates.” Irwin {48, p. 510, n. 64}.
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dolphin can be heated up and turned warm. This entails that the dolphin
will become warm from being previously cold. And so, in general, the claim
that the opposite of F grounds the ability of a being to become F entails PO.
2.7.2 Defense of application
Of course, we may doubt that it is possessing the opposite of F that explains
why a being can be appropriately acted upon and become F. Aristotle him-
self will raise worries for this claim in Phys. I.6 and ultimately modify it
(see Ch.3). But he does offer some small defense in our target passage: he
argues that some other candidates fail to play this explanatory role, namely,
contradictories fail to play this explanatory role.
Contradictories are such that a being must possess one of them, but never
both together. However, unlike opposites, this claim is not restricted to cer-
tain kinds of beings. For instance, the hot and the not-hot are contradic-
tories. Each being, it seems, must be either hot or not-hot. However, the
opposite of the hot is the cold, and it is not the case that each being must be
hot or cold. For instance, we might say that the number 4 is not hot, but we
would not say that it is cold.
Aristotle is right to consider contradictories here. After all, it always
happens that the pale comes from the not-pale, e.g. only not-pale things can
be acted upon and turned pale. There are many examples of these kind of
occurrences, e.g. coincidental changes are always also examples of change
between contradictories. Aristotle defines ‘coincidental’ as follows: ‘A thing
is said to be coincidental if it may, but equally may not, be an attribute of
something, or if, in order to define what it is, you have to mention what it
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is an attribute of ’ (186b18–20).28 For instance, unmusical men become pale,
hot things become straight. When the musical becomes pale, since the mu-
sical is not-pale, the not-pale becomes pale. Similarly, when the hot becomes
straight, since the hot is not-straight, the not-straight becomes straight. So
every coincidental change is a change that occurs between contradictories,
e.g. the stick changes from being not-straight to being straight.
Nevertheless, Aristotle does not think that contradictories can fully ex-
plain why changing beings can change in non-chance ways. For instance,
being not-pale fails to explain why not-pale things can become pale. To see
this, consider the following: the not-pale is either nothing at all or the not-
pale is some other feature, e.g. the musical, or the round. And these cannot
explain why a being can become pale. For instance, the number 4 is not pale.
But the fact that the number 4 is not pale does not explain why the number
4 can be acted upon and made pale. For the number 4 cannot become pale
at all. So if the mere absence of pallor could explain how beings can become
pale, then everything can be appropriately acted upon and turned pale. But
this is absurd, and so Aristotle claims that change does not occur between
every pair of contradictories but only between contradictories that are also
opposites.
2.8 Third Stage: Problem Changes
Aristotle’s choice of music lessons and sun tans are good examples of the gen-
eral claim that changes occurs between opposites. But Aristotle anticipates
that his reader will doubt whether all changes occur between opposites. To
28συμβεβηκός τε γὰρ λέγεται τοῦτο, ἢ ὃ ἐνδέχεται ὑpiάρχειν καὶ μὴ ὑpiάρχειν, ἢ οὗ ἐν τῷ λόγῳ
ὑpiάρχει τὸ ᾧ συμβέβηκεν.
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address this concern, he turns to discuss some hard cases:
The same holds of all other cases: even things which are not sim-
ple but complex follow the same principle, but the opposite state
has not received a name, so we fail to notice the fact. For it is nec-
essary that the ordered should always come from the disordered,
and the disordered from the ordered, and the ordered should pass
away into the disordered, and not just any chance disorder, but
the disorder opposed to this order (188b8–15).29
In this passage, Aristotle says every change occurs between opposites even
though we are unable to name the opposites that certain changes occur be-
tween. This is a strong claim that requires a good argument. Aristotle is
imagining his reader pointing to certain changes and claiming that there is
no linguistic or observable evidence that these changes occur between oppo-
sites. Aristotle responds by saying that there are strong a-priori reasons for
accepting that all changes occur between opposites and so that, despite the
lack of linguistic or observational evidence, these problematic changes do in
fact occur between opposites.
Let us suppose that when we assemble a jigsaw puzzles we order all the
pieces together: once put together, the jigsaw pieces stand in some order.
Before being put together, the jigsaw pieces lay haphazardly in the puzzle
box. Aristotle claims that the jigsaw pieces must have been in some initial
disorder and that this disorder is the opposite to the way we ordered them
(or some intermediate between the disorder and order). The difficulty is why
anyone should accept that this disorder is really opposed to the attained
order.
29ὁμοίως δὲ τοῦτο καὶ ἐpiὶ τῶν ἄλλων, ἐpiεὶ καὶ τὰ μὴ ἁpiλᾶ τῶν ὄντων ἀλλὰ σύνθετα κατὰ τὸν
αὐτὸν ἔχει λόγον· ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ μὴ τὰς ἀντικειμένας διαθέσεις ὠνομάσθαι λανθάνει τοῦτο συμβαῖνον.
ἀνάγκη γὰρ piᾶν τὸ ἡρμοσμένον ἐξ ἀναρμόστου γίγνεσθαι καὶ τὸ ἀνάρμοστον ἐξ ἡρμοσμένου, καὶ
φθείρεσθαι τὸ ἡρμοσμένον εἰς ἀναρμοστίαν, καὶ ταύτην οὐ τὴν τυχοῦσαν ἀλλὰ τὴν ἀντικειμένην.
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Aristotle offers little argument. He just insists that disorder, shape, and
arrangement and so on have opposites. But one way of appreciating his
point is by recognizing how focused he is on the processes involved in an
actor acting upon a patient and changing it. Before being assembled, the
jigsaw pieces can be acted upon in certain ways but not others. They can be
arranged and ordered, but they cannot be made to run. Aristotle assumes
that there is some feature that the jigsaw pieces share which explain why
they can be arranged and ordered. We can agree with him that this fea-
ture has no name. We can also agree that this nameless feature cannot be
the mere absence of the relevant order (for not everything which lacks this
order can be appropriately ordered). We may not readily agree with Aris-
totle that this nameless feature must be the opposite of the relevant order.
Nevertheless, there is nothing special about this hesitancy. Aristotle offers
no argument that it must be the opposite of F which explains why x can
become F. This applies to both putting together jigsaw puzzles as well as
music lessons. While we might agree with Aristotle that the contradictory
of F cannot explain why a being can acted be upon and become F, we might
still doubt that it is the opposite of F that plays this role. Aristotle himself
will raise worries for this view in Phys. I.6. (See Ch. 3).
2.9 A Problem and a Solution
Here I address one problem for my interpretation that will help clarify it. On
my reading, Aristotle believes opposites ground the ability of an entity to be
made into something new, e.g. a stone’s being cold explains why that stone
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can be turned into a hot stone.30 However, we may doubt that opposites
can play this role at all. For we may think that things like density, rarity,
different shapes and sizes, are very different from the various abilities that
they are supposed to ground. For instance, consider heat and the ability to
be cooled down; I shall coin the word ‘coolable’ for this ability. We may think
that the property of being hot and the property of being coolable are very
different properties altogether. And so we may doubt that being hot grounds
the ability of hot things to be cooled down. Similarly, we may doubt that it is
being compressed that explains why some compressed soil can be loosened.
However, some philosophers believe that a property like being coolable
is, in a way, part of the nature of a property like the hot. For instance,
Sydney Shoemaker argues that properties are second order causal powers
(and first order causal power are part of their nature).31 Briefly, Shoemaker
claims we must make two kinds of distinctions, a distinction between dispo-
sitional and non-dispositional predicates and a distinction between disposi-
tional and non-dispositional properties. He says of dispositional predicates:
“Sometimes it belongs to the meaning, or sense, of a predicate that if it is
true of a thing then under certain circumstances the thing will undergo cer-
tain changes or will produce certain changes in other things.”32 For example,
‘flexible’ and ‘soluble’ are dispositional predicates. It is part of the meaning
of these predicates that, if they are true of a thing, then under certain cir-
cumstances that thing will undergo certain changes, e.g. salt will dissolve
when added to water. On the other hand, other predicates like ‘square’, ‘cop-
per’ are non-dispositional. Shoemaker claims that “[there are causal powers
30I take grounding as a relation that holds between properties and a thing rather than a
relation between facts about these properties and things. See Schaffer {75}.
31Shoemaker {80}.
32Shoemaker {80, p. 255}.
60
2.9. A PROBLEM AND A SOLUTION
associated with being made of copper – for example, being an electrical con-
ductor. But presumably this association is not incorporated into the mean-
ing of the term ‘copper’.’33 So dispositional predicates ascribe powers while
non-dispositional predicates do not seems to ascribe powers.
Nevertheless, Shoemaker argues that this difference between disposi-
tional and non-dispositional predicates does not track a difference between
dispositional and non-dispositional properties. For he thinks that what
makes apparently non-dispositional properties like copper the properties
that they are is the causal powers that they contribute to those things which
possess them. He says that “while properties are typically not powers of the
sort ascribed by dispositional predicates, they are related to such powers in
much the way that such powers are related to the causal effects which they
are powers to produce.”34 So Shoemaker thinks that a property like copper
contributes causal powers to whatever is copper, e.g. whatever is copper has
the power to conduct electricity. And he thinks that “the identity of a prop-
erty is determined by its causal potentialities, the contributions it is capable
of making to the causal powers of things that have it.”35
There is no need to focus on Shoemaker’s claim that the identity of a prop-
erty is determined by the causal powers it contributes. We may agree that
such causal powers bear a relation to the essence of a property but disagree
exactly about the relation. What I want to focus on is Shoemaker’s inter-
esting suggestion that apparently non-dispositional properties have causal
profiles. For it may appear that properties like being pale are causally inert,
but it is not obvious that they are.36
33Shoemaker {80, p. 255}.
34Shoemaker {80, p. 256}.
35Shoemaker {80, p. 256–257}.
36Beere {5, p. 61–63}, making a similar point in his interpretation of Met. IX, says “[t]he
idea is not that, over and above the ordinary determinate properties of things, we should
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Shoemaker’s distinction helps ease what may seem an obvious problem
for my interpretation of Aristotle. Aristotle moves from claims about what
actors and patients are such as to do and suffer to claims about what chang-
ing beings are such as to change. These seem very different issues. Actors
and patients clearly have causal profiles. It is essential to being a doctor
that a person has various abilities to treat medical patients. Similarly, it is
essential to being a medical patient that a person has various abilities to be
acted upon and healed by a doctor. It is these causal profiles which explain
why actors are such as not to act in chance way and patients are such as
not to suffer in chance ways. Yet we might worry that being cold, dense, or
tall are radically different from the properties associated with being certain
kinds of actors and patients. For we may worry that the former properties do
not have causal profiles while the latter do. Nevertheless, Shoemaker shows
us that things like being dense and hot could have causal profiles. Whether
or not we agree with Shoemaker, Aristotle must be entertaining this claim
in Phys. I.5. For he believes that being cold explains why cold things can be
warmed up. This requires that the cold has a causal profile, part of which is
the ability to be warmed up.
2.10 A Production Model of Change
In the first part of this chapter, I reconciled Aristotle’s apparent conflicting
characterizations of his predecessors by claiming that various assumptions
lay behind these characterizations. We have seen that various causal as-
also attribute further properties, the powers, that have an extraordinary and indeterminate
character. The idea is rather that the familiar qualities of things, which we are accustomed
to regard as determinate, already contain an element of indeterminacy, to the extent that
they are the powers exercised in changes whose course depends only in part on the power
in question. The powers in things are merely some of their determinate actual properties.”
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sumptions also lie behind Aristotle’s postive argument for PO. In this con-
cluding section, I stand back from the text and offer some characterization
of these assumptions, which collectively I call a Production Model of Change
(PMC). PMC comprises the following 3 claims:
A1: For every change C, there exists some actor X and some patient Y, such
that the product of C results when X acts upon Y.
A2: If X acts upon Y, then there is some F such that X causes Y to become
an F.
A3: If X causes Y to become an F, then F is one of a pair of opposites.
Aristotle repeats A1 throughout the work. For instance, he characterizes
the phenomenon that the physicist must explain as follows: ‘We can as-
sume that some or all natural beings are being changed; this is clear from
induction (185a12–14)’.37 Aristotle does not just say that natural beings
change. He uses the passive ‘being changed’ (‘κινούμενα’). Throughout the
work he repeats this claim that whatever changes is changed by something
(e.g. 200b28–32, 241b34). What is changed is the patient. What changes the
patient is the actor.38
Aristotle offers no direct argument for A1, i.e. an argument that could
convince someone who did not already accept it. However, he does discuss
problematic cases. For instance, he applies A1 to two different groups of
changes. For some changes, the actor and patient are distinct from one an-
other altogether, e.g. some warm water acts upon and warms up a dolphin
playing in that water. In this case, the actor is external to the patient. For
other changes, the actor and patient are the same thing, e.g. when a dolphin
37ἡμῖν δ’ ὑpiοκείσθω τὰ φύσει ἢ piάντα ἢ ἔνια κινούμενα εἶναι· δῆλον δ’ ἐκ τῆς ἐpiαγωγῆς.
38See also Met. 1032a11–1032a15.
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swims, the dolphin is both the actor and the patient. Aristotle recognizes
that his reader might doubt whether A1 is satisfied when there is no exter-
nal actor, e.g. in cases of self-motion. However, he defends the application in
Phys. VIII as follows:
It is clear that it is not through some part of the whole being of
such a nature as to be capable of moving itself that the whole
moves itself: it moves itself as a whole, both being moved and
imparting motion through containing a part that imparts motion
and a part that is moved (258a22–25).39
So when a being moves itself, one part of the being is a patient, the other
part an actor. I do not want here to discuss the many questions that Aristo-
tle’s views about self-motion give rise to. Rather, I wish only to stress that
Aristotle accepts A1 and believes it has unrestricted scope.
A2 raises several questions. First, what is the relationship between the
actor and the feature which it imposes upon that patient? We saw that
Aristotle’s predecessors believe that the actor possesses and transmits this
very feature, e.g. the actor which makes some water hot is itself hot. But A2
is absurd if it requires an actor to instantiate the very features it causes a
patient to possess. For instance, it would require that a doctor must herself
be healthy in order to act upon and cause her patient to become healthy. But
many doctors are infected by the patients they try to cure, and, nevertheless,
continue to cure sick patients while they themselves are sick. Similarly, it
would require that bees which turn pollen into honey are themselves honey,
that a baker which turns dough into bread is herself bread, that a beaver
which turns wood into a dam is itself a dam, and so on.
39δῆλον δὴ ὅτι τὸ piᾶν αὐτὸ ἑαυτὸ κινεῖ οὐ τῷ αὐτοῦ τι εἶναι τοιοῦτον οἷον αὐτὸ αὑτὸ κινεῖν, ἀλλ’
ὅλον κινεῖ αὐτὸ ἑαυτό, κινούμενόν τε καὶ κινοῦν τῷ αὐτοῦ τι εἶναι τὸ κινοῦν καὶ τὸ κινούμενον. See
Gill and Lennox {39} for Aristotle’s understanding of self-motion.
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Aristotle has a nuanced view of the relationship between an actor and
the feature it causes a patient to possess. While he does not think that
a housebuilder must be a house to impose the form of a house upon some
material, he does believe that a housebuilder possesses the form of a house.
He thinks she possesses the form in her soul, and she does so just because
she possesses the knowledge of housebuilding. She then imposes this form
through the motions of her instruments on to the materials that she works
into a house.40
Aristotle also thinks that the the motions of the housebuilder’s instru-
ments possess the form of the house without themselves being a house. He
explains this by saying that movement of the instruments contains a def-
inition of the relevant product being made (GA 734b37–735a4). Similarly,
he thinks that heat can be present in a motion without the motion being
hot, e.g. heat is present in a doctor’s rubbing of a patient’s skin even though
the rubbing is not itself hot (Met. VII.9). How exactly is heat so present?
Jonathan Beere explains this point using the following example:
The relevant motions occur, and occur in just the way they occur,
because of what the object that is coming into being is. As a sword
comes into being, the smith’s hammer moves in such a way as to
create a long, narrow, flat piece of metal. The goal is reflected in
the way the hammer starts and stops, in the angle at which it
strikes the metal, how long it goes on striking a particular point,
and so forth. An onlooker, especially an expert onlooker, need not
ask a smith what he is making in order to see that it will turn out
to be a sword.41
Aristotle thinks that both actors and their actions possess the form of the
product they are creating without thereby being instances of the type of
product they are creating. There are two points to emphasize here. First,
40There is a delicate question about how Aristotle applies this locomotion. See Bodnar {8}
for discussion. For our purposes, we can set aside these complications.
41Beere {5, p. 77}. See also Bodnar {8}.
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Aristotle believes that the relevant form is present throughout the action.
Second, the relevant form’s presence explains certain facts about the actor
and action. Actors and actions are always certain kinds of actor and ac-
tions, e.g. a housebuilder and housebuilding are a different kind of actor
and action from a medical doctor and medical treatment. Aristotle seems to
characterize types of actions in terms of what they produce, and so types of
actors in terms of what they produce. Hence, the presence of the form in the
actor and action, in whatever way it is present, explains why a thing is a
certain sort of actor rather than another, and why an action is a certain kind
of action rather than another.
So Aristotle need not say that the doctor who cures her patient must be
healthy herself, nor that bees must be be honey, nor that the baker be bread,
or the beaver be a dam. Rather, each works this form into some patient.
To do this, they each need to possess this form. However, Aristotle does not
think that they always possess the form by instantiating it. This possession
is important for explaining facts about the actor and the action. When bees
turn pollen into honey, they act in certain ways to do this. The form (account)
of honey is present in bees at least in the sense that it is only by reference
to this account that we can understand bees as honey makers and some of
their actions as honey making.
A3 seems obviously false. Consider building the hull of a sail boat. Let us
agree that there is a passive contribution, namely, the timber that we use to
build the boat. And let us agree that there is an active contribution, namely,
the form of the boat that we will impose upon those materials. Why should
we accept that this form is one of a pair of opposites?
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We have seen that Aristotle does provide reason for thinking that the
form is not one of a contradictory. All I propose to do here is to show that
he accepts A3, although slightly modified. This can be seen from Phys. I.7.
There he claims that for every pair of opposites, one opposite is the form and
another opposite is the privation. Let us call the form F and the privation
F-. Aristotle claims that any change that occurs between F and F- involves F
coming to be present or ceasing to be present in some being (191a5–7). For
instance, in the opposition hot/cold, hot is the form and cold is the privation.
Aristotle thinks that every change in temperature involves heat coming to
be present in some patient, or the heat in some patient being destroyed.42
Aristotle argues for this claim by saying that there is an account of the
form, but not the privation, i.e. of F but not of F- (191a12–14). This means
that (i) there is something such to be F, and (ii) to be F- is to lack whatever
it is to be F in a particular way.43 For instance, there is an account of being
hot—perhaps to be hot is to be such as to transmit heat. But there is no
similar account of being cold. Rather, for a being to be cold is to lack heat in
particular way, i.e. to be in a state where it is not transmitting heat but is
capable of being turned into a state where it does transmit heat.
Concluding: We have seen that Aristotle argues for PO by assuming some
background views of the causal processes involved in any change. Most im-
portantly, Aristotle’s focus is how a being can be changed by some actor. In
Phys. I.6, Aristotle raises a problem for PO. Roughly, if change occurs be-
tween opposites, then it seems that there must be some third principle that
42It is unclear whether coldness is transmitted to the patient in this latter case. Aristotle
might mean that we destroy the heat in a being by transmitting coldness to that being. He
may also mean that the destruction of heat in a being does not involve the transmission of
coldness.
43I here follow how Beere {5, p. 82–89} explains this point.
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changes. For instance, if changes in the spectrum of temperature always
begin with something cool and terminate with something warmer (or vice
versa), then we should and can ask what it is that changes from being cooler
to being warmer. It is this question that Phys. I.5 leaves unanswered and is
returned to in I.6.
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CHAPTER 3
ON THE SUBJECT OF CHANGE: PHYSICS I.6
3.1 Introduction
How do you make a nice steaming mug of tea? You begin with some cold
water, you heat it up in a kettle over a stove, and you pour the water into
your mug. You let the cup brew and the result is something hot, a hot cup of
tea. Your cup of tea was made from something initially cold that was heated
up over several minutes.
In Phys. I.5, Aristotle argued that all changes occur between opposites.
This tells us that our hot tea must be made from something cold, that hot
things are made from cold things. Similarly, dense things are made from
rare things, and dry things are made from wet things. If we had stopped
our search for the principles of nature in Phys. I.5, we may think that hot
things are made from things that are only cold, that dry things are made
from things that are only wet. However, according to Aristotle, this Phys. I.5
account is incomplete.
He begins Phys. I.6 by taking up his conclusion from Phys. I.5 that the
principles of nature are opposites (see Ch.2). His main goal in Phys. I.6
is to raise a problem for this Phys. I.5 account: if the only principles were
opposites, each changing being would be one of a pair of opposites. But
Aristotle thinks that opposites cannot change. For instance, according to the
Phys. I.5 account, hot things must be made from cold things, and dry things
must be made from wet things. But Aristotle argues that coldness cannot
be heated up, and wetness cannot be turned dry. There has to be something
else, according to Aristotle, which is heated and dried, something which was
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initially but not only cold, something which was initially but not only wet.
Aristotle argues that this third thing is a principle of nature distinct from
those opposites a change occurs between, a principle which can change.
Aristotle calls this third principle the ὑpiοκείμενον. ‘ὑpiοκείμενον’ is the
present participle of the verb ‘ὑpiόκειμαι’. The basic meaning of this verb
is ‘placed under’ or ‘lie under’, but it has a range of different uses. For in-
stance, it is used in contexts of supplication, i.e., when one person submits to
the authority of the other (Grg. 510c). It is also used to describe the subject
of predication, e.g. that which lies under a predicate. In Phys. I.6, Aristo-
tle uses the phrase to describe whatever admits of being changed, i.e. some
bronze admits of being sculpted. He argues that opposites do not admit of
being changed, and so argues that there must be some principle that is not
an opposite that admits of being changed. In what follows, I translate ὑpiο-
κείμενον as ‘the subject’, though, we may also translate it as ‘substratum’. So
Aristotle argues that opposites cannot be subjects of change, that coldness
cannot be a subject of warming, that wetness cannot be a subject of drying.
Aristotle’s introduction of the subject as a third principle is crucial for
understanding what role, if any, persistence plays in his search for the prin-
ciples of nature. The arguments for its introduction are highly condensed
and Aristotle leaves unstated and unexplained several key assumptions, as-
sumptions which some believe crucially involve claims about persistence.
Different combinations of the following four claims are considered candi-
dates for the suppressed assumptions of Phys. I.6:
1. Some feature of the subject explains why that subject can undergo cer-
tain changes and not others.
2. The subject persists through that change it is subject for.
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3. There is an explanation for how a subject persists through a change.
4. There is a diachronic criterion of identity for each persisting subject.
David Ebrey argues that Aristotle’s argument assumes only 1.1 To under-
stand 1, let us recall how Aristotle spoke about actors and patients in the
last chapter. We saw that Aristotle believes that doctors and not house-
builders are those who cure sick patients. Nevertheless, the very same per-
son, Galen, can be both a doctor and a house-builder. So if we are to refer
to Galen in a way that picks him out as an appropriate actor, then we must
refer to Galen with the proper expression, e.g. ‘the house-builder’. When
we describe Galen as a house-builder, we say both that he is identical to a
house-builder and also refer to what grounds his ability to build houses, e.g.
his being a house-builder. Similarly, Ebrey sees Aristotle as searching out
those entities which are such as to be acted upon and changed by some actor,
where the suchness refers to some feature that grounds its ability to change.
He thinks that opposites neither ground this ability nor do they themselves
possess it. When we describe a dolphin as a cold thing, we do refer to an
object that has the ability to be warmed up. However, we do not also refer
to what grounds the ability of that dolphin to warm up. So we need a third
principle, a third principle that has by its nature an ability to warm up.
David Bostock thinks that Aristotle assumes 2. He argues that the
phrase ‘what underlies’—which I translate as ‘subject’—is synonymous with
‘what persists’.2 On this reading, Aristotle assumes, but does not explic-
itly state in Phys. I.6, that a necessary condition for x to be a subject of
1Ebrey {31}. For Ebrey, explaining how a subject undergoes a change is different from
explaining how it persists through a change. According to him, Aristotle remains neutral
as to whether the subject persists. And so even if the subject does not persist through a
change, Ebrey believes that, for Aristotle, there is still an explanation of how that subject
undergoes that change.
2Bostock {12, p. 7–8}.
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change C is that X can and does persist through C. Since opposites cannot
persist through a change, Aristotle concludes that there must be something
else which persists through a change. For instance, coldness cannot persist
through a warming. So, on this reading, Aristotle concludes that there must
be something distinct from both the cold and the hot, something which can
survive as it is becoming hot from being cold.
Finally, Sarah Waterlow thinks that the arguments assume 1–4. For
instance, she claims:
A given agent or patient can of course be described in terms denot-
ing properties that are irrelevant (‘accidental’), but there would
not be an agent or patient acting and being acted upon unless they
were also truly describable in terms of characteristics in which
the causal relationship is grounded.3
According to Waterlow, Aristotle believes that changing beings have intrinsic
characteristics that determine the changes which they can undergo. How-
ever, according to Waterlow, to explain what change a being can undergo
requires explaining how a being can persist through that change; to explain
how a dolphin can be heated up requires explaining how that dolphin can
persist through that heating. Waterlow believes further that claim 3 entails
claim 4. According to her, the explanation for how a subject persists is sup-
plied by a diachronic criterion of identity for that persisting subject. The
explanation for how a dolphin persists as she warms up is supplied by the
diachronic criterion of identity for dolphins.
In this chapter, I will argue against each of these interpretations by ex-
amining a key argument in Phys. I.6 for the claim that the subject is a third
principle. On the new reading I develop here, that argument assumes 1–3.
However, I will argue that 3 does not imply 4, and so the argument does
3Waterlow {84, p. 6–7}.
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not turn on 4. The issue is important. Waterlow assumes that 3 entails 4.
Thus she thinks that diachronic criteria of identity play a role in Aristotle’s
search for the principles of nature and organizes that search. But there are
different explanations for persistence, explanations that are different from
explaining what the identity through time of any being consists in:
5. There is an explanation for how a subject can survive as it is being
acted upon and as it is being changed.
My main goal in this chapter is to show that Aristotle’s argument that the
subject is a third principle assumes 5, but that this is no evidence that he is
also particularly focused on 4. This is not to say that Aristotle has no views
elsewhere about 4, or that he need not say anything about 4. But I think
5 is at the fore of Aristotle’s thinking about persistence in Phys. I and does
organize some of his search for the principles of nature.
An outline of what’s to come. In Section 3, I outline one key and cen-
tral argument for the claim that the subject is a third principle in Phys. I.6.
This argument is highly condensed, and interpreters debate the suppressed
assumptions. This provides both a litmus test and a means for illustrating
the differences between the various interpretations I just outlined. In Sec-
tions 3–5, I argue against the three interpretations I just pointed to, and in
Section 6 I develop my new interpretation.
3.2 The Argument for a Third Principle
Aristotle’s argument focuses on what can and cannot be made into a new
product. In this section, I introduce the argument and discuss three prob-
lems for interpreting it, problems that allow us to adjudicate between the
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various interpretations outlined in the introduction. The argument comes
in this short passage:
(a) Granted then, that they are a limited number, it is plausible
to assume them more than two. (b) For it is difficult to see how ei-
ther density should be of such a nature to make rarity something
or rarity is such to make density something. (c) The same is true
of any other pair of opposites; (d) for Love does not gather Strife
together and make things out of it, nor does Strife make anything
out of Love, (e) but both make a third thing something. (f) Some
indeed assume more than one such thing from which they con-
struct the nature of beings (189a21–27).4
In (a) Aristotle introduces an argument for the claim that there cannot be
only two principles. By ‘two principles’, Aristotle means those principles he
has been discussing in the previous chapter, opposites. In (b)–(f), he states
this argument by using two examples of two pairs of opposites, rarity/density
and love/strife. In (c) he says that his argument applies to all opposites. So
his argument does not turn on any peculiarities of love/strife, rarity/density.
Rather, these examples illustrate a general difficulty for the claim that the
only principles are opposites.
This difficulty focuses on what entities opposites can make something.
In the phrase ‘x makes y something’, x picks out some actor and y picks out
whatever is acted upon by x. But we can understand the phrase ‘to make y
something’ (‘piοιεῖν τι’) in different ways:
1. x makes y F, where F is some property that y comes to possess.
4ἐpiεὶ δὲ piεpiερασμέναι, τὸ μὴ piοιεῖν δύο μόνον ἔχει τινὰ λόγον· ἀpiορήσειε γὰρ ἄν τις piῶς ἢ ἡ
piυκνότης τὴν μανότητα piοιεῖν τι piέφυκεν ἢ αὕτη τὴν piυκνότητα. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἄλλη ὁpiοιαοῦν
ἐναντιότης· οὐ γὰρ ἡ φιλία τὸ νεῖκος συνάγει καὶ piοιεῖ τι ἐξ αὐτοῦ, οὐδὲ τὸ νεῖκος ἐξ ἐκείνης, ἀλλ’
ἄμφω ἕτερόν τι τρίτον. ἔνιοι δὲ καὶ piλείω λαμβάνουσιν ἐξ ὧν κατασκευάζουσι τὴν τῶν ὄντων φύσιν.
Note that we can translate ‘ἡ piυκνότης τὴν μανότητα piοιεῖν τι piέφυκεν’ as either ‘density is such
as to do something to rarity’, or ‘density is such as to make rarity something’. I presume
that these two are equivalent. When the hot tea makes me warm it is doing something to
me, i.e. warming me up. Similarly, the cold lemonade does something to me by making me
cold. See Charlton {23, p. 3}, Ebrey {31, fn. 11, p. 45} for discussion.
74
3.2. THE ARGUMENT FOR A THIRD PRINCIPLE
2. x makes y into z, where z is numerically distinct from y.
Drinking hot rum is an example of 1. Drinking hot rum makes Arion warm.
Sculpting is an example of 2. A sculptor makes some bronze (into) a statue.5
1 and 2 seem very different cases. In the first, an entity, Arion, has altered
in some way, but the result of this alteration is not some new entity. In 2
an entity, a statue, comes into existence just because another entity, some
bronze, is acted upon and changed.
We may think that we must decide between these two cases, that Aris-
totle must intend one or the other. However, both 1 and 2 can be treated
on a par by noting that we often speak of the product of an alteration as a
new product, e.g. Theseus makes Arion into a fighter. Arion makes the child
into a musician. So we can use a sentence of the form ‘x makes y into z’ to
describe an alteration; however, in these cases, the product is identical to
the patient acted upon. So I will assume that Aristotle means that density
cannot create something new by acting upon rarity, where ‘something new’
ranges over the products of both qualified and unqualified changes (see Ch.1
for this distinction): density can neither merely alter rarity, nor can density
bring a new entity into existence by anyway acting upon rarity.
The argument Aristotle presents, then, has this structure:
P1 Density is not such as to make rarity into something and vice versa.
P2 Rarity and density make some third thing, which is different from each
of them, into something. [From P1]
P3 This third thing is part of the nature of beings. [From P2]
There are three problems with this argument, problems which allow us ad-
judicate between the interpretations outlined in the introduction. First, as
5In English we would use a preposition here, i.e. ‘the sculptor makes the bronze into a
statue.’ Greek does not require the preposition.
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stated, the argument is invalid. Aristotle invalidly infers P2 from P1, that
rarity and density make some third thing into something just because they
do not make each other into something. But in order to validly infer P2 from
P1, Aristotle must assume that there is some x such that rarity and density
make x into something. This is no mere anomaly. A few lines later, Aristotle
summarizes the view of his predecessors by saying that “early thinkers made
the two [i.e. the opposites] active and the one passive, whereas some recent
thinkers say rather that the one is active and the two passive (189b14–16).”6
These later philosophers are Plato and the Platonists, philosophers Aristotle
discusses in Phys. I.9. The older philosophers believe that every change in-
volves opposites turning some patient into something. It is apt for Aristotle
to discuss this belief only if he thinks it bears on his argument for the claim
that the subject of change is a principle of natural beings. If it bears no rela-
tion, then it is mysterious why he emphasizes action and passion both here
and throughout Phys. I (see Ch.2 for citations).
It is unclear why Aristotle assumes this or what he means by it. Perhaps
we can imagine a world in which a sphere rotates for eternity yet was never
caused to move. Aristotle does not think that this is possible, but he offers no
reason why he thinks it is impossible. More importantly, it is unclear why
Aristotle speaks about opposites making things at all. Aristotle has been
examining different views about the principles of natural beings. These are
different views about the kinds of entities involved in any change. But to
infer P2 from P1, Aristotle must link the principles of nature with some view
about what causes change, a view he does not state in our target passage.
So an adequate interpretation needs to identify the missing assumptions
6οἱ μὲν ἀρχαῖοι τὰ δύο μὲν piοιεῖν τὸ δὲ ἓν piάσχειν, τῶν δ’ ὑστέρων τινὲς τοὐναντίον τὸ μὲν ἓν
piοιεῖν τὰ δὲ δύο piάσχειν φασὶ μᾶλλον.
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behind Aristotle’s inference from P1 to P2.
The second problem is that Aristotle gives no argument for P1, no argu-
ment for why opposites cannot make each other into something. However,
this is central to his argument for a third principle. Aristotle does owe us
some argument for P1. After all, we do seem to make hot things from cold
things. We do seem to make dry things from wet things. So why does he deny
that wetness can be dried, or that coldness can be warmed up? He thinks
that some requirement must be satisfied if a being is to admit of heat, a re-
quirement that coldness cannot satisfy. An interpretation needs to identify
and properly characterize this requirement.
The third and related problem is how to interpret P3.7 Aristotle does not
merely claim that some third thing is acted upon and turned into something.
He thinks that this acted upon thing is part of the nature of beings. What
does this mean and why does he think it follows from P2?
Here it is useful to look again at 190b17–23, which I discussed in the
first chapter. There Aristotle argues that the product of every change is
somehow analyzable into the subject of that change and the form which was
imposed upon that subject. For instance, a musical man is analyzable into
musicality and man. A statue is analyzable into some bronze and the form
that was imposed upon that bronze to create that statue. This suggests
that Aristotle has been searching out those entities which are parts of the
products of certain changes. P3 tells us that he thinks that one of these
parts is that entity which is made into that natural being. Since, say, rarity
cannot be made into a dolphin while some subject of change can, then that
7In (f) Aristotle says that some of his predecessors believe that there is more than one
thing acted upon by the opposites. At 189b16–27 he rejects the claim that there is a plurality
of things acted upon, but he never rejects the claim that there is one thing acted upon. See
Bostock {12, p. 17–18} for discussion.
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subject but not rarity is part of the nature of that dolphin.
Each of these three problems is an instance of one general problem: the
argument leaves unstated and undefended some key assumptions. This is
a problem for Aristotle. His project is to identify the principles of natural
beings. That there is a third principle distinct from those opposites that a
change occurs between is supposed to be shown by this argument. If the
argument’s key assumptions can be given no defense, we have little reason
to accept its conclusion. This would undermine his overall project.
3.3 Interpretation 1
Our first interpretation of the argument was David Ebrey’s, an interpre-
tation that sees no claims about persistence assumed as premises in that
argument.
According to Ebrey, opposites cannot change, period. On this reading,
neither density nor anything else could make rarity into something because
rarity, in virtue of what it is, cannot be changed at all.8 Neither heat nor any-
thing else could turn coldness into anything because coldness, in virtue of
what it is, cannot be changed at all. Ebrey suggests that it is just a category
mistake to think that opposites can be changed and made into something
new.9
Ebrey then takes Aristotle to argue that there is some third thing, some-
thing which in virtue of its nature can be acted upon and turned into some-
thing new. This third thing can in virtue of its nature be made into some-
thing new by rarity. The major upshot of Ebrey’s reading is that Aristotle as-
8Ebrey {31, p. 49}.
9Ebrey {31, p. 50}.
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sumes each changing being possesses some nature, a nature which explains
why it can be acted upon and changed. It is this nature that opposites lack
and the subject of change possesses.
Ebrey’s interpretation offers a partial answer to the first problem: how
can Aristotle infer P2 from P1? On Ebrey’s reading, Aristotle assumes that
each change involves an actor acting upon some patient. All that is now
required to secure the inference from P1 to P2 is that the relevant actor is
an opposite (or possesses an opposite), e.g. that the actor is density (or some
dense thing).
However, Ebrey’s reading has difficulty with the second problem. He
claims that opposites have no ability to be acted upon and so changed. But
if Ebrey is to convince us of this claim, he must adequately characterize this
ability to be acted upon and changed. For instance, suppose I try to convince
you that hot chocolate is unable to perform a handstand. Hot chocolate does
lack this ability! And it is easy to explain why. Consider what the exercise of
this ability involves. It involves a person holding themselves in an inverted
position with their head towards the ground and their feet straight up to-
wards the ceiling. Since hot chocolate has no hands or feet, it is clear why
we will never find it exercising the ability to perform a handstand.
Similarly, we can ask Ebrey what the exercise of the ability to be acted
upon and changed involves. Unless an answer is forthcoming, he has given
us no reason to accept his claim that it is a category mistake to claim that
opposites can be acted upon and changed.
Ebrey also offers no answer to the third problem. Surprisingly, when he
quotes the passage that contains our argument, he fails to cite the sentence,
‘some assume more things, too, and from these they construct the nature of
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beings’.10 This passage suggests that the subject acted upon is part of the
resulting product; that when rarity acts upon some subject, that subject is
part of the resulting product. This entails that the subject persists through
the production: if the milk my hot cocoa is made from is part of that cocoa
once made, then that milk persists through the making. Ebrey thinks that
persistence plays no role in Aristotle’s introduction of the subject of a third
principle. So perhaps he ignores this claim because he cannot accommodate
it.
This issue is important and I dwell on it for the next several pages. Ebrey
thinks that Aristotle’s focus is how and why a being can be acted upon and
changed. Why can milk be warmed up, but the number 4 cannot? He thinks
that explaining why beings can be acted upon and changed does not require
that they persist as they are being acted upon and changed. So he thinks
explaining how milk can be warmed up neither requires that milk persist
as it is warmed up nor requires that there be some explanation of how it
persists.
However, Ebrey misconstrues Aristotle’s understanding of action and
passion. Aristotle does think that in order for x to be acted upon, x must
persist as it is being acted upon. And so explaining how something can be
acted upon precisely does require explaining how it can persist as it is being
acted upon. In order to argue for this point, let me recall the following three
claims which together comprise what I called in Ch.2 a Production Model of
Change:
A1: For every change C, there exists some actor X and some patient Y, such
that the product of C results when X acts upon Y.
10Ebrey {31, p. 45}.
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A2: If X acts upon Y, then there is some F such that X causes Y to become
an F.
A3: If X causes Y to become an F, then F is one of a pair of opposites.
In Ch.2, I discussed one feature of Aristotle’s understanding of A2. Not only
does he believe that a patient becomes F by some actor making that patient
F, he thinks that throughout the change, the actor is making the patient F.
Consider heating. Heating begins when heat starts to be transmitted to
some cold patient. Heating is completed when the heat has been so trans-
mitted. In the interim, heat is being transmitted to the patient and the
patient is receiving that heat. So the action of heating something up and
the passion of being heated up are simultaneous: when one finishes, then so
does the other. If actions and passions are simultaneous, then both the actor
and patient must persist through the change. Why does it follow? Let me
outline the argument before discussing it:
P1 For any action A, there is some actor x who acts.
P2 For any passion P, there is some patient y who suffers.
P3 For any action A, as long as A is occurring x is acting.
P4 For any passion P, as long as P is occurring y is suffering.
P5 For any action A, there is some corresponding passion P such that A
and P are simultaneous.
P6 For any passion P, as long as P is occurring there is some actor x acting.
(From P1–P5)
P7 For any action A, as long as A is occurring there is some patient y
suffering. (From P1–P5)
P1–P4 are straightforward and I assume uncontroversial. P6–P7 follow from
P1–P5. The argument turns on P5. P5 does not follow from the previous
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premises, and it is controversial. Nevertheless, I think Aristotle both accepts
P5 and that this acceptance dictates the particular features of persistence
that he is interested in (see the final section).
In Ch.2 I discussed how Aristotle believes that whatever feature the pa-
tient comes to possess is imposed by the actor upon that patient. We can
see how this claim supports P5 by noting how controversial it is. Consider
how a doctor Galen restores a limb to health by rubbing the skin. We may
think that rubbing causes friction and, subsequently, heat in that limb and
that this heat subsequently causes health. It is natural to think that health
is imposed only at the final stage of this process, that health is not being
imposed at Galen’s first touch.
However, Aristotle disagrees. He does not think that Galen merely im-
poses some force onto the skin and that this force subsequently causes heat,
which in turn causes health. He thinks that Galen imposes health onto the
patient throughout his action. So the moment that Galen begins rubbing the
skin, he begins to impose that very health the patient will come to possess
(see Ch.2).
If we assume that the action of curing begins when the actor begins to
impose health upon the patient, and if we assume that the passion of being
cured begins when the patient begins to get healthy, then curing and being
cured are simultaneous. This may appear a surprising result. Since it is
important, I explain why over the next 2 pages.
We may find P5 obviously false if we assume that it expresses the claim
that a cause is simultaneous with its effect. Such a claim is in stark opposi-
tion to a standard Humean view of causation. Hume argued that causation
is reducible to non-causal relations of spatio-temporal contiguity, succession,
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and regularity between cause and effect. So he holds that event C causes
event E iff C is spatio-temporally contiguous to E, E succeeds C in time, and
all events of type C (i.e. events that are like C) are regularly followed by (or
are constantly conjoined with events of type E (i.e. events like E). On this
analysis, C cannot be simultaneous with E, i.e. causes are always temporally
prior to their effects.11
Interpreters debate how Aristotle understands causation and debate how
that understanding relates to Humean and post-Humean understandings of
causation. While these debates need not concern us here, I wish to stress
one way that Aristotle differs from Hume.12 Later in the Physics, Aristotle
claims:
The difference between active and potential causes is that active
particular causes exist and cease to exist simultaneously with the
effects they cause e.g. this person healing and that person being
cured, this house-building man and that house being built. But
this is not always true of potential causes for the house and the
house builder do not perish simultaneously (195b16–21).13
In this passage, Aristotle tells us that an active cause is simultaneous with
its effect. My building a house is simultaneous with the house being built.
This is a marked difference from Hume. As Jonathan Lear explains, “[o]ne
way to characterize the difference between Hume and Aristotle is to say that
while for Hume causation must be understood as a relation between two
events, for Aristotle there is only one event—a change.”14 Let me illustrate
this point with some of Aristotle’s examples.
11Hume {46, I.iii 14}.
12For discussion see, for instance Fine {32}, Frede {33}, Freeland {34}, Hocutt {45}.
13διαφέρει δὲ τοσοῦτον, ὅτι τὰ μὲν ἐνεργοῦντα καὶ τὰ καθ’ ἕκαστον ἅμα ἔστι καὶ οὐκ ἔστι καὶ ὧν
αἴτια, οἷον ὅδ’ ὁ ἰατρεύων τῷδε τῷ ὑγιαζομένῳ καὶ ὅδε ὁ οἰκοδομῶν τῷδε τῷ οἰκοδομουμένῳ, τὰ δὲ
κατὰ δύναμιν οὐκ ἀεί. φθείρεται γὰρ οὐχ ἅμα ἡ οἰκία καὶ ὁ οἰκοδόμος.
14Lear {60, p.31}.
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When a teacher teaches a student Greek, a certain event occurs. This
one event can be described as a teacher teaching and as a student learn-
ing (202a31ff ).15 While this event is causal—the teacher teaching brings
about a change in the student—this phenomenon is not best analyzed as a
relation between two temporally contiguous and successive events: there is
not first the event of a teacher teaching and then a later event of the stu-
dent learning. There is just the one event that is both the teaching teaching
and the student learning. So the action of the teacher and the effect of that
action—the learning of the student—are simultaneous just because there is
one event that is both a teaching and a learning.16
Aristotle’s view is radical, never more so than when we apply it to loco-
motion. Aristotle is committed to the claim that a moving object is acted
upon for the duration of its motion. For instance, a snooker ball that is mov-
ing around the snooker table is being continually acted upon and moved. If
nothing caused the ball to keep moving, the ball would stop altogether. This
claim violates Newton’s Laws of Motion. In particular, it violates the first
law which states that every object will remain at rest or in uniform motion
in a straight line unless compelled to change its state by the action of an
external force. In contrast, Aristotle believes that an object only remains in
uniform motion as long as it is compelled to maintain its uniform motion,
i.e. only as long as it being moved.
Aristotle recognizes his claim is counter-intuitive. In Phys. VIII.10, he
puzzles about projectiles. He asks how is it that something thrown, like a
15Lear {60} and Irwin {47} think there is one event that is both a teaching and a learn-
ing. Charles {21} argues that these are two numerically distinct events which are members
of an equivalence class. We can set this complication aside. On both readings, the teach-
ing and learning are simultaneous, which is what I want to emphasize here. For ease of
presentation, I will continue to speak of there being numerically one event.
16Lear {60, p. 32–34} discusses whether to describe this as the claim that cause and effect
are simultaneous. See also Shields {78, p. 47–49} for discussion.
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spear, continues to move after the thrower lets go of that spear? (266b27ff )
This is a problem for Aristotle. It appears that the projectile keeps moving
even though nothing acts upon and keeps that spear in motion.17 Aristotle
tries to solve the problem by arguing that the thrower also imparts the power
to move another thing to some air that spear is in. He thinks that this power
is then passed on from one parcel of air to the next as each parcel of air
pushes the spear forward. Thus the spear is continually acted upon as it is
moved.18
I will not try to defend Aristotle’s views on motion. At this stage, his
mechanics has been superseded. My goal is to emphasize that Aristotle be-
lieves that actions and passions are simultaneous, a belief that is central
to his mechanics and physics more generally. While this belief may seem
counter-intuitive, some observations about English may make it less so: the
present indicative of English verbs, e.g. ‘act’, ‘change’ are often poor choices
for discussing change. The issue is one of aspect. The English present indica-
tive only has perfective aspect, e.g. habitual and simple aspect. In contrast,
the English present participle has progressive, or imperfective aspect.19 So
unlike the present participle, the present indicative of English verbs is a
poor choice for talking about things which are, well, undergoing.
Consider these sentences: ‘the snooker cue hits the white ball’ and ‘the
white ball moves’; ‘the snooker cue is hitting (and so moving) the white ball’
and ‘the white ball is moving, or being moved’. The first set of sentences
17Note that this problem arises only when the object is moved by something external to
it. A flying bird moves itself when it flies through the sky, but the spear cannot move itself
as it moves towards its target.
18Waterlow {84, c.IV} discusses the problems Aristotle encounters when trying to identify
what she calls a continuing active cause for the motion of those things that do not move
themselves.
19In Greek the present indicative has both aspects and only attention to context can de-
termine which is being used.
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reports actions and changes that have either been completed, or they re-
port actions and changes that are performed regularly. So it is easy to read
each sentence as referring to numerically distinct and temporally successive
events: the action of one verb is completed and at a later time the action of
the other verb is completed. But the latter two sentences do not have this
connotation. The event of a snooker cue hitting a white ball cannot be prior
to the event of the white ball being hit by the snooker cue. This action and
passion are simultaneous with one another.
Ebrey misses these features of Aristotle’s views of action and passion. Ac-
cording to him, Aristotle could allow things to be acted upon without persist-
ing through the relevant action. And it is easy to miss Aristotle’s particular
understanding of action and passion when we use the present indicative of
say, ‘act’. When we read a sentence like ‘Galen acts upon his patient’, we
might mistakenly direct our attention exclusively to the beginning of his in-
teraction with his patient. To put it another way, it seems that Ebrey focuses
only on what is required of a being if an actor is to start acting upon it. But
the start of an action is not, for Aristotle, the same as that action. The start
of a passion is not, for Aristotle, the same as that passion. So if Ebrey is
correct that Aristotle’s focus is on the interaction between actor and patient,
since the actor acts upon the patient throughout the change, explaining how
a patient can be acted upon requires explaining how it can be acted upon
throughout the change.
3.4 Interpretation 2
Our second interpretation turns on two claims. The first claim says that
the subject must be able to persist through that change of which it is sub-
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ject, that whatever subject hot cocoa is made from must persist through this
making. The second says that the opposite that the product came from can-
not so persist, e.g. while the hot cocoa came from something cold, the cold
did not persist.
This interpretation fares poorly with our first problem. It simply ignores
Aristotle’s claim that rarity and density cannot act upon another and so
must act upon something else. So this interpretation cannot explain why
action and passion figure in Aristotle’s argument for the claim that the sub-
ject is a third principle. If his focus is merely persistence, why frame the
argument in terms of action and passion?
This interpretation fares better with the second and third problem. The
latter first. On this interpretation, the subject must persist through the
change, the milk must persist as it is being warmed up. It can then explain
why Aristotle thinks that the subject is part of the product of the change,
i.e. Aristotle thinks that the persisting subject is one of the elements of the
product of the change.
It also fares well with the second problem, for we can at least explain
why Aristotle would deny that opposites persist, would deny that coldness
persists as you warm up cold milk.
Recall that Aristotle in Phys. I.5 argues that changes occur between op-
posites. For instance, he claims:
If then this is true, everything that comes to be or passes away
comes from, or passes into, its opposite or intermediate. But the
intermediates are from the opposites. For example, colors are
from pale and dark. Everything, therefore, that comes to be by
nature is either an opposite or is from opposites (188b21–26).20
20εἰ τοίνυν τοῦτ’ ἔστιν ἀληθές, ἅpiαν ἂν γίγνοιτο τὸ γιγνόμενον καὶ φθείροιτο τὸ φθειρόμενον ἢ
ἐξ ἐναντίων ἢ εἰς ἐναντία καὶ τὰ τούτων μεταξύ. τὰ δὲ μεταξὺ ἐκ τῶν ἐναντίων ἐστίν, οἷον χρώματα
ἐκ λευκοῦ καὶ μέλανος· ὥστε piάντ’ ἂν εἴη τὰ φύσει γιγνόμενα ἢ ἐναντία ἢ ἐξ ἐναντίων.
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One way of understanding Aristotle’s claim that change occurs between op-
posites is to understand him as claiming that processes of change occur be-
tween opposites. In Plato’s Phaedo, Socrates explains this difference as fol-
lows:
There is a further point, something such as this about these oppo-
sites: between each of those pairs of opposites there are two pro-
cesses: from the one to the other and then again from the other to
the first; between the larger and the smaller there is increase and
decrease, and we call the one increasing and the other decreasing.
And so there is separation and combination, cooling and heating,
and all such things, even if sometimes we do not have a name for
the process, but in fact it must be everywhere that they come to
be from one another, and that there is a process of becoming from
each into the other (71a12–b10; trans. G.M.A. Grube).21
Let us consider some examples. The sweet and the sour are opposites. But
there are also two opposite processes of change between these two opposites.
First, there is the process of souring, e.g. when milk changes from being
sweet to being sour, milk undergoes the process of souring. Second, there
is the process of sweetening, e.g. when you add sugar to your tea, the tea
changes from being sour to being sweet—it undergoes the process of sweet-
ening.
Changings are defined as processes in which certain opposites come to be
and perish. For instance, during the process of warming, the cold perishes
and the hot comes to be.22 It follows that opposites cannot persist through
those changes which occur between them, e.g. since heating is a process
21Τί δ’ αὖ· ἔστι τι καὶ τοιόνδε ἐν αὐτοῖς, οἷον μεταξὺ ἀμφοτέρων piάντων τῶν ἐναντίων δυοῖν ὄντοιν
δύο γενέσεις, ἀpiὸ μὲν τοῦ ἑτέρου ἐpiὶ τὸ ἕτερον, ἀpiὸ δ’ αὖ τοῦ ἑτέρου piάλιν ἐpiὶ τὸ ἕτερον· μείζονος
μὲν piράγματος καὶ ἐλάττονος μεταξὺ αὔξησις καὶ φθίσις, καὶ καλοῦμεν οὕτω τὸ μὲν αὐξάνεσθαι, τὸ
δὲ φθίνειν· Ναί, ἔφη. Οὐκοῦν καὶ διακρίνεσθαι καὶ συγκρίνεσθαι, καὶ ψύχεσθαι καὶ θερμαίνεσθαι,
καὶ piάντα οὕτω, κἂν εἰ μὴ χρώμεθα τοῖς ὀνόμασιν ἐνιαχοῦ, ἀλλ’ ἔργῳ γοῦν piανταχοῦ οὕτως ἔχειν
ἀναγκαῖον, γίγνεσθαί τε αὐτὰ ἐξ ἀλλήλων γένεσίν τε εἶναι ἑκατέρου εἰς ἄλληλα·
22Aristotle believes that the perishing of the hot and the coming to be of the cold are one
in number. See, for instance, Phys. 225a12–20, 229a7–229a30.
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which essentially involves the perishing of the cold, then the cold cannot
endure the heating of whatever patient is heated up. Similarly, sweetening
is a process that occurs between the sour and the sweet. This means that
during a process of sweetening the sour ceases to be and the sweet comes to
be. So the sour cannot persist through a process of sweetening, i.e. it cannot
endure the sweetening of whatever patient is sweetened.
3.5 Interpretation 3
Our third interpretation combines elements of both the first and second. Ac-
cording to Waterlow, Aristotle assumes that some feature explains why the
subject can change in certain ways and not others, and also assumes that
the subject persists. Waterlow crucially sees a connection between both as-
sumptions. She thinks that explaining how a subject can undergo a change
requires explaining how that subject can persist through that change, an ex-
planation that she thinks is provided by a diachronic criterion of identity.23
Recall here that Aristotle concludes that opposites must act upon some
third thing and make it into something. This third thing is the subject of
change. Since it can be made into something new, the subject of change is
such as to persist through this making. Waterlow believes that this ‘such-
ness’ refers to the sortal that the subject falls under, sortals which play two
distinct roles. On the one hand, objects that fall under the same sortal will
23I assume that Waterlow thinks that explaining how a being can undergo a change is re-
lated to diachronic criteria of identity. She does speak of a need to re-identify the cultured
man with the uncultured man (Waterlow {84, p. 26}, and speaks about how the individual
man must remain a man throughout the change. She thinks that this is central to how
Aristotle solves the Eleatic Challenge in Phys. I.8. Nevertheless, when she goes on to ex-
plain her view in more detail she focuses on the causal processes by which a change comes
about in a given subject and stops speaking about identity through time. These are differ-
ent issues. I don’t think that Waterlow sees this, and perhaps this explains why she talks
about both issues together.
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tend to have the same abilities to be affected and be changed. This is why
she claims that sortal membership brings with it internal determinants to
change. All objects that fall under a sortal S will possess certain features
which determine what changes they can and cannot undergo. Second, these
sortals provide a diachronic criterion of identity for objects that fall under
them, a criterion that explains how such objects can persist through the
change.
We have seen that Aristotle does focus on the first of these two issues, on
what changes a being can undergo. He thinks that rarity cannot be made
into anything by density, but a subject of change can be so made. So Aristotle
does seem to focus on internal determinants of change. Is this sufficient
evidence that Aristotle’s focus is diachronic criteria of identity? I think not.
On Waterlow’s reading an appropriate description of the subject will con-
vey information about what changes that object can undergo. She explains
her view by saying this of the appropriate description: ‘for a language user of
normal experience, the first description on the list provides some indication,
however sketchy and incomplete, concerning various possible circumstances
under which, and processes by which, the change is likely to have taken
place, as well as concerning possible conditions for reversing it.’24 She thinks
that this will normally involve conveying information about various causal
powers ‘manifested in regularities’.25 For instance, in order for some clay to
be molded into a statue, the clay must be malleable. Waterlow thinks that
some description of the clay will convey to us that the clay is malleable. This
description will pick the clay out under a relative sortal, i.e. membership
of a sortal will specify a set of powers to change and be affected in various
24Waterlow {84, p. 25}.
25Waterlow {84, p. 25}.
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ways. To see how such membership determines the kind of changes that x
can undergo, let us distinguish three types of powers:
Identity Entailing Powers: P is an identity entailing power iff for any x,
if x is P, and P is triggered at t1, then x exists at some other time, tn.
Identity Excluding Powers: P is an identity excluding power iff for any
x, if x is P, and P is triggered at t1, then x ceases to exist.
Identity Neutral Powers: P is an identity neutral power iff for any x, it is
not the case that if x is P, and P is triggered at t1, that x exists or fails
to exist at other times.26
Sortal membership will usually specify mixtures of these types of powers
(different sortals will specify different mixtures.) So, for instance, being
malleable is an identity entailing power. A piece of bronze will persist as
it is being moulded into a statue. The ability to undergo oxidation seems an
identity excluding power. For instance, while bronze can undergo oxidation,
it is destroyed in this process, i.e. when copper chlorides form. We might
consider being able to heat up other things an identity neutral power. Some
entities, like water, persist as they pass on their heat to say a cold stone.
Others, like matches, do not persist.27
It is these powers that determine how a being can be affected and
changed. Waterlow’s claim is that possession of these powers is explained by
sortal membership. So, for instance, she thinks that Arion can be warmed
up by the fire he sits at because he is a human being: it is not his being
cold, but his being human that explains why he possesses this ability to be
affected in this way.
26Adapted from Zimmerman {91}.
27Here I assume that for a subject to persist through C, the subject must exist both when
C begins and when C has been completed.
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We may accept that sortal membership is associated with possession of a
mixture of powers. The problem for Waterlow is that sortal membership is
not the only thing associated with possession of these powers. Consider the
ability to displace water. This ability is possessed by Arion, stones, dolphin,
and twigs. Their possession of this ability is explained by the fact that each
are physical objects with weight. But neither physical object or possessing
weight is a sortal that will provide a diachronic criterion of identity.
Often what explains why an object can undergo certain changes is some-
thing far more general and less fine grained than the particular sortal that
the object falls under. This is a problem for Waterlow. She infers that Aris-
totle’s focus is diachronic criteria of identity just because he focuses on the
causal features which determine what changes a being can undergo. But
this is a poor inference. The explanation for why bronze and nickel can con-
duct electricity is not sortal specific. Their being metal explains why they
can conduct electricity. But the fact they are metal does not provide a di-
achronic criterion of identity for either. This is not to say that they don’t
have such criteria or that they don’t persist. They do persist! The point
is that the explanation for how they can undergo these changes need have
little to do with their diachronic criterion of identity.
Waterlow herself recognizes this problem.28 She says that there are many
descriptions which tell us about the causal processes in which a given change
comes about, descriptions which are not at the same time of the substance
sortal that changing being falls under. The problem is significant. Aristo-
tle introduces the subject of change as a third principle by considering the
causal processes involved in bringing about a change in a patient: density
cannot turn rarity into something new, but it can turn the subject of change
28Waterlow {84, p. 26}.
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into something new. Waterlow tries to identify a rich metaphysical project
about persistence from these discussions. But Aristotle’s concern is not the
metaphysical one of what the identity through time of objects consist in,
but the scientific question of how beings can survive as they are being acted
upon and being changed.
3.6 Interpretation 4
I will develop my objection to Waterlow by outlining a new alternative inter-
pretation. Waterlow believes the following four claims:
1. Some feature of the subject explains why that subject can undergo cer-
tain changes and not others.
2. The subject persists through that change it is subject for.
3. There is an explanation for how a subject persists through a change.
4. There is a diachronic criterion of identity for each persisting subject.
Waterlow assumes that 1–4 are related. She thinks that explaining how
a being can undergo a change requires explaining how it can persist. But
she also assumes that explaining how it can persist requires providing a di-
achronic criterion of identity for that persisting being. This is an invalid in-
ference. I too agree that Aristotle assumes 1–3, but I deny that he is thereby
committed to 4, or that reading him as being particularly concerned with 4
is helpful for understanding his argument for the claim that the subject of
change is a third principle. Why is the inference from 3 to 4 invalid? It is
invalid because there is a different kind of explanation for persistence, an
explanation that is not provided by a diachronic criterion of identity. I will
stand back from the text of Phys. I.6 to introduce and clarify this point.
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We have seen that, for Aristotle, changes are essentially two sided pro-
cesses. In every change, there is the action of some actor imposing some
feature onto some patient. On the other hand, there is the suffering of the
patient that is receiving the relevant feature. So throughout the process
of some patient becoming F, there is something acting upon and causing the
patient to become F, e.g. the hot water is acting upon the dolphin throughout
the process of the dolphin warming up.
This aspect of Aristotle’s mechanics and physics more broadly poses dra-
matic questions about how beings can persist through change, questions
that do not arise for philosophers who deny that actions and passions are
simultaneous.
Consider how some metal can undergo a process in which it is being ham-
mered into a sword. Throughout the hammering, the metal is being hit,
beaten, dented, and shaped. But as the hammer strikes the metal, the metal
is not destroyed outright. The metal must be sufficiently firm to retain its
integrity as it is being hammered, but not too firm so as to resist the force
altogether. Rather, the metal must be such so as the force of the blow is
absorbed and distributed across the metal leaving the right kind of shapes
and indents while at the same time not destroying the metal outright.
We could try explain how this piece of metal persists as it is being
hammered by saying that the initial metal and sword are connected by
a spatio-temporal and qualitatively continuous succession of appropriate
metal stages. This answer might tell us what the identity through time of
this metal consists in. But this answer tells us nothing about the mechanics
of persistence. A material scientist will explain in detail how the force can
be absorbed and metal changed in the right way. To put it another way, we
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want an explanation of how there could be such a continuous succession of
appropriate metal stages. Why didn’t the metal disintegrate? Why was the
force absorbed in exactly the right way? The material scientist will offer us
this explanation. They will tell us how the appropriate succession of object
stages came about in the first place.
Perhaps it helps here to point to a scenario where a metaphysical expla-
nation for persistence is completely useless. NASA is currently investigating
whether it is possible for humans to travel to Mars. It would be incredibly
difficult for any human to survive in space for such a long length of time.
Their bones become brittle and their bodies generally disintegrate from ex-
posure to different levels of radiation. Now let us suppose that our astronaut
Neil does in fact travel to Mars. We might explain this by saying that the
Neil who leaves Earth and the Neil who lands on Mars are connected by a
succession of spatio-temporal and qualitatively continuous human-stages. If
Neil persists, then it is true that there is such a succession. But it should be
clear that this explanation is useless to NASA scientists. NASA scientists
are investigating how to bring about such a succession of human-stages.
What must they build and how must they prepare Neil’s body so that this
condition can be satisfied?
Mary Louise Gill has come close to making a similar point (though her
focus is the middle books of Met). She observes:
One might think that a product, once generated, remains the
product that it is until something deprives it of its identity. Just
as the acquisition of a positive character requires a productive
agent, so the removal of that positive character might seem to
require a destructive agent. But Aristotle had a different ver-
sion. Although he recognized violent destruction as one means
of perishing, he also believed in internal decay due to an entity’s
matter.29
29Gill {38, p. 212}.
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Let us suppose that an oak tree has come into being from an acorn. Once
the oak tree has been generated, we might assume, according to Gill, that
there are no active causal processes required to keep the oak tree in exis-
tence. Rather, the oak tree will continue to exist until something acts upon
it and destroys it. Aristotle’s understanding of natural beings is very dif-
ferent. Aristotle thinks that all natural bodies are composed of different
amounts of earth, air, fire, and water. These elements have different and
incompatible natural tendencies to move in different directions.30 Earth has
a tendency to move downwards towards the center of the universe; fire, has
a tendency to move upwards away from the center towards the limits of the
sublunary realm (beneath the moon); air moves upwards through water but
not fire; water rests between earth and air. These different and incompatible
tendencies of the elements to move in different directions raise significant
questions about how those beings constituted by these elements can persist.
Gill uses Aristotle’s discussion of growth to illustrate this point. In An.
II.4 Aristotle criticizes Empedocles who explains why the roots of plants
grow downwards while the plant grows upwards as follows: the roots of
plants grow downwards because the earth in plants naturally moves in that
direction. The plants grow upwards because the fire in the plant moves
upwards (415b28–416a9). But Aristotle argues that this is unsatisfactory: if
plants have one part moving downwards and another moving upwards, the
plant should be torn apart and destroyed outright. So, as Gill claims:
Given the behavior of the elemental constituents, a product once
generated cannot quietly enjoy the unity that it has achieved, and
no external destroyer is needed to bring about its destruction. In-
stead, composites are always on the verge of annihilation on ac-
count of their own lower material properties, and the project of
30For instance, see Phys. IV.1.
96
3.6. INTERPRETATION 4
remaining the same and avoiding decay is one that demands con-
siderable exertion.31
Gill goes on to explain how Aristotle thinks that there is something which
actively preserves and maintains an organism once it has been generated,
i.e. something which causes its cohesion and ensures that it does not disin-
tegrate due to the behavior of the elements in that organism. She describes
this cause as enabling ‘an entity to retain a high degree of complexity and to
offset the process of internal decay.’32
Let me illustrate Gill’s claim with a very simple example. The Greeks
used to consume a drink called a posset, a mixture of wine, barley groats,
cheese, and certain drugs. These ingredients do not mix well together. The
solids tend to separate out and sink to the bottom. Let us suppose that a
posset exists only when the ingredients are suspended in the wine. It follows
that any posset that exists is subject to internal decay, i.e. its ingredients
tend to behave in ways that cause the drink to cease to exist altogether. In
order to counteract this effect, the ingredients must be continually stirred
together. So the persistence of the posset is dependent on its ingredients
being stirred. And the process of the ingredients being stirred is what Gill
calls an active cause of the posset’s persistence.
Again, if we wish to know what the identity through time of the posset
consists in, then we might say that there is a succession S of spatiotempo-
rally and qualitatively continuous posset-stages. This is an answer to one
question about how the posset persists through time. But this is somehow
uninteresting. The posset is a drink that can disintegrate at any moment.
What we want is an explanation of how there could be an appropriate suc-
31Gill {38, p. 213}.
32Gill {38, p. 213}.
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cession of posset-stages given that the ingredients behave in ways that tend
toward the destruction of that drink.
Similarly, for Aristotle, natural beings are constantly under threat. Their
composition continually tends towards their destruction, and it is only by
bring kept in a delicate homeostasis that they survive at all. When a natural
being changes, it undergoes a process in which it is acted upon for some
duration of time. If the natural being is to survive this process, it must
suitably change while maintaining its delicate homeostasis. For instance,
before Arion takes a drink of water, the already existing water in his body is
struggling to move downwards through his organs. It is kept in balance by
the tendencies of the other elements and Arion’s physiology. But when Arion
takes a long drink of water, he risks throwing this delicate balance into chaos
and literally tearing his body asunder. So, for Aristotle, to explain how Arion
quenches his thirst requires explaining how the tendencies of the elements
can be kept in balance as new water enters the body.
3.7 Conclusion
If I am right, Aristotle’s focus is how beings can survive as they are changed,
e.g. how does Arion survive as he is being warmed up by the heat of the
fire. Aristotle’s account is general. He does not give specific explanations for
specific changes. This project would require detailed scientific analysis, e.g.
the metallurgist must investigate metals and explain how they can undergo
processes like being smelted, the biologist must investigate organisms and
explain how they can undergo processes like growing and heating up. These
explanations are explanations of how beings persist through change. But we
may miss this if we think that explaining persistence is exhausted by pro-
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viding persistence conditions for persisting subjects. A medical researcher
who tells us how our immune system fends off the common cold is explaining
how sick patients persist through their illness. Nevertheless, while this ex-
planation assumes that the person before and after the illness are identical,
it will not tell us what unites these stages into one persisting person.
I have yet to give a knock-down argument that Aristotle is uninterested
in diachronic criteria of identity and I don’t have one forthcoming. My goal
is to offer a coherent reading of Phys. I.5–8 that identifies exactly what Aris-
totle says about persistence in these chapters. So far we have seen that he
focuses heavily on action and passion. While this focus raises a clear causal
concern for how beings can survive as they are being acted upon, it does
not by itself show that Aristotle, at this stage, is concerned with the persis-
tence conditions for changing beings. This does not mean that Aristotle is
nowhere interested in the latter issue. But it is vital to recognize that this is
not his main focus here, vital because we risk missing the interesting ques-
tions about persistence that he is interested in and which do feature in his
search for the principles of nature.
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CHAPTER 4
THE SUBJECT OF NATURAL GENERATIONS IN PHYSICS I.7
4.1 Introduction
What are chocolate cakes made of? A recipe will list as ingredients flour,
cocoa, baking powder, eggs, and milk. These ingredients are material. Ma-
terial ingredients may not be the only ingredients of cakes, or of dolphins, or
of motorcycles, and so on. Kathrin Koslicki, for instance, thinks that as well
as material parts each ordinary object has a form, which “is a kind of recipe
for how to build wholes of that particular kind”.1 The form of the cake is a
recipe for how things like cocoa and flour can be built into a cake. Similarly,
the form of a dolphin is a recipe for how organic matter can be built into a
dolphin.
Call the claim that material objects are built out of material and for-
mal ingredients hylomorphism. Hylomorphism is one of Aristotle’s signa-
ture innovations, an innovation that has defenders like Koslicki even today.2
Aristotle’s search for the principles of nature supposedly results in hylomor-
phism. In Phys. I.5, he argued that of all the pairs of opposites, some of these
pairs are principles of nature. We saw that for each pair of opposites, he calls
one a form and the other a privation. And in Phys. I.6 he argued that there is
a third principle of nature, a subject that is acted upon and turned into some
new product. In Phys. I.7, Aristotle argues that the product of each change
is made up of two of these principles, of some subject and the relevant form
1Koslicki {57, p. 172}.
2This is a simple outline of hylomorphism. Some think that some Aristotelian forms are
also material. See Whiting {85, c. 4}. Further, while Aristotelian forms are in some way
ingredients of individual substances they are not parts of them. See especially Met. VII.17,
and Koslicki {57}, Mann {66, c. 6} for discussion. These details are not important for what
follows, so I set them aside.
100
4.1. INTRODUCTION
that was imposed upon it, e.g. hot chocolate is made up of chocolate and
heat, and a bronze statue is made up of both some bronze and some shape.
Aristotle’s argument for hylomorphism, then, assumes as a premise the
claim that the matter from which a natural being is produced persists, that
the cocoa and milk from which hot chocolate is made persist through this
making.3 But Aristotle seems to deny this claim in Phys. I.7, the very same
chapter in which he seems to use it as a premise in his argument for hylo-
morphism.4
In Phys. I.7 Aristotle says that plants and animals come into being from
sperma, but this seems to be something that is destroyed in the process. Af-
ter all, the egg from which a dolphin comes into being does not make up
that dolphin. So it seems that Aristotle thinks that the matter from which
a dolphin is generated is destroyed in the process.5 So there is a problem at
the heart of Aristotle’s search for the principles of nature. That search ulti-
mately leads him to articulate and argue for hylomorphism. This argument
requires the persistence of matter, yet Aristotle may deny the persistence of
that matter natural beings are generated from.
In this chapter, I argue that Aristotle really does accept the apparently
bizarre claim that the sperma from which a dolphin is generated persists
3The persistence of matter is also a premise in the arguments of contemporary hylomor-
phists. Koslicki {57, pp. 176–181}, for instance, argues for hylomorphism by asking us to
consider a case in which an entity is made from a single preexisting material ingredient,
e.g. a statue is made from a single lump of clay. The single lump of clay is a proper part
of the statue. Since no object can have only one proper part, Koslicki concludes that the
statue must have some other part, a part which she argues is a formal part. This argument
assumes that the lump of clay the statue was made from persisted through this process.
If this assumption is false, Koslicki’s argument for hylomorphism is unsound. For further
discussion of Koslicki, see Bennett {6}.
4Ebrey {31}, Kelsey {55} have recently denied the standard view that Aristotle argues
for hylomorphism in Phys. I.7. My concern is whether Aristotle does commit himself to the
persistence of matter in that chapter, so I will not concern myself with their challenge.
5For other problems with the persistence of Aristotelian matter see Ackrill {1} and Gill
{38}.
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and is present in that dolphin once generated. This does not solve every
problem about the persistence of Aristotelian matter nor does it tell us just
how Aristotle argues for hylomorphism (I will not discuss the other premises
in that argument). But it does (i) solve a key tension in Aristotle’s discus-
sion of both in Phys. I.7, and (ii) show that persistence plays a key role in
his understanding of the principles of nature. I argue for my reading by ex-
amining what Aristotle explicitly says about sperma in his biological works,
in particular the GA. First, I begin by explaining why the sperma case is so
puzzling and arguing against two responses to it, one by William Charlton,
the other by Terence Irwin.
4.2 The Sperma Puzzle
Aristotle begins Phys. I.7 as follows:
Let us, then, speak about all coming to be, in the following way;
for the natural procedure is to speak first about what is com-
mon to every case, and then to study what is special to each case
(189b30–32).6
By this, Aristotle means that he will make some general claims about the
principles involved in every change.7 These principles, as we have seen, are
subject (ὑpiοκείμενον), form (εἶδος), and privation (στέρησις).
Aristotle says that he will speak generally about the principles involved
in every change, and he does so by using the example of an alteration, a
music lesson. While a music lesson is an alteration, this example is meant to
6῟Ωδ’ οὖν ἡμεῖς λέγωμεν piρῶτον piερὶ piάσης γενέσεως ἐpiελθόντες· ἔστι γὰρ κατὰ φύσιν τὰ κοινὰ
piρῶτον εἰpiόντας οὕτω τὰ piερὶ ἕκαστον ἴδια θεωρεῖν.
7Note that this is different from defining what change is. In Phys. III.I, Aristotle explains
how changes are diachronic entities that are related to the various entities that change. The
principles involved in a change are different entities from the change itself. For discussion,
see Coope {26}, Graham {40}, Kosman {58}.
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illustrate what is common to all change, i.e. to both qualified and unqualified
change. First, Aristotle claims that we can describe a music lesson in three
different ways:
A The man comes to be musical (189b34–35).
B The not-musical thing comes to be musical (189b35–36).
C The not-musical man comes to be a musical man (190a1–5).
He then claims:
The man, for instance, remains a man and is still a man when he
comes to be musical, whereas the not-musical or unmusical thing,
either simple or compound does not remain (190a9–13).8
Here Aristotle claims two things. First, he claims that the subject persists,
e.g. Arion persists. Second, he claims that the subject remains the same
kind of thing, e.g. Arion remains a man throughout his music lesson. Aris-
totle does not explain why remaining a man is more important than, say,
remaining snub-nosed. In the previous chapter, I suggested an answer to
this question: in every process of change, a patient is continually acted upon
by some actor for the duration of that process. I argued that Aristotle intro-
duces the subject of change to explain how beings can be so acted upon, i.e.
being a certain sort of subject involves being able to retain certain capaci-
ties to be changed as the actor acts upon and so changes it. If that’s right,
then Aristotle believes that it is by remaining a man that Arion survives
as the music teacher imposes their knowledge of music upon him. Being
a human is a reasonable explanation for how Arion could be acted upon in
this way: being a human involves possessing those cognitive capacities re-
quired to assimilate the relevant information as it is being passed down by
8ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἄνθρωpiος ὑpiομένει μουσικὸς γιγνόμενος ἄνθρωpiος καὶ ἔστι, τὸ δὲ μὴ μουσικὸν καὶ
τὸ ἄμουσον οὔτε ἁpiλῶς οὔτε συντεθειμένον ὑpiομένει
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the teacher and the appropriate physical features and capacities to support
music learning, e.g. being strong enough to hold the lyre, not exploding at a
certain frequency of pitch, and so on.
Aristotle also commits himself to both claims in a crucial step in his ar-
gument for hylomorphism:
Suppose, then, that there are indeed causes and principles of nat-
ural beings, from which they primarily are and have come to be—
not come to be coincidentally, but come to be what each thing is
called in accordance with its essence. It evidently follows that
everything comes to be from the subject and the shape. For in a
way the musical man is composed from man and musical, since
you will analyze him into their accounts. It is clear, then, that
whatever comes to be does so from these things (190b16–23).9
Aristotle believes that the product of each change comes about when some
form is imposed upon some subject, e.g. warm chocolate syrup comes about
when chocolate is heated, a statue comes about when some bronze is appro-
priately shaped. He concludes two things:
First, he concludes that the product of each change is made up in some
way of this subject and the form that it comes to possess, e.g. warm chocolate
syrup is in some way made up of chocolate and heat, a statue is made up
in some way of some bronze and some shape (see also 191b16, 191a31–32).
This first conclusion entails that the subject persists through the production,
e.g. the chocolate persists when we make warm chocolate syrup from it, the
9φανερὸν οὖν ὡς, εἴpiερ εἰσὶν αἰτίαι καὶ ἀρχαὶ τῶν φύσει ὄντων, ἐξ ὧν piρώτων εἰσὶ καὶ γεγόνασι μὴ
κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς ἀλλ’ ἕκαστον ὃ λέγεται κατὰ τὴν οὐσίαν, ὅτι γίγνεται piᾶν ἔκ τε τοῦ ὑpiοκειμένου καὶ
τῆς μορφῆς· σύγκειται γὰρ ὁ μουσικὸς ἄνθρωpiος ἐξ ἀνθρώpiου καὶ μουσικοῦ τρόpiον τινά· διαλύσεις
γὰρ [τοὺς λόγους] εἰς τοὺς λόγους τοὺς ἐκείνων. δῆλον οὖν ὡς γίγνοιτ’ ἂν τὰ γιγνόμενα ἐκ τούτων.
‘διαλύσεις γὰρ [τοὺς λόγους] εἰς τοὺς λόγους τοὺς ἐκείνων’ is difficult. Ross {74, p. 493} brackets
the first ‘τοὺς λόγους’ because it is plural while the supposed referent, ‘the musical man’, is
singular. However, we should note that bracketing the phrase leaves open whether Aristotle
means that the account of a musical man is divided into the account of man and musical, or
whether it is, somehow, the musical man that is so divided. That is, it leaves open whether
the subject and form are merely parts of the account of the product, or whether they are
also parts of the product.
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bronze persists when we make a statue from it.10
Second, Aristotle claims that the product is in some way analyzable into
the accounts of the subject and form that was imposed upon it to create that
product. Unfortunately, Aristotle says little to explain this point. For our
purposes, we need only observe that he thinks that when we explain what a
musical man is, we must do so in terms of being musical and being a man.
Similarly, when we explain what it is to be a bronze statue, we must do so in
terms of what it is to be bronze and what it is to have the form of that statue.
This second conclusion entails that the subject must remain the same kind
of thing, i.e. it remains that kind of thing which the product will, in part,
be analyzable into. For instance, the music student remains a man as she
learns music, the very thing that a musical man is in part analyzable into.
So Aristotle seems to accept what I call Persistence (PER):
PER For any change, there is a subject of that change, that subject persists,
that subject remains the same kind of thing, and that subject along
with some form makes up the product of that change.
Aristotle has told us he will speak generally about change. So PER has un-
restricted scope. In every change, the product comes about when the subject
comes to possess some form while remaining the same kind of thing. The
resulting product is a compound of this subject and form. And, so, we expect
that for any change whatsoever, we can identify a persisting subject and that
kind of thing the subject remains; the kind the product will be partly ana-
lyzable into. However, PER cannot easily be applied to every change that
Aristotle discusses, and Aristotle himself may even offer a counter-example
to it.
10Aristotle is careful not to offer any specific theory of how they are so made up.
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After speaking generally about change, Aristotle turns to distinguish
qualified change from unqualified change (190a31–33). During an unquali-
fied change, a natural being comes into or goes out of existence, e.g. a dolphin
is born. The subject of an unqualified change is what Aristotle calls matter
(ὕλη; 192a31–32).11 A natural being comes into existence when the matter
comes to possess some form, and that form and matter together make up
that new natural being.
In contrast, during a qualified change, no new natural being comes into or
goes out of existence, e.g. a dolphin grows larger.12 The subjects of qualified
changes are individual substances, things like men, dogs, trees, etc.
Aristotle’s goal is to defend his general claims by showing that they also
apply to the harder case of unqualified change (190b1–3). He argues for this
by example:
For in every case there is something that is a subject from which
the thing that comes into being [comes into being], as plants and
animals come into being from sperma. Some of the things that
come into being without qualification do so by change of figure
(for instance, a statue); some by addition (for instance, grow-
ing things); some by subtraction (for instance, Hermes from the
stone); some by composition (for instance, a house); some by al-
teration (for instance, by being turned [into something else] in
accordance with matter (190b3–10).13
Here are the five examples of unqualified changes:
11For the purposes of what follows, I use ‘matter’ for only the subjects of unqualified
changes. However, Aristotle does say that, in a sense, the subject of every change is matter.
See, for instance, GC 320a2–5.
12Some believe that a non-natural entity, a kooky object, comes into or out of existence
during these change. Code {25, 24} and Matthews {67, 68} argues that Aristotle believes
in kooky objects. Shields {77, c. 6} argues that Aristotle does not believe in what he calls
hyper-finely-individuated objects. The issue is not important for my purposes, so I set it
aside.
13ἀεὶ γὰρ ἔστι ὃ ὑpiόκειται, ἐξ οὗ τὸ γιγνόμενον, οἷον τὰ φυτὰ καὶ τὰ ζῷα ἐκ σpiέρματος. γίγνεται
δὲ τὰ γιγνόμενα ἁpiλῶς τὰ μὲν μετασχηματίσει, οἷον ἀνδριάς, τὰ δὲ piροσθέσει, οἷον τὰ αὐξανόμενα,
τὰ δ’ ἀφαιρέσει, οἷον ἐκ τοῦ λίθου ὁ ῾Ερμῆς, τὰ δὲ συνθέσει, οἷον οἰκία, τὰ δ’ ἀλλοιώσει, οἷον τὰ
τρεpiόμενα κατὰ τὴν ὕλην.
106
4.2. THE SPERMA PUZZLE
By change of figure: A bronze statue is formed by changing the shape of
some bronze.
By subtraction: A stone statue is formed by chipping away pieces of stone
from a block of stone.
By composition: A house is built by combining appropriate bricks, wood,
and other building materials.
By alteration of some material: Vinegar is produced by altering the wa-
ter in some wine.14
By addition: Growing things, animals, are generated when sperma is
added to in some appropriate way.15
This lists five processes of unqualified change, e.g. subtraction is a process in
which bits of something are taken away to leave a new entity like a statue.
Now we expect Aristotle can apply PER to these five types of unqualified
changes. Our expectation seems met in four of these five cases.
When we sculpt a statue from some bronze, the bronze is the subject, the
bronze persists, the bronze remains bronze, and the bronze along with the
form of the statue makes up that new statue.
When we chisel a statue by chipping away at some stone, the stone is the
subject, the stone persists, the stone remains a stone, and the stone along
with the form of the statue makes up that new statue.
When we build a house from some bricks, the bricks are the subject, the
bricks persist, the bricks remain brick, and the bricks along with the form
of the house makes up that new house.
14This suggestion is from Ross {74, p. 493}.
15In what follows, I will speak only of animals and ignore plants. Aristotle’s botanical
works have been lost.
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When we turn some water into vinegar, the water is the subject, the water
persists, the water remains water, and the water and form of the vinegar
makes up that vinegar.
However, it is difficult to apply PER to the fifth case, the generation of an-
imals. Aristotle says that animals come into being from ‘σpiέρμα’. I will leave
this phrase untranslated and use the transliteration ‘sperma’. Thus we ex-
pect Aristotle to believe the following: when animals are generated from
sperma, sperma is the subject, sperma persists, sperma remains sperma,
and sperma along with the form of the animal makes up that newly gener-
ated animal.
This is puzzling. Let us, for the moment, assume that Aristotle thinks
of mammalian eggs as sperma. Socrates comes into being from his mother’s
egg being fertilized. However, the following claim is false: the egg persists,
the egg remains an egg, and the egg along with the form of Socrates makes
up Socrates. But this is absurd. The egg is destroyed in the process of being
fertilized.
This is a clear difficulty. In the same chapter, Aristotle seems to claim
PER and also to give a counter-example to PER. I will present this diffi-
culty as what I call the Sperma Puzzle. The Sperma Puzzle comprises three
claims:
A1 For any change, there is a subject of that change, that subject persists,
that subject remains the same kind of thing, and that subject along
with some form makes up the product of that change. (PER)
A2 For the generation of any animal, the subject of that generation is
sperma.
A3 For the generation of any animal, the subject of that generation is
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sperma, that subject persists, that subject remains sperma, and that
subject along with the form of the animal makes up that newly gener-
ated animal.
The puzzle arises because what Aristotle explicitly says seems to commit
him to A1. He says A2. And while A1 and A2 together do not entail A3,
they clearly suggest A3, i.e. that the subject remains sperma throughout
the change. Similarly, when Arstotle says that a Hermes is made from
stone, there is little reason to deny that he thinks the subject remains stone
throughout the change. However, A3 seems false. Hence, Aristotle seems
committed to a bizarre falsehood. While Aristotle may be committed to many
falsehoods, interpreters have spilled much ink avoiding ways to attribute
this falsehood to him. They do so not because they wish to defend Aristo-
tle’s views on reproduction, but because they wish to properly understand
his views on matter and hylomorphism.
I first survey and reject two different responses to the Sperma Puzzle.
The first rejects A1 (and A3). It claims that Aristotle never defends PER at
all. On this view, Aristotle believes that the subjects of qualified changes
persist, but the subjects of unqualified changes do not persist. The second
accepts A1 and A2, but not A3. It claims that while the subjects of natural
generations do persist, they do not remain sperma.
Neither of these responses examines Aristotle’s biological works in detail.
This is unfortunate. In the first book of Generation of Animals, Aristotle of-
fers a sophisticated view about the nature of sperma. By bringing these de-
tails into focus, I argue that he does accept the apparently bizarre claim that
sperma persists, remains sperma, and is present in the new animal, i.e. he
accepts each of A1–A3. However, I argue that the claim makes sense given
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Aristotle’s views of reproduction. To be sure, the claim is false—Aristotle’s
biology has been superseded. Nevertheless, I show that by bringing some
salient details of Aristotle’s biological works into focus, we can ease what
has been considered a deep tension in Aristotle’s discussion of persistence,
matter, and hylomorphism in Phys. I.7.
4.3 Solution One: Restricting the Analysis
Introduction
Recall that the Sperma Puzzle arises, in part, because Aristotle begins Phys.
I.7 by claiming that he will speak generally of all change. He seems to com-
mit himself to PER when doing so. So we expect Aristotle to apply PER to
the sperma case.
However, William Charlton rejects this reading of Phys. I.7. He denies
that Aristotle ever accepts PER. According to Charlton, Aristotle only com-
mits himself to a restricted version of PER:16
PER* For any qualified change, there is a subject of that change, that sub-
ject persists, that subject remains the same kind of thing, and that
subject along with some form makes up the product of that change.
So Charlton denies that Aristotle accepts PER. According to Charlton, the
subject of every qualified change persists, but the subjects of unqualified
changes do not. Charlton explains this by saying that even though animals
are made from sperma they are not made of sperma.17 He generalizes from
this example to the claim that while each natural being is made from some
16Charlton {23, pp. 70–79}. See also Jones {51}.
17Charlton {23, pp. 76–77}.
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pre-existing matter, it is not made of this pre-existing matter, e.g. earth
and water are the matter that clay is made from, but not the matter clay
is made of. Charlton says little to explain the difference being made from
and made of. However, he clearly has in mind the distinction Karen Bennett
nicely draws between synchronic and, what she calls, diachronic composition
relations.18 I will use her discussion to clarify Charlton’s interpretation.
Bennett argues that synchronic and diachronic composition are two dis-
tinct kinds of composition relations. She argues for this claim by considering
various examples. Take some flour, yeast, salt, and water. By mixing these
ingredients together and baking the resulting dough, you make a loaf of
bread. This loaf of bread is composed of the flour, yeast, salt, and water.
But these ingredients compose the bread in a different way from how some
pieces of wood compose a chair. According to Bennett, the relation between
the wood and chair is both a diachronic and synchronic relation. However,
the relation between the bread and the yeast, flour, salt, and water is only a
diachronic relation.
Bennett argues that diachronic composition and synchronic composition
are different relations by considering how the ingredients something is made
from are changed when they are made into that new thing. For instance, the
flour and eggs are destroyed when you make them into a cake. Similarly,
squash and onions are destroyed when you slice and mash them to make
butternut squash soup. In contrast, the wood is preserved when you make
it into a chair. So the flour and egg diachronically compose the bread. But
since the flour and egg are destroyed when you make them into bread, they
do not synchronically compose the bread.19
18Bennett {7}.
19Others have offered controversial examples. Earley {30} claims that atoms are de-
stroyed when they are made into molecules. Burke {17, 16} claims that a piece of bronze is
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While Bennett offers further details, her relevant claim for our purposes
is that what diachronically composes an entity need not synchronically com-
pose that entity.
Bennett’s distinction between synchronic and diachronic composition
provides a useful way of stating Charlton’s interpretation. He believes that
(i) sperma diachronically composes an animal, but the sperma does not syn-
chronically compose that animal. (ii) Nothing else which diachronically com-
poses an animal synchronically composes that animal. Charlton offers three
arguments for this reading. Each argument is unconvincing.
Argument 1
Charlton’s first argument focuses on the matter that synchronically com-
poses, say, a dog. According to Charlton, if the dog were dissected, no sperma
would be found. Thus the dog is not synchronically composed of sperma. His
argument has the following steps:
1. A dog is synchronically composed of flesh and bones.
2. It is not the case that a dog is diachronically composed of flesh and
bone.
3. A dog is diachronically composed of sperma.
4. Flesh and bones are distinct from sperma. (From 1–3)
5. It is not the case that a dog is synchronically composed of sperma.
(From 1&5)20
destroyed when it is made into a statue. Similarly, glass is made from lightning striking
sand, ash is made from burning wood, and diamonds are made from compressing coal. But
there is no sand in the glass, there is no wood in the ash, there is no coal in the diamonds.
(Consider whether a clear window is sandy).
20Charlton {23, pp. 76–77}.
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Claim 1 is meant to be supported by the fact that animals have material
bodies that are made up of flesh and bones. Charlton argues for Claim 2 by
claiming that flesh and bones do not become a dog. That is, flesh and bone
undergo no process of change that brings a dog into existence. Rather, flesh
and bones are parts of the product of that process which results in a new
dog, i.e. they are parts of the body of the dog. Claim 3 comes from Aristotle’s
claim that animals come into being from sperma. Claim 4 follows from 1–3:
if sperma is identical to x, then sperma should have the various properties
of x and vice versa. Since bones and flesh never diachronically composed
the dog while sperma did, then they must be distinct from sperma. And,
according to Charlton, 5 follows from 1–4.
However, premise 1 turns on an important ambiguity. In order for the
argument to be valid, we must read 1 as 1*:
1*. A dog is only synchronically composed of flesh and bones.
When we read 1 as 1*, the argument is valid. Sperma would then be dis-
tinct from each of those things that synchronically composes a dog. But if
Charlton intends 1*, then he is mistaken to attribute it to Aristotle. Dogs
are also composed of things like organs and blood. Charlton needs to provide
an argument that, for Aristotle, sperma is also distinct from each of these
things, an argument that he does not provide.
The general problem here is that Charlton assumes that, for Aristotle,
sperma is distinct from each of those things that synchronically composes
the dog. However, he does not defend this assumption by examining Aris-
totle’s biological works. In these works, Aristotle offers a rich account of
both the generation and make up of animals. In the last two sections, I
discuss this account and show that sperma is identical to something which
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synchronically composes the dog.
Argument 2
Charlton’s second argument is the following: sperma is “the factor the disap-
pearance of which makes the change to an animal a coming into existence.”21
According to Charlton, Aristotle distinguishes qualified change from unqual-
ified change by saying that the subjects of qualified changes persist while the
subjects of unqualified changes do not. This argument turns on two claims:
(i) Unqualified changes and qualified changes are distinct kinds of changes.
(ii) What distinguishes one kind of change from the other is that the subjects
of qualified changes persist while the subjects of unqualified changes do not.
Claim (i) is uncontroversial. Aristotle does say that he will first talk
generally about all change before distinguishing different kinds of change
(189b30–32). So we expect Aristotle to tell us how unqualified change dif-
fers from qualified change. On Charlton’s view, Aristotle satisfies this expec-
tation by telling us that the subjects of qualified changes persist while the
subjects of unqualified changes do not (claim (ii)).
Claim (ii) would distinguish unqualified change from qualified change.
But is there any evidence that Aristotle does distinguish these kinds of
changes in this way, or must distinguish these kinds of changes in this way
in Phys. I.7? Aristotle tells us how they differ as follows:
(a) A thing is said to come into being in many ways, and (b), in
some cases, some things are said not to come into being, but, in
these cases, a thing comes to be something; (c) only substances
are said to come into being without qualification (190a31–33).22
21Charlton {23, p. 77}.
22piολλαχῶς δὲ λεγομένου τοῦ γίγνεσθαι, καὶ τῶν μὲν οὐ γίγνεσθαι ἀλλὰ τόδε τι γίγνεσθαι, ἁpiλῶς
δὲ γίγνεσθαι τῶν οὐσιῶν μόνον.
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In (a), Aristotle says that change is said in many ways. He distinguishes two
different ways that change is said in (b) and (c). This distinction turns on
the various entities that can be said to come into being. Certain entities are
said to come into being only with qualification. These are entities from non-
substantial categories, e.g. musical, heat, and colour. These non-substantial
entities are said to come into being insofar as some substance comes to be
qualified. For instance, the hot comes into being only insofar as Socrates or
some other substance comes to be hot. Aristotle explains as follows:
In the other cases it is evident that there must something under-
lying whatever is coming to be; for a quantity, quality, relative,
and place, come to be of a subject, because the substance is the
only thing that is never said of any other subject, whereas every-
thing is said of a substance (190a33–190b1).23
In this passage, Aristotle assumes two things. First, he assumes a distinc-
tion between substantial and non-substantial entities. Substances are not
qualities of anything else while all non-substantial items are qualities of a
substance. Second, he assumes that when a non-substantial item comes into
being, it does so because some substance changes in one of its qualities.24
These two assumptions are related. It is precisely because non-substantial
entities are qualities of substances that non-substantial entities come into
being in virtue of substances changing in one of their qualities.
23κατὰ μὲν τἆλλα φανερὸν ὅτι ἀνάγκη ὑpiοκεῖσθαί τι τὸ γιγνόμενον καὶ γὰρ piοσὸν καὶ piοιὸν καὶ
piρὸς ἕτερον [καὶ piοτὲ] καὶ piοὺ γίγνεται ὑpiοκειμένου τινὸς διὰ τὸ μόνην τὴν οὐσίαν μηθενὸς κατ’
ἄλλου λέγεσθαι ὑpiοκειμένου, τὰ δ’ ἄλλα piάντα κατὰ τῆς οὐσίας·
24Unfortunately, Aristotle does not tell us what he means by ‘qualities come into being’.
The phrase can be understood in at least two different ways. First, when a dolphin warms
up, a new entity comes into existence. This could be either some hot object or the property
instance of heat which is related to but numerically distinct from that dolphin. Second,
when a dolphin warms up, we can speak as if a new entity comes into existence, but no new
entity did, in fact, come into existence. I see no way of deciding the issue here, but I do not
think we need to. Aristotle does believe that the sentence ‘the hot comes into being’ and
‘the hot perishes’ are true, but we can remain neutral about what underlying metaphysics
he thinks makes these sentences true. We can be neutral because no understanding of
the ontology of qualifications is required to understand his initially plausible distinction
between qualified change and unqualified change.
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In contrast, unqualified changes do not involve any substance coming to
qualify the subject of the unqualified change. For instance, when Socrates
comes into existence, no substance comes to be qualified by Socrates.
Recall that Charlton claims that Aristotle distinguishes qualified from
unqualified change by claiming that the subject of the former persists, but
the subjects of the latter do not. This is compatible with what Aristotle
explicitly says. He explicitly distinguishes the two changes in two related
ways. First, he distinguishes them in terms of the kind of entities that come
into being, i.e. qualifications or substances. Second, he distinguishes them
in terms of how those entities relate to the subject of change. In qualified
changes, the qualities that come into being do so by qualifying the subject
of change. In unqualified changes, substances come into being but not by
qualifying the subject of change. But while Charlton’s interpretation is com-
patible with what Aristotle says, nowhere in our text does he try distinguish
the changes as Charlton suggests.
So Charlton needs to argue that what Aristotle explicitly says entails that
the subjects of qualified changes persist while the subjects of unqualified
changes do not. I do not deny that some argument might be forthcoming.
But some argument is needed.25
Argument 3
Finally, Charlton observes that Aristotle does not explicitly say that sperma
persists.26 He is right. Aristotle nowhere explicitly says that sperma per-
25Charlton {23, p. 77} does mention GC I.4. Some, like Broadie {14} agree that Aristotle in
GC I.4 distinguishes unqualified change from qualified change by claiming that the subjects
of the latter persist, but the subjects of the former do not. But this is a controversial and
a minority interpretation of that chapter, an interpretation that Charlton does not try to
defend. See Charles {22}, Williams {88, pp. 211–219}.
26Charlton {23, p. 77}.
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sists.
However, this omission is no evidence that Aristotle does not believe that
sperma persists. First, Aristotle speaks generally about the subjects of every
change. Doing so, he says that the subject persists. Since Aristotle does not
explicitly say that sperma persists, according to Charlton, Aristotle some-
how retracts his general claims about all change. But there is a more plau-
sible explanation: Aristotle said that in every change the subject persists.
After he says that sperma is a subject, he does not explicitly say that sperma
persists because doing so would be redundant.
4.4 Solution 2: Sperma does not Remain Sperma
Introduction
Recall that Aristotle seems to believe that when a dolphin is generated from
some sperma, the sperma remains sperma and is present in that dolphin.
This is puzzling. Why would Aristotle think that a dolphin is synchroni-
cally composed of sperma? Our second solution to the Sperma Puzzle claims
that the subject persists but denies that the subject remains sperma, and so
denies that sperma makes up that dolphin.
Consider again A2 and A3:
A2 For the generation of any animal, the subject of that generation is
sperma.
A3 For the generation of any animal, the subject of that generation is
sperma, that subject persists, that subject remains sperma, and that
subject is present in the newly generated animal.
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Terence Irwin argues that Aristotle accepts A2, but denies that Aristotle
accepts A3. On Irwin’s reading, the subject is sperma at the beginning of the
change, but the subject does not remain sperma throughout the change. In
order to explain Irwin’s proposed solution, let me say something about his
general interpretation of the chapter. He explains his view as follows:
Aristotle argues, however, that there is always both a persisting
subject and a non-persisting contrary. A full description says that
the man who was unmusical becomes musical because he had the
quality unmusicality and has lost it, acquiring its contrary, musi-
cality. Other descriptions are true, but less informative, because
they do not refer to the items involved in the change under the
appropriate full descriptions. We can say ‘The unmusical man
becomes musical’, and ‘The unmusicality (to amouson) became
musicality’, because we refer coincidentally to the appropriate
items.27
I will call Irwin’s interpretation of Aristotle’s general claims about change
the intensional reading. I call defenders of the intensional reading intension-
alists.28 Intensionalists see Aristotle claiming that we can truly describe the
same change in different ways. However, they think that one of these de-
scriptions is privileged. They think a description is privileged when that
description says which subject persists and somehow explains how that sub-
ject persists. To illustrate this point, let us consider a music lesson once
again. We can describe a musical lesson in each of the following ways:
A The man comes to be musical (189b34–35).
B The not-musical thing comes to be musical (189b35–36).
C The not-musical man comes to be a musical man (190a1–5).
27Irwin {48, p. 88}.
28Most accept the intensional reading: Bostock {12}, Waterlow {84}, Charlton {23}, Dancy
{29}, Ebrey {31}, Jones {51}, Irwin {48}, Gill {38}, Kelsey {54}, Ross {74}.
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Intensionalists believe that A–C are different ways of describing the very
same event, the same change. In different ways, each description describes
the subject before and after the change, i.e. ‘man’, ‘musical’, ‘unmusical’,
‘unmusical man’, and ‘musical man’ are all different ways of describing the
very same subject of change.29
Although [A]–[C] describe the same change, intensionalists say that each
description says different things about that change. For instance, when we
describe the change as ‘the unmusical becomes musical’ we say that the pri-
vation unmusical is possessed by something that becomes musical. But by
describing the change in this way, we do not also say which subject becomes
musical or what that subject remains, e.g. that it is a man that becomes mu-
sical and remains a man. In order to describe a change fully, intensionalists
claim that we must use a term that says what the persisting subject is and
what it remains.30
So intensionalists think that Aristotle’s focus is on the full descriptions
of the change. In order for a description to be full, it must contain what I
call a D-term. Let me summarize what a D-term is by stating the following
independently necessary and jointly sufficient conditions for a term T to be
a D-term:
N1: T refers to the subject.
N2: T remains true of the subject as that subject changes.
29Quoting [A]–[B], Waterlow {84, p. 12} claims that ‘what occurs on either side of the verb
is a simple term. Quoting [C], she says that in this ‘third type [of become sentence] what
occurs on each side is a complex term.’ She claims that we can use both these simple and
complex terms to describe the very same entity.
30Waterlow {84, p. 14} says both these things: (i) the term ‘man’ remains through the
change while the term ‘unmusical’ does not. [A]lthough ‘uncultured’ does not ‘remain’ (i.e.
it cannot coherently be added to the right-hand formula in any of the sentences), another
description,‘man’, of the same component does ‘remain.’ (ii) since the description remains
then so does the subject under that description: Thus the same thing (component) remains
under one description though not under the other.’
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N3: In some way, T explains how the subject persists through the change.
Conditions N1 and N2 are straightforward. N3 is less obvious. Intension-
alists require N3 because N1 and N2 are weak. They are both satisfied
by ‘snub-nosed’, ‘being the son of Sophroniscus’, ‘being once musical’, and
so on. After all, Socrates also remains snub-nosed as he becomes musical.
But, according to intensionalists, while ‘snub-nosed’ satisfies N1 and N2 it
is not a D-term. Since they think that a D-term must do more than remain
true of the subject, they interpret Aristotle as believing that this term must
somehow explain how the subject persists through the change (N3).31 While
‘snub-nosed’ satisfies N1 and N2, it does not satisfy N3. Thus it is not a
D-term.
Intensionalists and the Sperma Puzzle
According to intensionalists, Aristotle tells us that we can describe the sub-
ject of change and the change it undergoes in many different ways. This
allows them to claim that ‘sperma’ is just one of the many ways of describing
the subject of a natural generation. Hence, ‘animals come into being from
sperma’ is also just one of the many ways of describing a natural generation.
However, according to intensionalists like Irwin, just because ‘sperma’ de-
scribes the subject at the start of the change, it need not describe the subject
throughout the change, i.e. the subject need not remain sperma.
Intensionalists could defend this reading in different ways. The best de-
31On the view I arued for in the last chapter, a D-term would explain how the subject
persists by describing whatever grounds the ability of the subject to be acted upon as it
is being changed. In contrast, Waterlow {84, p. 22} claims that the relevant term that
remains true of the subject “must import characteristic C whose instances are substantial
individuals qua instances of C.” And she conjectures (Waterlow {84, p. 25}) that in order for
a term to import C, that term must import principles of individuation for the subject we
refer to with that term.
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fense is Irwin’s and it is the one that I focus on here. According to Irwin,
‘sperma’ refers to the sperma as a stage of one persisting subject. In partic-
ular, ‘sperma’ refers to what is sperma at the beginning of the change. And,
according to Irwin, what is sperma at the beginning of the change is some
matter that constitutes the sperma (he takes the ‘is’ as the is of constitu-
tion). Since ‘sperma’ refers to what is sperma, and what is sperma is the
matter which synchronically composes sperma, this allows Irwin to claim
that ‘sperma’ refers to the matter of sperma, i.e. it applies to the “continu-
ous thing that is the matter of the organism.”32 This matter first composes
sperma, then a zygote, then an embryo, etc. Thus Irwin claims that the
matter persists, but does not remain sperma.
An analogy will help: suppose a sculptor makes a statue out of a bronze
pot. The bronze pot does not persist through this sculpting. Rather, it is the
bronze that synchronically composes the pot which persists and comes to
synchronically compose the statue. This bronze does not remain a pot once
it has been made into a statue, nevertheless, it persists through the process.
So when we say that the statue is made from the pot, Irwin thinks that ‘pot’
can refer to the bronze which synchronically composed that pot.
Irwin’s reading does seem plausible. If the subject of a natural genera-
tion cannot remain sperma, the subject might still be sperma at the start
of the generation. And the fact that it does not remain sperma throughout
the generation is no evidence that it does not persist through it. However,
Irwin’s reading leaves Aristotle with a deficient argument for what appears
one of his main claims in Phys. I.7. Recall PER:
PER For any change, there is a subject of that change, that subject persists,
32Irwin {48, n. 26, p. 515}.
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that subject remains the same kind of thing, and that subject along
with some form makes up the product of that change.
A D-term picks out the kind of thing the persisting subject remains. We
have also seen that Aristotle thinks the product of a change is analyzable
partly into the subject of change. So he requires the subject to remain the
same kind of thing. He turns to defend his general claims about all change
by showing that they also apply to unqualified changes. He does by giving
five examples (see Section 2). If Aristotle is to convince us that his general
claims do apply to these five cases, he must provide the material for a full
description of each change, i.e. he must provide a D-term for each.
N1–N3 are individually necessary and jointly sufficient conditions for a
term to be a D-term. And Aristotle does state candidate D-terms for some
other unqualified changes, e.g. he says we can sculpt a statue from bronze.
‘Bronze’ does seem to satisfy each of N1–N3. It refers to the subject, remains
true of it, and explains how the subject persists, e.g. being bronze involves
the sorts of abilities like malleability that allows some bronze survive being
sculpted into a statue. A bronze statue will also partly be analyzable into
bronze.
However, on Irwin’s view, ‘sperma’ cannot be a D-term. On his reading,
‘sperma’ satisfies N1, but it cannot satisfy N2 or N3. Even though we can
use ‘sperma’ to refer to the one subject, he believes that ‘sperma’ does not
remain true of that subject as it changes. So it cannot satisfy N2. Hence,
the description ‘the animal comes into being from sperma’ is not, on Irwin’s
reading, a full description of the generation of that animal. Of course, Irwin
never claims that this is a full description; his whole point is that while a
true description, it is not full. The problem, though, is that Aristotle would
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not provide a full description of natural generations in Phys. I.7, i.e. he
would not provide us with a D-term to compose such a description.33 His
argument is then inadequate. Aristotle discusses these examples to show
that his general account applies to these controversial cases. Since animals
are paradigmatic natural beings, we expect Aristotle to tell us which kind
of thing the subject of natural generations remains. After all, we have no
difficulty applying PER to Aristotle’s four other cases of unqualified changes.
But, on Irwin’s reading, we have to suppose that Aristotle is silent about the
kind of thing the subject of natural generations remains.
This silence is not fatal to the intensional reading. Aristotle himself may
just be silent. However, if an interpretation can treat the sperma case anal-
ogously to the other four cases of unqualified change, i.e. show that Aristotle
really tells us what kind of thing the subject of natural generations remains,
then that interpretation should be preferred. In Sections 4–5, I offer such a
reading. Unlike Irwin, I claim that Aristotle explicitly tells us not only what
subject persists through a natural generation but also what it remains as
such—the subject is both sperma and remains sperma.
33One might try to augment Aristotle’s account by trying to identify elsewhere this per-
sisting entity and what it remains. Irwin in conversation suggests that we may even take
Aristotle’s discussion of matter several lines later (190b25) as supplying this kind. On
this reading, the subject of natural generations remains matter throughout the generation.
Some interpreters do think that Aristotle in Phys. I.7 defends the existence of prime-matter,
a sui generus entity. See Charlton {23, pp. 129-147} for discussion and references. These
interpreters accept that Aristotle should tell us the subject of natural generations and what
that subject remains. They puzzle about the sperma case and try use his reference to matter
to alleviate their puzzlement. But even if Aristotle is committed to the existence of prime-
matter in Phys. I.7, it is a stretch to say that he claims there that the subject of natural
generations remains prime-matter. If this were his view, we would expect prime-matter
to be also the subject of sculpting a statue and chiseling a Hermes from some rock. But
Aristotle tells us that the subject of the former is bronze, and the subject of the latter is
stone. A friend of prime-matter might still insist that the subject of a natural generation is
prime-matter. But they should first argue that we cannot take the sperma case literally, i.e.
take Aristotle as claiming that the subject is sperma and remains sperma. I argue below
that we can and should take the sperma case literally. If I’m right, the sperma case offers
no support for friends of prime-matter.
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4.5 A New Solution: The Generation of Animals
I have discussed two responses to the Sperma Puzzle and argued against
both. Both fail, I think, because they pay little attention to Aristotle’s bi-
ological works. In those works, particularly the first book of GA, Aristotle
talks in detail about the nature of sperma, how it is produced, and just how
animals come into being from sperma. By bringing these details into focus,
I will show that Aristotle really does believe that sperma persists and re-
mains sperma throughout a natural generation. I will divide my discussion
across two sections. In this section, I summarize the salient details about
the nature and production of sperma, as well as its role in the generation of
an animal. In the next section, I discuss the persistence of sperma.
In GA I.18, Aristotle discusses the nature of sperma:
In the beginning of this investigation and those which follow from
it, the first thing to do is understand what sperma is, for then it
will be easier to inquire into its operations and the phenomena
connected with it. Now the object of sperma is to be of such a
nature that primarily from it come into being those things which
are naturally formed (724a14–18; trans. from Platt slightly mod-
ified).34
In this quotation, Aristotle speaks of those things that are naturally formed.
These things that are naturally formed are animals. So Aristotle here offers
a criterion for sperma: sperma is that from which animals come into being.
Aristotle turns to both clarify this criterion and discuss those candidates
which satisfy it. His most important claim is the following:
Sperma is a useful residue of nutriment in its last stage (726a26–
29).35
34 Α᾿ρχὴ δὲ καὶ ταύτης τῆς σκέψεως καὶ τῶν ἑpiομένων piρῶτον λαβεῖν piερὶ σpiέρματος τί ἐστιν·
οὕτω γὰρ καὶ piερὶ τῶν ἔργων αὐτοῦ καὶ τῶν piερὶ αὐτὸ συμβαινόντων ἔσται μᾶλλον εὐθεώρητον.
βούλεται δὲ τοιοῦτον τὴν φύσιν εἶναι τὸ σpiέρμα ἐξ οὗ τὰ κατὰ φύσιν συνιστάμενα γίγνεται piρώτου
35῞Οτι μὲν οὖν piερίττωμά ἐστι τὸ σpiέρμα χρησίμου τροφῆς καὶ τῆς ἐσχάτης
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Here Aristotle characterizes sperma as a useful residue of ultimate nutri-
ment, i.e. a useful residue of food. If we put this characterization together
with the last, we get the following:
SP1 Sperma is a useful residue of ultimate nutriment from which an animal
comes into being.
While SP1 tells us that animals come into being from sperma, a more precise
version of SP1 is as follows:
SP2 Sperma is a useful residue of ultimate nutriment from which the parts
of the body come into being (725a11–13).
SP2 is a rich characterization of sperma that tells us: (i) The role sperma
plays in the generation of an animal. Namely, it is that from which an an-
imal comes into being. (ii) Sperma is first and foremost what the parts of
the animal come into being from, e.g. tissues come into being from sperma.
(iii) The entities which play this role, i.e. these entities are useful residues
of ultimate nutriment. (iv) The origin of sperma. We will see that sperma is
produced from the ultimate nutriment.36
Now SP1 and SP2 contain an ambiguity. This ambiguity is crucial for
understanding Aristotle’s discussion of sperma in GA. According to Aristotle,
we can read ‘come into being from’ in four different ways:
1. One thing comes after the other, e.g. day comes from night, man comes
from boy.
2. Opposites come from opposites, e.g. unmusical comes from musical,
sickness from health.
36I am here following Henry {42, p. 369–360}.
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3. A whole comes into being from some matter being shaped, e.g. a statue
comes into being from some bronze being appropriately shaped, a bed
comes into being from some wood being appropriately shaped.
4. The beginning of the movement comes from another, e.g. the beginning
of movement in artefacts is the arts, the burning of a house is the torch
(724a20–35).
We have just seen that Aristotle characterizes sperma as a residue from
which the parts of an animal come into being. However, we can understand
the phrase ‘from which the parts of an animal comes into being’ in several
different ways, and so understand SP2 in different ways. For ease of presen-
tation, I will explain the point by focusing on the phrase ‘animals come from
sperma’ instead of ‘the parts of the animal come into being from sperma’.
(1)–(4) offer four different ways to understand the phrase ‘animals come
from sperma’. We could mean that the animal merely comes after the
sperma in a similar way to how night comes after day in (1). We could also
mean that something changes from being sperma to being an animal. In
a similar way, Arion would change from being musical to unmusical if he
suffered a catastrophic brain injury (2). Alternatively, we could mean that
animals come from sperma as matter, e.g. a dolphin comes into being from
some sperma being appropriately informed. This would be similar to how a
bed comes into being from some wood being appropriately worked upon (3).
Finally, we could mean that sperma is what acts upon and makes an animal
out of the material. In a similar way, a statue comes from a sculptor, i.e. the
sculptor is what acts upon the material to create the statue.
Aristotle believes that (3) and (4) are the only plausible ways of reading
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‘come into being from’ in SP2.37 His goal is to show that SP2 describes two
different entities for each of these readings. First, he argues that semen
(γονἠ) is a useful residue of ultimate nutriment which acts upon and creates
an animal from some material, i.e. animals come from semen as efficient
cause. Second, he argues that the menses, or menstrual blood, (καταμήνια) is
also a residue, but it is the residue out of which the embryo is constructed,
i.e. animals comes from the menses as matter (726a28ff ).38 So Aristotle
thinks that SP2 describes semen when ‘come into being from’ refers to the
efficient cause. And he thinks that SP2 describes menses when ‘come into
being from’ refers to the material cause. So both the menses and semen are
sperma, albeit in different way. First, I will discuss the similarities between
the semen and menses, then I discuss the differences.
4.5.1 Similarities: Residues
Aristotle thinks that each type of sperma, both menses and semen, are
residues of ultimate nutriment. So Aristotle clearly associates sperma with
nutrition. Here it is important to stress that key to Aristotle’s understanding
of generation is the belief that all living things have the capacity to nourish
themselves (An 415b27—28, 416b9-–11). And, so, he thinks, possessing a
nutritive capacity or nutritive soul explains why living things are alive (DA
415a24–25). The generation of an organism, then, involves the creation of
some entity which has a nutritive soul, i.e. something which has the ability
to grow itself. Aristotle compares this to how a son sets up a home away from
37He quickly dismisses (1) and (2). See 724b2–4.
38Occasionally, Aristotle says that women do not produce sperma (c.f. 727a27–29.) This
can be confusing. However, when Aristotle speaks strictly, he says that the female does not
contribute semen (729a20–33, 771b20). For Aristotle, the female produces a different kind
of sperma from the male sperma (727b7). This is an impure sperma that needs to be worked
upon (728a26–27, 737a27–31). See also Balme and Gotthelf {3}, Henry {42, n.5 p.280}.
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his father (740a2—23). While a child, the father is responsible for the child’s
upkeep. Sufficiently grown, the child turns to manage his own affairs. Sim-
ilarly, Aristotle thinks that by acting upon the menses (one kind of sperma),
the semen (another kind of sperma) creates those parts of the embryo that
allow it grow itself, i.e. the heart (735a24, 741b16). Once these parts are
generated, an organism has the ability itself to control the generation and
growth of the rest of its body.
This explains why Aristotle connects sperma with nutrition. But what
does he mean by calling sperma a useful residue of nutriment? Aristotle
thinks that there are many different types of residues formed at different
stages of digestion. The first residues are those formed by the concoction of
food in the stomach. For our purposes, let us think of concoction as heating,
or, if you like, cooking. Once in the stomach, the food is cooked.39 Being
cooked, the food is transformed into nourishment. As an analogy, consider
potatoes. Raw potatoes are toxic. But when they are cooked, they become nu-
tritious. Similarly, food, Aristotle thinks, becomes nourishment only when it
is concocted in the stomach.
This process has a by-product. It is these by-products that Aristotle calls
residues (724b26–27, 745b18).40 These first residues are of two types. The
first is a residue that can be used to replenish and grow things like fat, hair,
nails, and so on (745b15ff ). The second is a residue that cannot immediately
be used by the body. This residue divides into two sub types, a liquid and
solid residue. The solid residue is useless and plays no role in growth. It is
sent to the intestines where it is condensed and finally excreted (PA 657b29–
33). In contrast, the liquid residue passes to the spleen for further processing
39For a book length discussion of concoction see Freudenthal {36}. See also Boylan {13}
40Analogously, consider how after roasting a chicken, the grizzle collects at the bottom of
the pan. This grizzle is a residue formed from cooking that chicken.
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after which it is useful for growth.41
While the residue from the stomach is concocted in the spleen, the orig-
inal nourishment is further concocted in the liver. We might compare these
two stages of concoction to extracting some metal from a rock. Suppose that
extracting gold from a rock involves first heating that rock and reducing it to
some molten state. Then suppose that we apply a much greater heat to the
molten goo and burn off what is not gold. Similarly, Aristotle thinks that,
in a sense, we purify food by burning of what is non-nutritious in several
distinct stages.
The third and final stage of concoction is the most important stage of di-
gestion. Here the nourishment will finally be purified. Again, there are two
products of this process, a residue and the nutriment. This is the nutriment
in its last stage, i.e. the ultimate nutriment. Aristotle thinks that this final
nutriment is blood. And blood, for Aristotle, is the purest nourishment that
can finally be used to grow and replenish the relevant parts of the body (PA
650a34–35, 651a14–15, 678a6–9, GA 726b1–5, 740a21).42 All the stages of
digestion lead to this point—the creation of blood.
Let us recall that Aristotle defines sperma as a useful residue of the ulti-
mate nutriment. We now see that he means that sperma is a useful residue
of that process which produces blood in the heart. In this sense, sperma is
the last residue of digestion. So both semen and menses are the last residue
of digestion, of that process which forms blood.
41For a much fuller description see Boylan {13}.
42Aristotle’s understanding of blood and the processes by which it replenishes these parts
is complicated. We need not concern ourselves with these complications here. For further
discussion, see Freudenthal {36}.
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4.5.2 Differences between semen and menses
While Aristotle thinks that both the male and female produce a useful
residue of ultimate nutriment, he thinks that the career of these residues
differs radically in both the male and female body. In the male body, this
residue is carried to the testes where it is further concocted into semen. In
contrast, the residue in the female body is collected in the uterus. But unlike
the male, Aristotle thinks that the female is unable to concoct this residue
into semen. This is why he says that the female is characterized by an in-
ability (728a17–21). Males can produce semen while females cannot. So if
the female cannot produce semen, what is the residue that collects in her
uterus?
This may appear surprising, but Aristotle thinks that this residue is just
blood (728a17–21). It is blood that is not being used by the mother for her
own growth and sustenance. Let me explain: Aristotle thinks that once
concocted in the heart, blood flows to various parts of the body through var-
ious blood vessels. He believes that many (smaller) vessels terminate in the
uterus. These vessels are supposed to transport blood to the various parts to
replenish and sustain those parts (738aff ). However, Aristotle thinks that
there is often a surplus of this blood. This surplus of blood collects near the
uterus until ultimately the blood “is excreted through very fine vessels into
the uterus, these being unable on account of their narrowness to receive the
extra quantity, and the result is a sort of haemorrhage” (738a14–16).43
The excretion of the blood into the uterus is an internal excretion. The
blood continues to collect in the uterus before finally being fertilized or dis-
charged (an external excretion). But while the blood collects in the uterus,
43ἐκκρίνεται διὰ λεpiτοτάτων φλεβῶν εἰς τὰς ὑστέρας, οὐ δυναμένων διὰ τὴν στενοχωρίαν δέχεσθαι
τὴν ὑpiερβολὴν τοῦ piλήθους, καὶ γίγνεται τὸ piάθος οἷον αἱμορροΐς.
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it undergoes no real change. Recall that the female cannot concoct this
blood into semen. Instead, Aristotle calls the uterus a receptacle for blood
(764b32–36). It is like an overflow tank. It collects the extra blood and dis-
charges it unless fertilized. The reason why this blood is a residue is that
it has not been used by the mother for her own growth and replenishment.
Similarly, if surplus timber remains after building a ship, that timber is a
residue.
4.6 The Sperma Puzzle Solved
Recall that the Sperma Puzzle arises because the sperma example seems to
violate PER:
PER For any change, there is a subject of that change, that subject persists,
that subject remains the same kind of thing, and that subject along
with some form makes up the product of that change.
PER requires that animals come into being from some subject which persists
through the change. However, Aristotle’s candidate for this subject, sperma,
does not seem to persist, remain sperma, and make up the newly generated
animal. Thus is seems not to satisfy PER. Sperma does fail to satisfy PER
if sperma is something like a mammalian egg or ovum. These entities are
destroyed when they are turned into new products. But our discussion of the
biology shows that sperma is not an ovum. Sperma is blood, and blood is not
an ovum.
It may seem surprising that Aristotle thinks that semen makes an em-
bryo out of blood. But this is why, for instance, he says that women tend not
to have nose bleeds when they are menstruating, and vice versa (727a1–25).
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If the blood is expelled from the nose, he thinks there will be no build up
of blood in the uterus. Similarly, this is why he thinks that the embryo is
nourished by the menstrual blood while it is in the uterus, i.e. the embryo
‘eats’ the blood that would normally be discharged once a month (733b26–31,
745b22ff, 775b11ff ).
Of course, semen does not fertilize blood. However, Aristotle was un-
aware of the mammalian ovum, and so was unaware that menstrual fluid is
a discharge of blood, ovum, the uterus lining, among other things. On Aris-
totle’s view, the material out of which the body is first formed just is blood.
And this blood is as much blood as that which is used to grow and replenish
the parts of the body, i.e. blood is used to create certain parts of the body,
but also grow and sustain those parts.44 This is why Aristotle says that the
matter out of which something is produced is also that out of which it grows
(740b2–8, 740b34–35).
An analogy will help: Suppose that a builder builds a wall with some
red bricks. One year later, she decides to double its height. She will do so
by adding some new layers of red bricks. So our builder uses red bricks to
initially create the wall and to later increase its size. At each stage, she uses
the same kind of material—red bricks. Similarly, Aristotle thinks that blood
is used to create the parts of the body, grow those parts, and replenish those
parts.
So by bringing the biological details into focus, we can see that sperma
does satisfy PER. Just as in his biological works, in Phys. I.7 Aristotle de-
scribes the process by which animals come into being from sperma as growth
(190b3–10). This is as we expect. Growth requires blood. The female sperma
44To put the point vividly, there is little difference between the blood that the semen turns
into an embryo and the blood that flows from the nose during a nose-bleed.
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is excess blood. This excess blood is turned into the first parts of the embryo.
So the persistence of (female) sperma requires only that this blood persists
and remains blood as the semen makes the first parts of an embryo out of
it. In other words, PER is satisfied as long as this excess blood persists,
remains blood, and is present in the new animal.
I have no direct argument that blood does persist through this process.
Instead, let me respond to two objections to the view I have put forward.
First, one might raise a new version of the Sperma Puzzle by questioning
whether the very same blood remains as it is used to construct the tissue,
blood vessels, heart, and so on, i.e. one might still question whether the
blood that was in the mother’s uterus is identical to any blood in the off-
spring’s tissues. Analogously, suppose that we were to pour a bucket of wa-
ter into a small paddle pool. The pool is mostly empty. Now suppose that the
pool is filled up by rainfall over a long period of time. Which exact portion of
the water persisted through the filling of the pool? If we cannot aswer this
question, we might doubt that any portion did, in fact, persist.
Answering this question requires that we determine what the identity
through time of portions of water consists in. Similarly, if we are to know
which portion of blood persists through a natural generation we must deter-
mine what the identity through time of portions of blood consists in. One
might object that I must show how Aristotle would answer these questions,
but that I have yet to do so.
However, Aristotle’s goal in Phys. I.7 is to show that there is a persisting
subject for each change. But meeting that goal does not require that he also
give an analysis of what the identity through time of objects consists in, or
indeed to give any general analysis of what persistence is. I have used the
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biological works to show that Aristotle believes that menstrual blood is one
kind of sperma and that this menstrual blood persists. It would also be out
of place for him to offer a metaphysics of persistence there. So while I agree
that my reading raises the interesting question of what the identity through
time of stuffs like blood and water consists in, I disagree that my reading is
undermined by the fact that Aristotle does not try answer this question in
Phys. I.7 or GA.
Second, recall how Aristotle claims that the product of every change is
somehow analyzable into both the persisting subject and form that it ac-
quires:
It is clear that everything comes into being from the subject and
the shape. For in a way the musical man is composed from
man and musical, since you will analyze him into their accounts
(190b19–23).45
By this, Aristotle means that when we explain what a musical man is we
must do so in terms of being musical and being a man. On my reading,
sperma is the persisting subject of natural generations. Thus when we ex-
plain what it is to be the product of such a process, we must do so in terms
of sperma and some appropriate form. But I imagine someone complaining
here that this is absurd. Socrates is the product of a natural generation.
However, why would Aristotle say that when we explain what Socrates is
we must do so in terms of sperma—blood produced by the mother—and some
form? Socrates is an ensouled body and not some informed blood.
Here let us recall SP1 and SP2:
SP1 Sperma is a useful residue of ultimate nutriment from which an animal
comes into being.
45ὅτι γίγνεται piᾶν ἔκ τε τοῦ ὑpiοκειμένου καὶ τῆς μορφῆς· σύγκειται γὰρ ὁ μουσικὸς ἄνθρωpiος ἐξ
ἀνθρώpiου καὶ μουσικοῦ τρόpiον τινά· διαλύσεις γὰρ [τοὺς λόγους] εἰς τοὺς λόγους τοὺς ἐκείνων.
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SP2 Sperma is a useful residue of ultimate nutriment from which the parts
of the body come into being.
SP2 says that sperma is that out of which the parts of the body are formed,
e.g. sperma is the blood out of which the tissue, blood vessels, and so on
are first formed. Aristotle need only say that it is these parts, rather than
Socrates himself, which are analyzable into sperma and some form. And
since sperma just is blood, Aristotle can and should say that when one ana-
lyzes tissue into sperma and some form, one is analyzing tissue in terms of
blood and some form.
Perhaps one will respond that if I am right then it is misleading of Aris-
totle to claim that animals come into being from sperma. One might object
that Aristotle should say that it is the parts of animals that come into being
from sperma. I do concede that Aristotle could provide more details in Phys.
I.7. However, I deny that, on my reading, Aristotle is misleading. For we saw
in the biological works that Aristotle claims SP1, but uses SP1 as a short-
hand for SP2. So we have good evidence that Aristotle says that animals
come into being from sperma, and that he also thinks that this is to spelt
out with the claim that the parts of animals come into being from sperma.46
Third, one might object that, on my reading, even if the subject from
which Arion comes into being persists, it does not persist throughout the
life of Arion. To bring this objection into focus, consider again the musical
lesson. When Arion learns music, he is the subject of musicality. And he
will remain the very same subject of musicality for as long as he remains
46One might still ask Aristotle just how blood makes up the first parts of an animal. But
Aristotle need not offer any details for the purposes of Phys. I.7. Recall that he carefully
says that a musical man is in a way composed of musical and man, and doesn’t tell us what
this way is. So he leaves open the larger question of just how the subject and form compose
the product of a change.
135
4.6. THE SPERMA PUZZLE SOLVED
musical, e.g. the Arion who plays his first concert is one and the same as the
Arion who plays his last. So the subject from which the musical man comes
into being not only persists through this production, it persists at least as
long as the musical man does. Natural generations, as I describe them for
Aristotle, cannot be like this. The sperma which persists as it is being made
into the first parts of the animal is the subject of the form of the animal
at the very early stages of development. Sufficiently grown the animal will
produce blood for itself. The blood that the animal produces for itself is not
sperma—surplus blood from the mother. So once the body of the animal has
sufficiently grown, the subject of the form of the animal is not the blood from
which it came into being. So, on my reading, (i) sperma is the subject from
which the animal comes into being, (ii) sperma is the subject of the form of
the animal at the initial stages of its life, but (iii) sperma is not the subject
of that form at later stages in the animal’s life.
Is (iii) a problem for my reading? It is a problem if Aristotle claims or
needs to claim that the form of the animal must have one and the same
material subject throughout the life of that animal. But Aristotle need not
accept this claim for the purposes of Phys. I.7. He needs to show that a
natural being, at the moment it comes into being, is composed, in a way,
of a form and the subject from which that natural being is produced. This
requires that the matter from which the natural being is produced persists
through the production and is part of that natural being at the moment of
its production. But this claim is compatible with the claim that this matter
is replaced throughout the life of the natural being. So, at least from the
perspective of Phys. I.7, (iii) poses no problem for my reading.
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4.7 Conclusion
In this chapter, I have discussed an apparent deep tension in Phys. I.7. Re-
call PERSISTENCE:
PER For any change, there is a subject of that change, that subject persists,
that subject remains the same kind of thing, and that subject along
with some form makes up the product of that change.
Aristotle seems committed to PER, but he also offers a counter-example to
PER. PER is a premise in Aristotle’s argument for hylomorphism in Phys.
I.7. So not only does Aristotle seem to contradict himself, he also seems to
undermine his own argument for hylomorphism, one of his signature inno-
vations.
While interpreters have responded to this puzzle in different ways, they
each respond by trying to dampen the most obvious and simple reading of
the sperma example: Sperma persists, remains sperma, and is present in the
new animal. Charlton responds by arguing that Aristotle never says PER at
all. Irwin responds by allowing Aristotle claim PER, but leaving Aristotle
silent about what kind of thing the subject of natural generations remains.
Both responses fit poorly with the natural flow of Phys. I.7. First, Aristotle
tells us he will speak generally about all change. When doing so, he claims
PER. So Charlton has to read Aristotle as retracting this general claim. Sec-
ond, Aristotle defends PER by showing how it applies to controversial cases.
Natural generations are one such case. But, on Irwin’s reading, Aristotle
does not tell us how natural generations satisfy PER.
By focusing on the biological details, I have shown that we need no
such intricate moves to interpret the sperma example. Aristotle tells us
which subject persists and what it remains—sperma. My reading offers a
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new, straightforward, and literal interpretation of the sperma example that
leaves Aristotle endorsing PER, telling us which subject persists, and telling
us what that subject remains. I submit that we should accept this reading
which is both simple and literal.
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CHAPTER 5
AN ELEATIC CHALLENGE IN PHYSICS I.8.
5.1 Introduction
In Physics I.8, Aristotle responds to a puzzle that led some philosophers to
deny that change exists. Persistence has been taken as key to understanding
this puzzle and Aristotle’s solution. My goal in this chapter to explain how
persistence plays a role in both this puzzle and Aristotle’s response. He
reports the puzzle as follows:
(1) They say that no being either comes to be or perishes. (2) For,
they say, it is necessary that what-comes-to-be comes to be either
from what-is or from what-is-not, and (3) it is not possible for
what-comes-to-be to come to be from either; (4) for what-is cannot
come to be (since it already is), (5) while nothing can come to be
from what-is-not (since there must be some subject). (6) And then,
having reached this result, they make things worse by going on
to say that there is no plurality, but only being itself (191a27–33
trans. Irwin and Fine slightly modified).1
In (1)–(6), Aristotle refers to an argument for the claim that being is one.
Call the claim that being is one monism, and call defenders of this view
Monists. Call the argument in (1)–(6) the Eleatic Challenge. The Challenge
has two stages. In the first stage, the Monist argues that change is impossi-
ble. In the second stage, the Monist argues that, since change is impossible,
being is one. In (1)–(5), Aristotle reports the first stage of the argument, and
he devotes Phys. I.8 to discussing and responding to it. In (6) he reports the
conclusion of the second stage of the argument. However, he does not explain
1φασιν οὔτε γίγνεσθαι τῶν ὄντων οὐδὲν οὔτε φθείρεσθαι διὰ τὸ ἀναγκαῖον μὲν εἶναι γίγνεσθαι
τὸ γιγνόμενον ἢ ἐξ ὄντος ἢ ἐκ μὴ ὄντος, ἐκ δὲ τούτων ἀμφοτέρων ἀδύνατον εἶναι· οὔτε γὰρ τὸ ὂν
γίγνεσθαι (εἶναι γὰρ ἤδη) ἔκ τε μὴ ὄντος οὐδὲν ἂν γενέσθαι· ὑpiοκεῖσθαι γάρ τι δεῖν. καὶ οὕτω δὴ
τὸ ἐφεξῆς συμβαῖνον αὔξοντες οὐδ’ εἶναι piολλά φασιν ἀλλὰ μόνον αὐτὸ τὸ ὄν.
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what (6) means nor does he discuss why the impossibility of change entails
(6) in Phys. I.8. But these omissions do not affect his overall strategy: he
argues that the first stage of the argument fails. If the Monist’s arguments
for the impossibility of change fails, their argument from the impossibility
of change to monism is unsound. It is unsound because it would assume the
false premise that change is impossible. So by rebutting the first stage of
the Eleatic Challenge, Aristotle argues that this argument for monism fails.
Aristotle summarizes his rebuttal to the Challenge at the end of the chap-
ter:
And so, as we have said, we have solved (7) the puzzles that com-
pelled people to do away with some of the things that we have
mentioned. For (8) this is why earlier thinkers were also diverted
from the road leading them to <an understanding of> coming to
be, perishing, and change in general. (9) For if they had seen this
nature <of the subject>,2 that would have cured all their igno-
rance (191b30–34).3
In (7) Aristotle speaks about those philosophers who deny that change ex-
ists, and in (8) says that they deny that any kind of change exists. For
example, they deny that people either come into being, move, grow, or al-
ter.4 Aristotle believes that this denial rests on a misunderstanding. In
(9) he diagnoses and corrects this misunderstanding: they misunderstand
the principles of nature. In particular, they misunderstand the nature of
the subject of change. If they understood what the subject of change is and
2Aristotle does not mention the word ‘subject’. But one Bekker page previously, he speaks
about the nature of the subject of change (ἡ δὲ ὑpiοκειμένη φύσις) (191a7–8). So I follow Irwin
and Fine when they supply ‘subject’(‘ὑpiοκειμένη’). See also Ross {74, p. 497}.
3ὥσθ’ (ὅpiερ ἐλέγομεν) αἱ ἀpiορίαι λύονται δι’ ἃς ἀναγκαζόμενοι ἀναιροῦσι τῶν εἰρημένων ἔνια·
διὰ γὰρ τοῦτο τοσοῦτον καὶ οἱ piρότερον ἐξετράpiησαν τῆς ὁδοῦ τῆς ἐpiὶ τὴν γένεσιν καὶ φθορὰν καὶ
ὅλως μεταβολήν· αὕτη γὰρ ἂν ὀφθεῖσα ἡ φύσις ἅpiασαν ἔλυσεν αὐτῶν τὴν ἄγνοιαν
4Aristotle says that these philosophers deny that ‘γένεσις’, ‘φθορά’ and ‘ὅλως μεταβολή’
exists. ‘μεταβολή’ is Aristotle’s most general word for change: it includes unqualified change,
growth, alteration, and locomotion, c.f. Phys. 225b7–9. Morison {71, p. 11–15}, and Ross {74,
p. 7–8} discuss how Aristotle uses different words for change and they discuss how these
words are related.
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what role the subject plays in change, they would not puzzle about whether
change is possible. Subsequently, they would not deny that change exists
and be ultimately led to endorse monism.5
Reconstructing the Eleatic Challenge and Aristotle’s response to this
Challenge is difficult. We expect that the source of the disagreement is one
over principles: Aristotle thinks that it is because the Monist has mistaken
views about the principles that they deny that change exists. But on the cor-
rect understanding of the principles, he argues that the Eleatic Challenge
fails. So Aristotle instills the following expectations: first, he will show us
why his predecessors views of the principles impale them on both horns of
the dilemma. Second, he will show us how his own view of the principles
allows him to escape either one or both horns of the dilemma. However,
it is difficult to reconstruct the argument and Aristotle’s solution in a way
that satisfies these expectations. For instance, some reconstructions of the
Challenge leave an argument that is obviously invalid and requires no un-
derstanding of the principles to see that it is invalid (see below for details).
An adequate reconstruction requires that we identify how exactly Aris-
totle’s disagreement with his predecessors over principles is at the heart
of the Eleatic Challenge and his response. Several think that the core of
the disagreement lies in issues of persistence. For instance, several see the
5In Phys. I.8, Aristotle argues that the Eleatic Challenge fails to establish the impossi-
bility of change. Doing so, he argues that change is possible. Showing that change possibly
exists does not show that change exists. However, earlier in the Physics Aristotle says: “We
can assume that some or all natural things are changing; a survey of instances makes it
clear that this is the case. At the same time, it is not our business to correct all mistakes,
but to do so only where someone has drawn false inferences from principles, and not oth-
erwise (185b12–16).”ἡμῖν δ’ ὑpiοκείσθω τὰ φύσει ἢ piάντα ἢ ἔνια κινούμενα εἶναι· δῆλον δ’ ἐκ τῆς
ἐpiαγωγῆς. ἅμα δ’ οὐδὲ λύειν ἅpiαντα piροσήκει, ἀλλ’ἢ ὅσα ἐκ τῶν ἀρχῶν τις ἐpiιδεικνὺς ψεύδεται,
ὅσα δὲ μή, οὔ. Some philosophers mistakingly believe certain things about the principles
of nature. And so they mistakingly argue that the assumption that natural beings exist
and change is false. Aristotle’s strategy is to correct these mistakes. While correcting these
mistakes does not prove that change exist, it does undermine a challenge to our common
belief that natural beings exist and change.
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Eleatic Challenge as containing a sub-argument for the first premise in the
following argument:
1. Sheer replacement is impossible.
2. If change exists, then change is identical to sheer replacement.
3. Thus change is impossible.
Here is an example of a sheer replacement: suppose that God were to com-
pletely annihilate Arion and every part that composes Arion. This annihila-
tion is not the same as squashing Arion flat or otherwise killing him (for in
these cases some of the material composing Arion survives). Now suppose
that a short while later God creates a bronze statue in the place where Arion
once stood. She doesn’t do this by, say, moulding some pre-existing bronze.
Rather, with one wave of her cosmic wand, she brings into being both the
material that composes the statue and the statue itself. If God were able to
do this, then the statue would have replaced Arion. The Eleatic Challenge,
supposedly, contains an argument that this kind of sheer replacement is im-
possible. Mary Louise Gill, for instance, writes:
Parmenides denied the possibility of change because, on his view,
for coming-to-be to occur, something must come to be from noth-
ing. Aristotle agrees with his predecessor in excluding such ab-
solute emergence, yet accommodates change by insisting that
coming-to-be, although involving replacement, also involves con-
tinuity. He thus avoids the charge that, when a change takes
place, the preexisting entity simply perishes into nothing and is
replaced by a product that emerges out of nothing.6
On this reading, the Eleatic Challenge claims that sheer replacement re-
quires that objects come into being from nothing and perish into nothing.
But the Eleatic Challenge argues that this is impossible. So if change is iden-
tical to sheer replacement, then change is impossible. In order to show that
6Gill {38, p. 7}. See also Waterlow {84, p. 8} and Irwin {48, p. 84–87}.
142
5.1. INTRODUCTION
change is possible, we have to explain just how changes differs from sheer
replacements. On this reading, Aristotle distinguishes the two by claim-
ing that something persists through changes while nothing persists through
sheer replacements. So on this way of reading Phys. I.8, persistence is key
to Aristotle’s solution. He recognizes that change requires some persisting
subject while the Monist was unaware of this requirement.
For some interpreters, diachronic criteria of identity are central to this
response. Sarah Waterlow, for instance, thinks that Aristotle must defend
the claim that something does persist through a change by convincing us
that the subject before and after the change are stages of the one continu-
ing subject.7 According to Waterlow, his defence consists in claiming that
diachronic criteria of identity are provided by the substance sortal that the
persisting subject falls under. For we recall that Waterlow thinks that Aris-
totle privileges a certain description of the subject of change because this
description embodies a diachronic criterion of identity for that persisting
subject.8
In this chapter, I offer a new reading of the Eleatic Challenge and Aris-
totle’s response. I argue that both Aristotle and the Monist accept the fol-
lowing two claims: (i) since changes occurs between opposites, a changing
being must be able to admit these opposites. (ii) Since an actor acts upon
and changes a changing being for the duration of the change, a changing
7See Ch.1 for further discussion.
8Waterlow {84, p. 20} Gill {38} agrees that, for Aristotle, something continues through
each change. However, according to her, what persists through an unqualified change are
features and properties of the pre-existing entity. For instance, when I turn some hot iron
into a sword, the heat of the iron persisted through the change. See Furth {37} for a similar
interpretation and Shields {76} for discussion of Gill. While these interpreters disagree on
the details, they agree that Phys. I.8 provides reasons for accepting that something persists
through each change, i.e. I.8 tells us that change is distinct from sheer replacement, and
so possible, because something persists through change but not sheer replacement. In con-
trast, Ebrey {31} and Kelsey {53} deny that persistence has anything to do with Aristotle’s
solution.
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being must be able to persist as it is being so acted upon. The Eleatic Chal-
lenge states an argument that (i) and (ii) cannot be simultaneously satisfied
by any being. If a being satisfies (i), it cannot satisfy (ii) and vice versa. And
if no being can simultaneously satisfy (i) and (ii), then no being can change.
Aristotle deploys his own view of the principles to show that (i) and (ii) can
be simultaneously satisfied.
This reading differs from alternatives in two ways. First, it finds sup-
port for the main premises of the Eleatic Challenge in the text of Phys. I.
For, on my reading, the Challenge argues that there is a tension between
the conclusion of Phys. I.5—the principles of nature are opposites—with the
conclusions of I.6—the subject of change is also a principle. Aristotle’s solu-
tion uses the material from Phys. I.7 to show that there is no such tension.
All interpreters agree that Aristotle uses his own view of the principles to
solve the Eleatic Challenge. But no interpreter has argued that support
for the main premises of the Challenge comes from earlier in Phys. I. Some
interpretations leave the main premises of the puzzle undefended. Other
interpretations defend the premises from outside the text of Phys. I.
Second, my reading offers a unique reading of how persistence plays a
role in Phys. I.8. On my reading, both the Monist and Aristotle assume
that it is a requirement for the existence of change C that there exists a
subject which can and does persist through C, something from which the
product comes into being and something which is subject for the form of
that product once it has come into being. Their debate is over whether this
requirement can be satisfied. Someone who denies this requirement will find
no argument in Phys. I.8 to convince them otherwise, e.g. they will not find
Aristotle using persistence to distinguish changes from sheer replacements.
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5.2 The Earlier Philosophers
Aristotle begins Phys. I.8 by saying the following:
(1) This is also the only solution to (2) the puzzle raised by (3) the
earlier philosophers, as we shall now explain (191a23–24).9
In (1) Aristotle says that his previous discussion will allow him solve a puz-
zle raised by those earlier philosophers he refers to in (3). So what Aristotle
writes in this chapter builds upon what he wrote in prior chapters, though
Aristotle does not say how. The puzzle he refers to in (2) is the Eleatic Chal-
lenge that I quoted in the introduction. Aristotle says that this is not his
own puzzle, but something argued by some of his predecessors; though he
does not say who. In this section, I explain how Phys. I.8 relates to the in-
vestigation of principles by discussing how Phys. I.8 relates to Phys. I as a
whole and identifying Aristotle’s targets.
In (1) Aristotle says that ‘this’ is also a solution to the Eleatic Challenge
he goes on to discuss. ‘This’ refers to Aristotle’s own view of the principles
of nature and how those principles are related. I will return to this below
when I discuss his solution to the challenge. What I want to flag here is
that Aristotle indicates that some or all of his own view of the principles
will help us to solve the Eleatic Challenge. This places a constraint on any
adequate interpretation of that challenge: an interpretation must explain
why Aristotle thinks that the Challenge can only be solved by deploying his
view of the principles. We will see that several interpretations of the Eleatic
Challenge fail to meet this constraint: they interpret the argument in such
a way that we can meet the challenge independently of any investigation of
the principles of nature.
9῞Οτι δὲ μοναχῶς οὕτω λύεται καὶ ἡ τῶν ἀρχαίων ἀpiορία, λέγωμεν μετὰ ταῦτα.
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In (3) Aristotle refers to the earlier philosophers, but nowhere in Phys.
I.8 does he state their names. Nevertheless, we can identify these philoso-
phers by one thing that he says about them: they believe that since change is
impossible, there is no plurality of beings but only being itself (see Introduc-
tion). Aristotle speaks about the same philosophers earlier in the Physics.
He begins Phys. I.2 as follows:
There must be either just one principle or more than one princi-
ple. If there is one principle, this principle is either unchangeable,
as Parmenides and Melissus say, or changeable as the physicists
say (184a15–18).10
Parmenides and Melissus both believe that there is one principle, and they
both deny that there are a plurality of beings.11 This principle is one and
unchangeable (184b25–185a1). It is also worth noting here that Aristotle
begins Phys. I.3 as follows:
If we examine the matter in this way, then, it seems impossible
for all things to be one. Nor is it difficult to rebut those arguments
used to show that all things are one, because both of them—
Melissus and Parmenides—argue sophistically (186a4–7).12
Here Aristotle says that Parmenides and Melissus use certain arguments to
prove that being is one.13 He spends Phys. I.2–3 discussing and rebutting
10 Α᾿νάγκη δ’ ἤτοι μίαν εἶναι τὴν ἀρχὴν ἢ piλείους, καὶ εἰ μίαν, ἤτοι ἀκίνητον, ὥς φησι Παρμενίδης
καὶ Μέλισσος, ἢ κινουμένην, ὥσpiερ οἱ φυσικοί· Aristotle uses the word ‘κίνεσις’ here. We could
translate this word as ‘movement’. If we translate the word in this way, Aristotle character-
izes Parmenides and Melissus as denying that only movement exists. But Parmenides and
Melissus deny that all change exists.
11In this quote, Aristotle says that they believe that there is one principle. He does not
say that they believe there are no plurality of beings. A monist like Thales believes that
there is only one principle—water—but he also believes that there are a plurality of beings.
Nevertheless, Aristotle clearly thinks that Melissus and Parmenides believe both that there
is one principle and that there are no other beings in addition to this one principle, c.f.
187a9–10.
12Τόν τε δὴ τρόpiον τοῦτον ἐpiιοῦσιν ἀδύνατον φαίνεται τὰ ὄντα ἓν εἶναι, καὶ ἐξ ὧν ἐpiιδεικνύουσι,
λύειν οὐ χαλεpiόν. ἀμφότεροι γὰρ ἐριστικῶς συλλογίζονται, καὶ Μέλισσος καὶ Παρμενίδης.
13In Phys. I.2. Aristotle discusses what Parmenides and Melissus could mean when they
say that being is one. For example, do they mean that only one individual exists, e.g. that
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some of those arguments. Phys. I.8 also refers to an argument that being
is one: since change is impossible, there is no plurality of beings but only
being itself. So while Aristotle does not mention Parmenides and Melissus
by name in Phys. I.8, he has these Eleatics in mind and is taking up again
the issues he introduced and discussed in I.2&3; the arguments of those who
believe that change is impossible and that being is one.
Some further evidence that Aristotle speaks about Parmenides in Phys.
I.8 is that Aristotle uses a certain metaphor to describe those who deny
change: they were diverted on their path of inquiry into the truth and na-
ture of beings (191a24–32, 191b31–33). This metaphor should remind us
of Parmenides. In his poem ‘On Nature’ Parmenides describes himself as a
traveller being carried beyond the beaten paths of mortal men (DK 28 B1’
1–12). He is carried along the path of night and day in a chariot guided
by daughters of the Sun, and finally brought to meet a Goddess. This God-
dess describes different paths of inquiry to him and explains which paths of
inquiry he can pursue and which he cannot. He can pursue the path of per-
suasion: that something is and cannot not be. But he cannot pursue the path
of inquiry into what is not and that it must not be (DK 28 B2’ 3–8.). When
Aristotle speaks of someone denying the existence of change being misled on
their path of inquiry, we easily hear him saying that Parmenides was misled
by the Goddess on his (Parmenides’) journey of inquiry.14
One might object that the philosophers who were misled by the puzzle
also include the natural philosophers. In Phys. I.4, Aristotle speaks of these
predecessors as follows:
only one human exists? Or do they mean that there are many individuals that exist but
that each individual is the same kind of thing, e.g. there are many things but each of them
is human? Aristotle argues that however we interpret ‘being’ and ‘one’, being cannot be one
(184b20–185b25).
14In addition, the next chapter begins by explicitly mentioning Parmenides (192a1).
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It seems likely that Anaxagoras posited an infinite number of
things in this way because he assumed the truth of the view
held by all the natural scientists that nothing comes into being
from non-being....They reasoned as follows: necessarily, every-
thing which comes into being comes either from things with be-
ing or from things without being; but it is impossible for anything
to come into being from non-being (all the natural scientists are
unanimous on this point); therefore, the only remaining possible
conclusion, they thought, was that anything which comes into be-
ing comes from things with being, which are already present in
the source (187a26–187b1).15
In this quote, Aristotle refers to a puzzle similar to the Eleatic Challenge
he reports in Phys. I.8. He says that this puzzle was tackled by the natural
philosophers: they accept that if X comes to be, then X cannot come to be
from what-is-not, but they argued that X can come to be from what-is. So
perhaps one might argue that the protagonists of Phys. I.8 include the natu-
ral philosophers. However, this cannot be the case. The natural philosophers
do not deny that change is possible nor do they deny that there are a plu-
rality of beings. They try to solve the Eleatic Challenge and do not endorse
the conclusion of that challenge. However, their response is inadequate, ac-
cording to Aristotle, for he believes that their particular understanding of
the principles is inadequate.
This inadequacy is important for understanding the Eleatic Challenge
and Aristotle’s solution: Aristotle’s solution must be unavailable to these
natural philosophers, i.e. there must be some unique features of Aristotle’s
view of the principles that he thinks are precisely what is required for meet-
15ἔοικε δὲ Α᾿ναξαγόρας ἄpiειρα οὕτως οἰηθῆναι διὰ τὸ ὑpiολαμβάνειν τὴν κοινὴν δόξαν τῶν φυσικῶν
εἶναι ἀληθῆ, ὡς οὐ γιγνομένου οὐδενὸς ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος (διὰ τοῦτο γὰρ οὕτω λέγουσιν, ἦν ὁμοῦ
piάντα, καὶ τὸ γίγνεσθαι τοιόνδε καθέστηκεν ἀλλοιοῦσθαι, οἱ δὲ σύγκρισιν καὶ διάκρισιν)· ἔτι δ’ ἐκ
τοῦ γίγνεσθαι ἐξ ἀλλήλων τἀναντία· ἐνυpiῆρχεν ἄρα· εἰ γὰρ piᾶν μὲν τὸ γιγνόμενον ἀνάγκη γίγνεσθαι
ἢ ἐξ ὄντων ἢ ἐκ μὴ ὄντων, τούτων δὲ τὸ μὲν ἐκ μὴ ὄντων γίγνεσθαι ἀδύνατον (piερὶ γὰρ ταύτης
ὁμογνωμονοῦσι τῆς δόξης ἅpiαντες οἱ piερὶ φύσεως), τὸ λοιpiὸν ἤδη συμβαίνειν ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἐνόμισαν,
ἐξ ὄντων μὲν καὶ ἐνυpiαρχόντων γίγνεσθαι, διὰ μικρότητα δὲ τῶν ὄγκων ἐξ ἀναισθήτων ἡμῖν.
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ing the Eleatic Challenge.
So here’s a plausible account of how Phys. I.8 is integrated into the rest
of Phys. I: Parmenides and Melissus both misunderstand the principles of
nature. This leads them to deny that change exists and subsequently argue
for monism. Aristotle believes that he must correct these mistakes. To do
this, he had first to investigate the principles of nature. He discusses how
his predecessors understand the principles, but thinks their particular the-
ories are inadequate. Aristotle finished outlining his own view at the end
of Phys. I.7. In Phys. I.8, he turns to discuss the Eleatic Challenge. So the
Eleatic Challenge serves as a kind of litmus test for an adequate theory of
the principles: an adequate theory must allow us meet the challenge. Aris-
totle’s goal in Phys. I.8 is to show that his own theory of the principles passes
this test.16
This places two constraints on an adequate interpretation of Phys. I.8. An
adequate interpretation must (i) identify the theory of principles that fails
the test, and explain just how this failure functions in the Eleatic Challenge.
(ii) It must explain just how Aristotle’s view of the principles passes the test.
Over the next several sections, I will discuss different reconstructions of the
Eleatic Challenge. We will see that several fail to meet the first constraint,
failing to explain how some failed view of the principles functions in the
Eleatic Challenge.
16Waterlow {84, p. 9} puts the point as follows: “From the very first, Aristotle tells us, this
dilemma shaped attempts to philosophize about change and becoming. He himself, as his
own approach shows, saw the paradox as defining a necessary adequacy-condition for any
theory of change: whatever else a theory might offer, it must at least solve or dissolve the
paradox.”
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5.3 The Eleatic’s Target
Since understanding an argument requires understanding what the argu-
ment tries to establish, I’ll begin by asking what this Challenge is trying
to establish in the first place. Before I begin, let me alert the reader that
I discuss some translation issues in this section and the next few sections.
Unfortunately the passage in which we find the Eleatic Challenge is horribly
abstract. It can be read in a myriad of different and incompatible ways, and
it raises several difficult problems about how to translate Greek sentences
about being, non-being, and becoming into English. Reconstructions vary
radically over these translation issues. This can be seen from how one can
translate the conclusion of the first stage in different ways:
They say that no being either comes to be or perishes.
This is difficult to interpret because we can understand the verbs ‘come to
be’ (‘γίγνομαι’) and ‘perish’, or ‘cease to be’, (‘φθείρω’) in at least two different
ways. First, we can understand both verbs completely, e.g. Socrates neither
comes into being nor ceases to be altogether. Second, we can understand
both verbs incompletely, e.g. Socrates can neither come to be warm, cold,
musical, etc.; nor can Socrates cease to be warm, cold, musical, etc. So it
seems that we can interpret the conclusion of the first stage in one of two
ways: it either denies that unqualified change exists, or it denies that qual-
ified change exists (see below for this distintion). I will argue that it can
be read as denying both, but first let me say why discussing this issue is
important.
Qualified change and unqualifed change are different phenomena. And
denying the existence of one can be done independently of denying the exis-
tence of the other. To see this, consider a view upon which qualified change
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exists but unqualified change does not. For instance, one can imagine a view
which says that matter never comes into or out of being, only matter exists,
and matter can (only) undergo qualified change. Similarly, one can imagine
a view upon which unqualified change exists, but qualified change does not.
For instance, one can imagine a view which says that composite objects are
composed of collections of atoms, and that whenever an atom is added or sub-
tracted from that collection, the composite object is destroyed and replaced
by another.17 So an argument against the existence of unqualified change
need not be an argument against the existence of qualified change and vice
versa. Thus the details of the Eleatic Challenge may differ depending on
whether its target is qulified or unqualified change.
There is some evidence that the Challenge is focused solely on unqual-
ified change. Aristotle reports the conclusion of the first stage using the
verbs ‘become’ (‘γίγνομαι’) and ‘perish’ (‘φθείρω’) together, and the associated
nouns ‘generation’ (‘γένεσις’) and ‘destruction’ (‘φθορά’) together. Elsewhere
Aristotle uses these words together to speak about unqualified change as
distinct from other changes. For example, in the Cat. he says that there
are 6 kinds of change: generation, destruction, increase, diminution, alter-
ation, and change of place (Cat. 15a13–14).18 At least here Aristotle uses
the words ‘coming to be’ (‘γένεσις’) and ‘destruction’ (‘φθορά’) to refer to some
kinds of changes as opposed to other kinds of change. So we might think
that the Eleatic Challenge only concludes that unqualified change exists.
However, there is also evidence that the Challenge denies that all kinds
of change exists. When Aristotle concludes the chapter, he says that the
17Perhaps such a view would require the atoms to move, and so it could not completely
eliminate the existence of qualified change. Nevertheless, on such a view, there are some
entities, composite objects, that cannot undergo qualified change even though they can come
into and out of existence.
18Κινήσεως δέ ἐστιν εἴδη ἕξ· γένεσις, φθορά, αὔξησις, μείωσις, ἀλλοίωσις, κατὰ τόpiον μεταβολή.
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deniers of change deny that coming to be (γένεσις), perishing (φθορά), and
change in general (ὅλως μεταβολή) exist (191b30–34). ‘μεταβολή’ is Aristotle’s
most general word for change: it includes unqualified change, growth, al-
teration, and locomotion. So Aristotle concludes the chapter by saying that
he has discussed an argument that no kind of change exists, i.e. that nei-
ther qualified nor unqualified change exists. This suggests that the Eleactic
Challenge argues that neither qualified nor unqualified change exists.
So some evidence suggests that the Challenge targets only unqualified
change while other evidence suggests that the target is both unqualified and
qualified change. This is confusing since it seems that we must translate the
conclusion as a denial of either qualified or unqualified change. However,
I think that we can understand the conclusion as a denial of all kinds of
change by focusing on how Aristotle distinguishes between qualified and
unqualified change in Phys. I.7:
A thing is said to come into being in many ways, and, in some
cases, some things are said not to come into being, but, in these
cases, a thing comes to be something; only substances are said to
come into being without qualification (190a31–33).19
Here Aristotle says that change is said in many ways and he distinguishes
two different ways that change is said. He first says that some entities
do not come into being without qualification. These are entities from non-
substantial categories, e.g. musical, heat, and colour. These non-substantial
items are qualifications of a substance: they are predicated of substances,
but substances are not predicated of anything else (190a33–190b1). The hot
and other qualifications of a substance only come into being insofar as some
substance comes to be them. For instance, the hot comes into being only inso-
19piολλαχῶς δὲ λεγομένου τοῦ γίγνεσθαι, καὶ τῶν μὲν οὐ γίγνεσθαι ἀλλὰ τόδε τι γίγνεσθαι, ἁpiλῶς
δὲ γίγνεσθαι τῶν οὐσιῶν μόνον.
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far as Socrates or some other substance comes to be hot.20 Qualified change
contrasts to unqualified change. Aristotle characterizes unqualified change
in terms of those entities that unqualifiedly come-into-being, substances. So
unqualified change is different from qualified change in part because sub-
stances are different from qualifications of substances. Unlike the hot and
the musical, Socrates is not a qualification of a substance. So when Socrates
comes into being, there is no substance that becomes qualified by Socrates.
What is important for our purposes is that Aristotle says that both sub-
stances and qualifications of a substance come into being, and we can as-
sume, perish. They differ in that substances unqualifiedly come into being
while qualities qualifiedly come into being.
Recall that Aristotle reports the conclusion of the Eleatic Challenge as
follows: no being comes to be or perishes. We can understand this claim to
be about about both qualified and unqualified change by (a) taking ‘no being’
(‘τῶν ὄντων οὐδὲν’) to include both qualifications of substance and substances,
and (b) taking both the verbs ‘come to be’ (‘γίγνομαι’) and ‘perish’ or ‘cease
to be’ (‘φθείρω’) completely. On this reading, the Monist denies that either
substances or qualities can come into being or perish (full stop). I discuss
some examples to illustrate this point.
The hot and the musical are qualities. Nevertheless, they are beings. The
Challenge, I suggest, denies that these beings can come into being or cease
to be altogether. If qualities cannot come into being or perish, then qualified
change, as Aristotle describes it, is impossible.
Fido and Socrates are also beings. But unlike the hot and the musical,
they are substances. The Challenge, I suggest, also denies that these beings
20Recall that while I claim that Aristotle thinks the sentence ‘the hot comes into being’
is true iff some substance becomes hot, I remain neutral about whether he endorses any
metaphysics of qualities in Phys. I.
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come into being or cease to be altogether. If substances can neither come
into being or cease to be altogther, unqualified change, as Aristotle describes
it, cannot exist.
So I take the conclusion of the first stage to have unrestricted scope: for
any X, if X is a being, irrespective of what ontological category X belongs to,
X can neither come into being or perish. Given how Aristotle characterizes
the difference between qualified and unqualified change, this entails that
neither qualified nor unqualified change exists. Read in this way, the Eleatic
Challenge argues for an extremely radical claim. It asserts that if any being
exists, irrespective of what that being is, it cannot alter, grow, or move; nor
could it have come into being, nor will it ever cease to be. Such a being exists
eternally and is unchanging in all respects.21
5.4 What-is or What-is-not
Now that we have the conclusion in focus, I turn to discuss the argument for
that conclusion. Most of the difficulties that arise for interpreting the Chal-
lenge arise in interpreting the phrases ‘what-is’ and ‘what-is-not’. Consider
the first premise:
For, they say, it is necessary that what comes to be comes to be
either from what-is or from what-is-not (191a27–33).22
21See Loux {63, p. 281} for a similar reading. Kelsey {53} believes that the Challenge is
about the coming into being of substance, i.e., the Challenge argues that substance must
come into being from either what-is-substance or from what-is-not-substance but that both
are impossible. This restricts the Challenge to unqualified change, which I see no reason
for doing. Finally, note that while Aristotle uses the words ‘γένεσις’ and perishing ‘φθορά’ to
speak abut unqualified change as opposed to other kinds of change in the Cat., I see little
evidence that he does so in this book of the Physics. When Aristotle explains the difference
between qualified and unqualified change, he uses ‘γένεσις’ and ‘φθορά’ to describe both these
changes. He uses ‘unqualified’ ἁpiλῶς to mark the difference between the two. The hot only
qualifiedly comes into being while Socrates unqualifiedly comes into being. So Aristotle
distinguishes different kinds of change differently in both works.
22φασιν οὔτε γίγνεσθαι τῶν ὄντων οὐδὲν οὔτε φθείρεσθαι διὰ τὸ ἀναγκαῖον μὲν εἶναι γίγνεσθαι
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This sentence is horrible, and I will discuss it in detail for the next several
pages. But first let me try to outline the forest from the somewhat minute
focus on the branches of the trees. The Eleatic Challenge concerns being,
non-being, and becoming. These obviously comprise a difficult and abstract
subject matter. Unfortunately, the subject matter is obscured by Aristotle’s
Greek (see below). He doesn’t try to make things easier for his reader. He
doesn’t, for instance, give some examples to illustrate and explain the dif-
ferent premises and inferences. So the details of the arguments are highly
obscure to us. To make matters worse, the Greek really can be taken in dif-
ferent ways. These different ways lead to more or less powerful arguments
for each horn of the Challenge. I will discuss some obvious translations of
these two phrases. I think the obvious translations fail, and argue for what
may seem a strained interpretation upon which ‘what is‘ and ‘what-is-not’
are variables that take those opposites a change occurs between as their
values. In order to make space for my alternative, it is important for me to
explain why simpler and more intuitive interpretations fail.
First, let us discuss ‘τὸ γιγνόμενον’. This is translated as ‘what comes to
be’. ‘τὸ γιγνόμενον’ is the present participle of the verb ‘come to be’ (‘γίγνομαι’).
This verb could be used either completely or incompletely. Used completely
the particple phrase should be translated ‘what comes into being’. Used
incompletely, the phrase means ‘what comes to be F’; where ‘F’ refers to
some unstated complement.
To illustrate this difference, let us use ‘X’ as the grammatical subject of
‘what comes to be’. The first reading of the participle results in this reading
of the premise: if X comes into being, then X comes into being from what-is
or what-is-not. The second reading of the participle results in this reading:
τὸ γιγνόμενον ἢ ἐξ ὄντος ἢ ἐκ μὴ ὄντος,
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if X comes to be F, then X comes to be F from what-is or what-is-not.
Neither of these readings makes much sense as stated. Both speak about
coming from what-is or what-is-not. And Aristotle just does not tell us what
he means by ‘what-is’ and ‘what-is-not’, nor does he tell us what it is for
things to come from what-is or what-is-not. For instance, does he mean that,
if Socrates comes into existence, then Socrates must previously have existed
or not existed? Or does he mean that if Socrates comes into existence, then
Socrates must have come into existence from say some previously existing
or non-existing matter? These are obviously very different claims which are
themselves unclear and in need of explanation. Unfortunately, there are
many others ways of reading the claim.
However, I assume that the participle is used completely. In the last sec-
tion, I discussed how we must read the conclusion of the Challenge as a de-
nial of all kinds of change. This reading of the conclusion requires taking the
occurrence of ‘come to be’ (‘γίγνομαι’) and ‘cease to be’ (‘φθείρω’) in the conclu-
sion completely. By itself, this does not require that we take the occurrence
of each of these verbs in the rest of the argument completely. Nevertheless, I
will take each occurrence completely as I can do so while still presenting the
main reconstructions of the Challenge. So I take the participle ‘what comes
to be’ (‘τὸ γιγνόμενον’) completely, i.e. as ‘what comes into being’. Thus the
first premise of the Eleatic argument reads:
• If anything whatsoever comes into being, irrespective of what ontologi-
cal category that thing belongs to, then that being must come into being
from what-is or from what-is-not.
I will focus my attention on the difficulties for interpreting the premise when
read in this way. These difficulties arise because it is extremely difficult to
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understand what it means for X to come into being from what-is or from
what-is-not. Both ‘what-is’ ‘ἐξ ὄντος’ and ‘what-is-not’ ‘ἐκ μὴ ὄντος’ are partici-
ple phrases formed from the preposition ‘from’ ‘ἐξ with the present participle
of the verb ‘being’ ὲἶναι΄ in the genitive case.23 Translating and interpreting
these participle phrases is difficult because interpreting how ‘being’ (ὲἶναι΄)
is used in these phrases and what it means is difficult. Ross, for instance,
writes:
It is not at first sight clear whether this means ‘either from what
is or from what is not’ or ‘either from what is it or from what is
not it.24
Why does Ross say that we can read the passage in both ways and what
exactly do these different readings amount to? We normally translate the
Greek verb ὲἶναι΄ with the English verb ‘to be’ or ‘being’. The English verb
‘to be’ has two syntactic uses; a complete and an incomplete use. Lesley
Brown explains the difference between these complete and incomplete uses
by using these two examples:
1. Socrates is.
2. To be or not to be.25
If a speaker uses ‘to be’ completely when she says 1 and 2, she utters well
formed sentences: we do not require her to supply anything further to un-
derstand what she says. However, if she uses ‘to be’ incompletely when she
says 1 and 2, she says no well formed sentence. What she says could be
equivalent to, ‘Socrates is a’ and ‘To be a or not to be a’. If a speaker says
23We can translate the preposition ‘ἐξ’ as either ‘from’ or ‘out of ’. But I doubt that mere
reflection on this preposition will help us interpret the puzzle. So I will remain silent about
it.
24Ross {74, p. 494}. See also Kelsey {53, p. 333}.
25Brown {15, p. 212–213}.
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these two phrases to you, you will not understand her and will need to ask
her ‘Socrates is a what’?
We can use the English verb ‘to be’ in these two syntactically different
ways: completely and incompletely. These two syntactical uses correlate
with different uses of the verb.
When we use the English verb ‘to be’ completely, we mean ‘exists’. So if
a speaker uses ‘to be’ completely when she says 1, she means that Socrates
exists. If she uses the verb completely when she say 2, she means ‘To exist
or not to exist’.
However, when a speaker use the verb ‘to be’ incompletely, she uses it to
mean one of two things: a) the copula, or b) ‘identical to’. Brown describes
the copula as: “The verb whose sole function is to join subject to predicate
and which has no ‘further meaning of its own’. So it lacks meaning.’26 So if
our speaker uses ‘to be’ incompletely when she says 1 and means the copula,
then we will expect her to supply some complement to complete what she
says, e.g. ‘Socrates is laughing.’ Alternatively, when we use the verb ‘to be’
incompletely, we often can use it to mean ‘is identical to’. For example, if we
ask our speaker the question, ‘Who is that snub nosed man laughing?’, and
she answers ‘Socrates is’, she likely means that Socrates is identical to the
snub nosed man laughing.
Ross says that we can translate what Aristotle writes in Greek in two
different ways. These two ways come from (i) taking the Greek verb ὲἶναι΄
either completely or incompletely, and (ii) assuming that this syntactic dis-
tinction correlates with the same semantic distinction we encounter with
the English verb ‘to be’.27 This leads to two different readings of the phrases
26Brown {15, p. 213}.
27It is unlikely that the Greek verb ‘εἶναι’ has exactly all and only the syntactic and se-
mantic properties as the English verb ‘to be’. For instance, Brown {15} believes a complete
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‘what-is’ and ‘what-is-not’, and so to two different readings of the premises
that contain these phrases. For instance, the first premise can be read as
follows:
The Complete Reading (CR) If X comes into being, then X comes into be-
ing from what exists or from what does not exist.
The Incomplete Reading (IR) If X comes into being, then X comes into
being (i) from what is predicatively X or from what is not predicatively
X, or (ii) from what is identical to X or from what is not identical to X.
CR and IR offer radically different interpretations of the Eleatic Challenge.
Subsequently, how they interpret Aristotle’s response will differ radically.
Let me illustrate the difference between CR and IR by using some concrete
examples of both a quality and a substance coming into being:
1. If the hot comes into being, then the hot comes into being from what
exists or from what does not exist.
2. If the hot comes into being, then the hot comes into being from what is
hot or from what is not hot.
use of ‘εἶναι’ is closely related to an incomplete use. She asks us to compare the verb ‘εἶναι’
to the verbs ‘teach’ and ‘eat’. A speaker can say ‘Jane teaches’ and ‘Jane teaches French’.
These two uses of ‘teach’ are closely related. ‘Jane teaches French’ entails ‘Jane teaches’.
‘Jane teaches’ entails ‘Jane teaches something’. So Brown says that ‘Jane teaches’ is syntac-
tically complete but that it allows for further completion. If that’s right, the presence of a
completion does not make the verb incomplete (because we can complete already completed
verbs). Similarly, Brown believes that ‘εἶναι’ is both used completely and that it can be com-
pleted further. The English verb ‘to be’ does not have this feature. The closest we could
come to expressing the same phenomena in English is with the phrases ‘a being’ vs. ‘an F-
being’ (where ‘F’ selects a particular kind that beings fall under). So the sentence ‘Socrates
is a being’ is well-formed. Nevertheless, we can fill the sentence out further by saying that
‘Socrates is an F-being’. This latter sentence entails the former while the former entails
that Socrates is some kind of being or other. (See also the influential work of Kahn {52}.)
Obviously, if‘εἶναι’ has a different set of syntactic and semantic properties from ‘to be’ then
the difficulties for interpreting the Eleatic Challenge increase dramatically. But I am going
to set aside this issue. My alternative reading below treats the participles as variables that
have as their values the termini of a change. Such an interpretation need take no stand on
what the participles mean.
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3. If Socrates comes into being, then Socrates comes into being from what
exists or from what does not exist.
4. If Socrates comes into being, then Socrates comes to be from what is
Socrates or from what is not Socrates.28
1 and 3 illustrate CR. 2 and 4 illustrate IR. IR and CR are radically different
claims. IR is concerned with whether a being like Socrates can come into ex-
istence from some being which was or was not Socrates. So understood, the
Eleatic Challenge denies that either is possible. What’s key on this reading
is that the arguments concern the relationship between the pre-existing en-
tity and the product of the change, e.g. whether that pre-existing entity is or
is not Socrates. CR is not obviously concerned with the relationship between
the product and the entity it comes from. CR is concerned with whether the
entity that the product comes from exists or does not exist. So understood,
the Challenge argues that neither is possible.
I think that neither reading is correct. I explain why over the next few
pages, but let me reiterate why I do so. CR and IR both offer different read-
ings of the Challenge. On the one hand, both are intuitive ways of reading
the premises of the argument. Indeed, they may seem the only intuitive
ways. Nevertheless, I will argue that IR and CR leave us with very poor and
weak arguments on different horns of the Challenge. I will then go on to
argue that there is an alternative to both CR and IR. However, in order to
make space for this alternative, it is important for me to explain why IR and
CR fail.
Here’s my general argument against both CR and IR: Aristotle thinks
that an adequate rebuttal of the Eleatic Challenge requires that we bring
28We can read ‘is’ in 2 and 4 as either the copula or the ‘is’ or identity.
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clearly into focus the correct view of the principles of nature. But, I argue,
on CR and IR, we need no correct view of the principles. For, on both CR and
IR, the Eleatic Challenge fails just because it is invalid and obviously in-
valid. In other words, I argue that, on either of these readings of the Eleatic
Challenge, Aristotle is wrong to say that meeting that challenge requires
any understanding of the principles of nature. I will discuss CR and IR in
turn.
5.4.1 The complete reading
Recall that CR interprets the first premise as follows:
CR If X comes into being, then X comes into being from what exists or from
what does not exist.
On this reading, we must identify the subjects of ‘what exists’ and ‘what does
not exist’. There are two distinct options, and so two distinct versions of CR.
The first takes both to have an indefinite subject. Call this reading CR1.
CR1 If X comes into being, then X comes into being from something or other
that exists or does not exist.
The second takes the subject to be X itself. Call this reading CR2
• If X comes into being, then X comes into being from X existing or X not
existing.
I will clarify each reading and then argue against both.
CR1
On CR1, we must (i) take the participles ‘what-is’ ‘ἐξ ὄντος’ and ‘what-is-
not’ ‘ἐκ μὴ ὄντος’ substantively, and (ii) assume that the omitted article is an
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indefinite article. Let us use‘Y’ for this indefinite subject. So, on CR1, the
first premise reads:
CR1 If X comes into being, then X comes into being from Y-existing or from
Y-not-existing.
Notice that ‘Y’ does not refer to any specific being. It refers to anything
whatsoever that can be truly described as existing or not existing.29 Simi-
larly, ‘a whale’ need not refer to any specific whale. It can refer to anything
whatsoever that can be truly described as a whale.
Here is an example to illustrate CR1:
• If Socrates comes into being, then Socrates comes into being from some
existing thing or from some non-existing thing.
What’s important to note here is that there is no specific existing or non-
existing thing being referred to. So understood, the claim is weak. However,
we are meant to suppose that the Eleatic Challenge argues that neither
option specified is possible.
On the one hand, CR1 can interpret the second horn of the dilemma in a
way that leaves a plausible argument. On this horn, the Challenge argues:
• If X comes into being from anything whatsoever which can be truly de-
scribed as not-existing, then there is no subject. But this is impossible.
We can justify this inference if we assume that X must come into being from
a subject, and that this subject must exist. Both seem reasonable assump-
tions.
The problem, though, with CR1 is how it interprets the first horn of the
dilemma. On CR1, the first horn argues the following:
29I set aside issues of how we may refer to non-existing entities.
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• If X comes into being from some existing thing or other, then X exists
before X comes into existence. But this is impossible.
The difficulty lies in why anyone would accept this inference. Sean Kelsey
puts the point nicely:
Why should it follow, just because Socrates comes to be from
something that “is” (period), that he already was, before he came
to be?30
Let us recall that Aristotle thinks that the Eleatic Challenge can be met,
but he thinks that meeting the challenge require identifying and correcting
a mistaken view of the principles that the Challenge assumes. But if we
accept CR1, we can meet the Challenge without any deep understanding of
the principles of nature. For on CR1, the Challenge assumes:
• If X comes into being from something or other existing, then X comes
into being from X.
For instance, CR1 claims that if Socrates comes into being from something
or other that exists, then Socrates comes into being from Socrates. But CR1
offers us no explanation as to why the Monist would endorse this inference.
And the only way of supporting the inference is unavailable to the Monist.
For the only way to support this inference is by further assuming:
• Only X exists.
Assuming this claim would allow the argument on the first horn to go
through. If only X exists, and X comes into being from Y existing, then X
is identical to Y and X comes into being from itself. For instance, if only
Socrates exists and Socrates come into being from Y existing, then Socrates
is identical to Y and Socrates comes into being from himself.
30Kelsey {53, p. 333}.
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But the Eleatic Challenge just cannot assume that there is only one be-
ing X that exists. There are two stages to the Eleatic Challenge. In the
first stage, the Monist argues that change is impossible. In the second stage,
she uses the impossibility of change to argue that there is only one being.
Aristotle does not provide the details of the second stage. Nevertheless, irre-
spective of the details, the Eleatic Challenge cannot both use an argument
for the impossibility of change to establish monism and assume monism as
a premise in the argument for the impossibility of change.
Again, Aristotle argues that the Eleatic Challenge fails. But Aristotle
also says that we must understand the principles of nature to understand
why the Challenge fails. But on CR1, we need no understanding of the prin-
ciples to respond to the Challenge. All we need observe is that the Challenge
assumes its conclusion as a premise. Seeing that such an argument fails re-
quires no understanding of the principles of natures. It requires only a basic
grasp of logic.
CR2
Unlike CR1, CR2 takes ‘what comes into being’ (‘ τὸ γιγνόμενον΄’) as the sub-
ject of the participles ‘what-is’ ‘ἐξ ὄντος’ and ‘what-is-not’ ‘ἐκ μὴ ὄντος’. On
this reading, the first premise of the Eleatic Challenge reads:
• If X comes into being, then X comes into being either from X-existing
or from X-not-existing.31
31See Waterlow {84, p. 9} for this reading. Note that ‘τὸ γιγνόμενον’ is in the accusative.
So one might ask how ‘τὸ γιγνόμενον’ could be the subject of ‘ἐξ ὄντος’ and ‘what-is-not’ ‘ἐκ
μὴ ὄντος’, which are in the genitive. But while the cases of these phrases do not agree with
one another, the case of ‘what-is’ ‘ἐξ ὄντος’ and ‘what-is-not’ ‘ἐκ μὴ ὄντος’ is governed by the
preposition ‘ἐξ’. So syntax allows this reading. Let me add that Waterlow seems to think
that the participle ‘ὄντος’ is used circumstantially with temporal force: X comes from it (X)
previously existing or from it (X) previously not-existing.
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There is some evidence for CR2. On the first horn, the Challenge argues that
what is cannot come into being from what-is because what-is would already
be. This assumes that if what comes into being (τὸ γιγνόμενον) comes from
what-is (ἐξ ὄντος), then what-is (τὸ ὂν) would come into being. For example,
it says that if Socrates comes into being from what-is, then what-is would
come into being. This suggests that ‘what comes into being’ (‘τὸ γιγνόμενον’)
is referring to whatever ‘what-is’ (‘τὸ ὂν’) is referring to.
So understood, CR2 offers a reasonable argument on the first horn of
the dilemma. CR2 says, for instance, that if Socrates comes into being from
himself previously existing, then Socrates would have existed before he came
into existence. It is easy to see why this is a problem. If Socrates continually
exists for some duration of time, this is not a time during which Socrates has
come into or out of existence. This is precisely a time during which he has
continued to exist. So Socrates cannot come into existence from previously
existing for that would not be a change at all.
However, CR2 offers a poor argument on the second horn of the dilemma:
• If X comes into being from X-not-existing, then there would be no sub-
ject. But this is impossible.
For instance, CR2 says that if Socrates comes into being from himself not-
existing, there would be no subject. Before I explain why this is problematic,
I first discuss the incomplete reading (IR). I then argue that CR2 and IR
both fail as interpretations of the second horn of the dilemma.
5.4.2 The incomplete reading
IR says that ‘what-is’ ‘ἐξ ὄντος’ and ‘what-is-not’ ‘ἐκ μὴ ὄντος’ are used in-
completely and says that we must supply a complement to complete both
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phrases. This complement is ‘what comes to be’. So IR reads the first
premise as follows: X comes to be from what-is-X or from what-is-not-X. For
instance, Socrates comes to be from what is Socrates or what is not Socrates.
We can read ‘is’ here as either the copula or the ‘is’ of identity, but I will con-
tinue to speak of both together as the incomplete reading; my objection to IR
applies irrespective of whether we read ‘is’ as the copula or the ‘is’ of identity.
CR2 and IR yield a poor argument on the second horn of the dilemma,
poor for the same reason. On IR, the Monist would would argue that if X
comes to be from what-is-not X, there is no subject. For example, if the
hot comes to be from what-is-not hot, there would be no subject. On CR2,
the Monist would argue that if the hot comes into being from it, the hot, not
existing, there would be no subject. But these inferences are suspect. Kelsey
puts the point as follows:
Why should it follow, just because Socrates comes to be from
something that is not Socrates, that he comes to be from noth-
ing at all (or from nothing that “underlies”)?32
Similarly, why should it follow, just because Socrates comes to be from him-
self not existing, that he comes to be from nothing at all (or from nothing
that underlies)? On CR2 and IR, the Monist infers that, if Socrates comes
to be from something that is not-Socrates or from himself not-existing, then
there would be no subject. But why would she accept this inference? The
obvious response is that Socrates comes to be from a subject which is not
Socrates but is something else, say, menstrual blood. This response must
be unavailable to the Monist. But it is only unavailable to him if he can
show that, if Socrates comes to be from what-is-not Socrates or from himself
not-existing, then Socrates comes to be from nothing at all.
32Kelsey {53, p. 334}.
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The difficulty for IR is that the Monist cannot support her claim in this
way. If she claims that, if Socrates comes to be from what is not Socrates,
then Socrates comes to be from nothing at all, she would assume that the
only being that exists or could exist is Socrates. But the Monist cannot
assume that only Socrates exists. For the claim that only Socrates exists
entails monism; that there exists only one being. However, Aristotle tells
us that the Monist uses the impossibility of change to argue for monism.
So the Monist cannot assume monism in an argument that is ultimately for
monism. And, on CR2 and IR, assuming monism is the only way she could
support his argument on the second horn of the dilemma.
Let me be clear. Aristotle thinks that the Monist’s argument on the sec-
ond horn fails. But Aristotle also says that we must understand the princi-
ples of nature in order to understand this failure. But on CR2 and IR, we
need no deep understanding of the principles to meet the Eleatic Challenge.
All we need observe is that the Monist assumes monism in an argument for
monism.
Perhaps we might defend CR2 and IR by translating ‘subject’ (ὑpiοκείμε-
νον) in different ways. For instance, Michael Loux writes:
the remark in question has to be understood to have the neutral
force “There must be something there beforehand.” But, then, the
remark does not provide a separate reason for endorsing the claim
that “nothing comes to be from that which is not;” so understood,
the remark merely reformulates that claim or restates it in other
words.33
Aristotle reports earlier thinkers believing that there must be something
which iὑpiοκεῖσθαι’. I translate this phrase ‘to underlie’, i.e. to be a subject.
But Loux worries that this is a mistranslation. He claims that Aristotle
33Loux {63, p.285}.
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discovered the need for a subject of change. Since the Monist was unaware
of the need for a subject of change—according to Loux—, Aristotle should not
say that she assumes that need as a premise. So Loux says that we must
translate the term in some other way, and he suggests that we can translate
it as ‘something or other’. The Monist then argues that if Socrates comes
to be from what-is-not-Socrates or from himself not existing, Socrates would
come to be from what-is-nothing at all.
Below I discuss whether the Monist recognizes the need for a subject of
change. Here I only say that translating ‘ὑpiοκεῖσθαι’ in this alternative way
does not help. The Monist would assume that if Socrates comes to be from
what-is not Socrates, Socrates would come to be from nothing at all. But this
is no argument. The inference could only be supported by assuming that the
only way for something to be is to be Socrates. This, of course, assumes the
very thing that the Monist ultimately tries to argue for—monism.
Concluding: I have discussed and argued against some different ways of in-
terpreting the first premise. Each way results in arguments for the impossi-
bility of change that assumes monism. This would be surprising. According
to Aristotle, the Eleatic Challenge constrained two centuries worth of scien-
tific investigation into nature and change. Many philosophers tried to meet
the challenge and so block the radical conclusion that being is one and un-
changing. Aristotle too tries to meet the challenge. But he explicitly says
that doing so requires that we get a clear view of the principles of nature.
But if either IR or CR is correct, then no deep investigation of the princi-
ples is needed. So interpreted, this argument for monism assumes monism.
Nobody should take such an argument seriously.
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5.5 An Alternative Reading of ‘what-is’ and ‘what-is-not’
There is an alternative to both IR and CR that leaves strong arguments on
both horns of the Eleatic Challenge, and also explains why Aristotle says
that we must understand the principles of nature to meet that challenge.
This alternative relies on various claims about opposites, some of which we
encountered earlier in Phys. I. I will argue that ‘what-is’ and ‘what-is-not’
are variables that take as their values those opposites that a change occurs
between. Understood in this way, we can sidestep the difficulties that arise
when translating these phrases. For if they function as variables, they can
be replaced with any letters or words that we choose and define as variables.
I will first discuss why I believe that ‘what-is’ and ‘what-is-not’ function as
variables that take opposites as their values. I then discuss how this leads
to a new and attractive reading of the Eleatic Challenge.
Recall that Aristotle begins Phys. I.5 as follows:
(a) All thinkers agree in making the opposites principles, (b) both
those who describe the All as one and unmoved, for even Par-
menides treats hot and cold as principles under the names fire
and earth, (c) and those too who use the rare and the dense. (d)
The same is true of Democritus also, which his plenum and the
void, both of which exists, he says, the one as being, the other as
not-being. Again he speaks of differences in postion, shape, and
order, and these are genera of which the species are opposites,
namely, of position, above and below, before and behind; of shape,
angular and angle-less, straight and round (188a19–26).34
In (1) Aristotle says that all his predecessors agree that some pair of oppo-
sites are principles. In (2) he speaks about Parmenides and says that Par-
menides believes that earth and fire are principles; though Aristotle says
34Πάντες δὴ τἀναντία ἀρχὰς piοιοῦσιν οἵ τε λέγοντες ὅτι ἓν τὸ piᾶν καὶ μὴ κινούμενον (καὶ γὰρ
Παρμενίδης θερμὸν καὶ ψυχρὸν ἀρχὰς piοιεῖ, ταῦτα δὲ piροσαγορεύει piῦρ καὶ γῆν) καὶ οἱ μανὸν καὶ
piυκνόν, καὶ Δημόκριτος τὸ piλῆρες καὶ κενόν, ὧν τὸ μὲν ὡς ὂν τὸ δὲ ὡς οὐκ ὂν εἶναί φησιν· ἔτι
θέσει, σχήματι, τάξει. ταῦτα δὲ γένη ἐναντίων· θέσεως ἄνω κάτω, piρόσθεν ὄpiισθεν, σχήματος
γεγωνιωμένον ἀγώνιον, εὐθὺ piεριφερές. ὅτι μὲν οὖν τἀναντία piως piάντες piοιοῦσι τὰς ἀρχάς, δῆλον.
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that this is equivalent to making the opposites hot and cold principles. Per-
haps it is confusing to find Aristotle saying that Parmenides believes that
there are two principles of those beings which change given that Parmenides
is supposed to believe that there is only one principle and that change is
impossible. But Aristotle’s point here is that Parmenides believes that, if
change were possible, then the opposites hot and cold would be principles of
those beings that change.
Now in (4) Aristotle says that Democritus believes that the opposites
plenum and void are principles. He adds something striking: he tells us
that Democritus says that the plenum exists as what-is, and that the void
exists as what-is-not. So for Democritus what-is and what-is-not are oppo-
sites because they are the opposites plenum and void.
Before I discuss this point further, note that while Aristotle says that
Democritus makes one of his opposites what-is and makes the other what-is-
not, he does not say the same about Parmenides or the natural philosophers
he refers to in (3). But he does make this point in other places. For instance,
in GC. Aristotle says:
(5) Thus Parmenides speaks of two, saying that that what-is is
fire and what-is-not is earth. (6) Whether we postulate this par-
ticular pair or another of the same kind makes no difference: for
we are seeking the character of the change, not its subject. (7)
The way which leads to what-is-not unqualifiedly is unqualified
perishing, and the way that leads to what-is unqualifiedly is un-
qualified generation. (8) In whatever way the distinction is made,
whether in terms of earth and fire or of some other pair, one of the
pair will be what-is, the other what-is-not (GC 318b5–12).35
In this passage, Aristotle is speaking about how to individuate unqualified
35ὥσpiερ Παρμενίδης λέγει δύο, τὸ ὂν καὶ τὸ μὴ ὂν εἶναι φάσκων piῦρ καὶ γῆν. Τὸ δὴ ταῦτα ἢ
τοιαῦθ’ ἕτερα ὑpiοτίθεσθαι διαφέρει οὐδέν· τὸν γὰρ τρόpiον ζητοῦμεν, ἀλλ’ οὐ τὸ ὑpiοκείμενον. ῾Η
μὲν οὖν εἰς τὸ μὴ ὂν ἁpiλῶς ὁδὸς φθορὰ ἁpiλῆ, ἡ δ’ εἰς τὸ ἁpiλῶς ὂν γένεσις ἁpiλῆ. Οἷς οὖν διώρισται
εἴτε piυρὶ καὶ γῇ εἴτε ἄλλοις τισί, τούτων ἔσται τὸ μὲν ὂν τὸ δὲ μὴ ὄν. See also Met. 986b33–987a1.
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generation from unqualified perishing. In (7) he says that a process of com-
ing to be begins with what-is-not and ends with what-is, and a process of per-
ishing begins with what-is and ends with what-is-not. This is as we might
expect. But what’s important for our purposes is how Aristotle uses ‘what-is’
and ‘what-is-not’. In (5) Aristotle explicitly says that Parmenides identifies
what-is and what-is not with fire and earth, i.e. with the opposites hot and
the cold.36 And Aristotle in (6) and (8) says that we need pay no attention to
this example of the hot and cold. There might be some other pair of opposites
that unqualifed change occurs between, like rarity and density. Neverthe-
less, Aristotle stresses that unqualified change always occurs between a pair
of opposites, whether those opposites be the hot and the cold, or the rare and
the dense, etc.
What Aristotle says in the last two passages is striking and more than a
little puzzling. One might, for instance, interpret him as saying that for Par-
menides fire is the existing stuff and earth is the non-existing stuff. This is
bizarre. Why would Parmenides say that all non-existing stuff is earth? Fire
and earth differ not because one exists and the other does not exist. Rather,
fire and earth differ because they are different kinds of existing stuffs.
So what does Aristotle mean when he says that philosophers like Par-
menides and Democritus identify what-is and what-is-not with a pair of op-
posites if he does not mean that one opposite exists and the other does not?
I suggest that Aristotle uses ‘what-is’ and ‘what-is-not’ as variables that
have as their values the opposites that a change occurs between. For ex-
ample, warming takes place between the opposites cold and hot: a stone be-
36One might worry that Aristotle presents Parmenides as using premises from the Way
of Opinion in an argument in the Way of Truth against the possibility of change. But I
am not claiming that Aristotle presents Parmenides in this way. My point is about usage.
This example is another instance where Aristotle uses ‘what-is-not’ and ‘what-is’ for those
opposites that a change occurs between.
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comes warm from being cold. So warming can be characterized as a change
that occurs between what-is-not and what-is as long as we take ‘the cold’ as
the value of ‘what-is-not’ and ‘the hot’ is the value of ‘what-is’.
I suggest that we read the first premise of the Eleatic Challenge in a
similar way:
• If X comes to be, then X comes to be from X or from the opposite of X.
For instance, if the hot comes to be, then the hot comes to be from the hot or
from the cold.37
My argument for reading the phrases in this way is twofold. First, Aris-
totle uses ‘what-is-not’ and ‘what-is’ for a pair of opposites earlier in Phys.
I.5 so there is no reason that he should not be doing so here. Second, reading
the phrases in this way leads to an attractive and plausible reading of the
Challenge that is immune to those difficulties that beset the alternatives.
5.6 A New Reconstruction
I will now turn to reconstruct the dilemma. I suggest that the Monist and
Aristotle agree on three key assumptions. I use ‘A’ for ‘assumptions’, and
these assumptions are what support the explicit premises of the Challenge.
A1: Change occurs between opposites.
A2: There is a subject of change.
A3: The subject of a change cannot be identical to either of the opposites
that a change occurs between.
37Michael Loux has offered a similar reading of the first premises. Loux {63, p. 288}
claims that (i) ‘what is’ and ‘what is not’ “provide fully significant and unambiguous charac-
terizations of the terms of a coming to be.” (ii) These phrases are “generalizations of more
particular characterizations” (Loux {63, p. 290}). However, Loux and I differ in that he
thinks ‘what-is-not’ stands for the mere absence of what-is, e.g. the mere absence of heat.
In contrast, I think it stands for the opposite of what-is, e.g. the cold.
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I discussed A1 in Ch.2: change must occur between opposites because pro-
cesses of change are defined in terms of those opposites that they occur be-
tween. I think A2 is never defended. I discussed A3 in Ch.3: the subject
of change cannot be identical to either of the opposites that a change occurs
between because (i) the subject of change must persist as it is being acted
upon by the actor which brings about a change in it, and (ii) the relevant
opposite is destroyed and so cannot persist through the change.
I will first reconstruct the Eleatic Challenge by using A1–A3. I then ex-
plain why I think we can safely attribute A1–A3 to the Monists, Parmenides
and Melissus. I use the letters ‘F’ and ‘O’ to stand for each of a pair of oppo-
sites.
P1: If F comes to be, F comes to be either from F or from O. (From A1)
P2: If F comes to be from F, F is already.
P3: It is not possible for F to come to be if F is already.
C1: F cannot come to be from F. (From P1–P3)
P4: If F comes to be from O, O is the subject of change.
P5: It is not possible for O to be the subject of change (From A3)
C2: F cannot come to be from O. (From P1; P4–P5)
C3: F cannot come to be. (From C1&C2)
Unlike IR and CR, this argument does not assume monism. Support for P1
comes from the claim that change occurs between opposites. Supporting P1
in this way does not depend upon monism, but on the assumption that the
only principles of nature are opposites. Similarly, support for P2 comes from
assuming that since the only principles of nature are opposites, then it must
be an opposite that is the subject of change. Let me illustrate this with an
example.
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Let us assume that the hot (or the hot thing) comes to be. P1 says that
when the hot comes to be, the hot can come to be from one of two things.
First, it can come to be from the hot. Second, it can come to be from the
cold. Neither option is possible. If there is heat where previously there was
heat, there has been no change: something has just continued to be hot. But
neither can the hot come to be from the cold. If the hot came to be from
the cold, the cold must be that subject which warms up. But, as Aristotle
discussed in Phys. I.6, the cold (or what is just cold) cannot be the subject of
change. So if the hot comes to be from the cold, then the hot must come to
be from nothing at all. And if the hot comes to be from nothing at all, there
is no subject.
Read in this way, the Eleatic Challenge is deeply integrated with and
builds upon the rest of Phys. I. The Challenge arises precisely from an in-
ability to see how opposites and a subject of change could simultaneously
be principles of nature. Aristotle accepts A1–A3; the assumptions the argu-
ment turns on and the assumptions he has discussed in length. So we find
Aristotle discussing a puzzle based on assumptions that he accepts. Aristo-
tle should then take the puzzle seriously. In particular, we expect Aristotle
to show how he can accept A1–A3 and yet still meet the challenge. After all,
the Monist also accepts A1–A3 but he believes that it is precisely because
A1–A3 cannot be satisfied that change is impossible. In the second part of
this chapter, I show how Aristotle deploys his own view of the principles to
argue that we can hold on to both A1–A3 and still escape both horns of the
dilemma. We will see that his response precisely turns on the claim that the
privation and subject of change are one in number, two in form. So unlike the
Monist, Aristotle has a view of the principles that allows him to argue that
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changes occur between opposites even though opposites are not the subject
of any change.
5.7 Objections and Responses
Let me clarify my reading by responding to two potential objections. First,
on my reading, one might worry that Aristotle could only be speaking about
qualified change and not also about unqualified change, i.e. coming into and
going out of existence. For instance, in respect to sculpting, I take ‘shapeless-
ness’ as the value of ‘what-is-not’ and ‘shaped’ as the value for ‘what-is’. But
both shapelessness and shaped exist. And so we might wonder whether un-
qualified changes like sculpting really are changes that occur between what
exists and what does not exit (or vice versa). In other words, we may worry
that, on my reading, unqualified changes are changes from what exists to
what exists. This is a reasonable concern. Let me say three things to try
ease it.
First, in Phys. I.5 and elsewhere, Aristotle clearly calls certain pairs of ex-
isting opposites ‘what-is’ and ‘what-is-not’. This might be counter-intuitive,
but Aristotle says it nonetheless.
Second, we can explain why Aristotle believes that unqualified change oc-
curs between opposites if we focus on the processes of unqualified changes.
When something comes into being, there is some change that occurs. Let us
suppose that a special form of heating (concoction) occurs whenever some-
thing new comes into being. And let us suppose that a special form of cool-
ing occurs whenever something ceases to be (altogether). These processes
of heating and cooling occur between the hot and the cold. For warming
and cooling are precisely the processes they are because they occur between
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these opposites. And Aristotle does believe that unqualified changes are al-
ways some kind of process of change, e.g. heating, concocting, combination,
separation, etc. Since these processes are always some kind of change, and
since changes are individuated in part by the opposites they occur between,
it is reasonable for him to believe that unqualified changes must occur be-
tween pairs of opposites.
Third, if unqualified changes occur between opposites, this does not en-
tail that new objects do not come in or out of existence during these changes.
For instance, we might accept that Socrates comes into being during a pro-
cess of heating and that this process occurs between the cold and hot. For
we might think that some initially cold thing undergoes a process of being
warmed up and that the result of it becoming warm is that Socrates comes
into existence. For instance, Thales might argue that the end result of some
rarefied water becoming dense is that Socrates exists. Nevertheless, this
process of unqualified change—compression—occurs between the opposites
rarity and density.
A second potential objection lies in my claim that Aristotle believes that
the Monist accepts A1–A3. This is striking because we may worry that Par-
menides cannot accept each. After all, if Aristotle was the one to discover
and argue for A1–A3, he should not present the Monist arguing for the im-
possibility of change on these assumptions. Why think Aristotle attributes
A1–A3 to his predecessors?
First, showing that Aristotle says that his predecessors believe that
change must be between opposites (A1) is simple. In the last section, I dis-
cussed how Aristotle explicitly says that Parmenides believes that the op-
posites are principles. Parmenides denies that change exists. So, obviously,
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Parmenides does not believe that the opposites are principles of beings that
really do change. Rather, Parmenides believes that if change were possible,
change would occur between opposites.
So Aristotle says that Parmenides accepts A1. Nevertheless understand-
ing how Aristotle attributes this belief to Parmenides requires care. For
example, he says:
As I have already said, in this much most of the others who write
on nature agree. (1) For all of them suppose that the elements,
called principles by them, are opposites, although (2) they sup-
pose this without explaining why they are elements as if they
were constrained by the truth itself (189b26–30).38
Aristotle in (1) says that his predecessors agree that the opposites are princi-
ples. But Aristotle in (2) qualifies what beliefs he attributes to his predeces-
sors. He thinks that they fail to understand why the opposites are principles.
Nonetheless, Aristotle still attributes to them this belief.
Showing that Aristotle attributes A2 to his predecessors is harder. Aris-
totle uses ‘ὑpiοκεῖσθαι’ when reporting the second horn of the Eleatic Chal-
lenge. I translate the term as ‘subject’ and I assume that the Monist argues:
if X comes to be from what-is-not, there would be no subject. For if X comes
to be from its opposite, its opposite would then be the subject. Since the op-
posite cannot be the subject, X would come to be from nothing at all. Hence,
there would be no subject.
However, we may worry whether Aristotle can attribute A2 to his prede-
cessors. If Aristotle discovered the need for a subject of a change while his
predecessors failed to recognize that need, Aristotle should not report them
38μέχρι μὲν οὖν ἐpiὶ τοσοῦτον σχεδὸν συνηκολουθήκασι καὶ τῶν ἄλλων οἱ piλεῖστοι, καθάpiερ
εἴpiομεν piρότερον· piάντες γὰρ τὰ στοιχεῖα καὶ τὰς ὑpi’ αὐτῶν καλουμένας ἀρχάς, καίpiερ ἄνευ λόγου
τιθέντες, ὅμως τἀναντία λέγουσιν, ὥσpiερ ὑpi’ αὐτῆς τῆς ἀληθείας ἀναγκασθέντες.
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as saying that change requires a persisting subject in a premise of their ar-
gument for the claim that change is impossible.
But I see no evidence that Aristotle thinks his predecessors were un-
aware of the need for a subject of change. He explicitly characterizes his
predecessors believing in a subject earlier in the work. Here are two exam-
ples:
On the other hand, the physicists speak in two ways. Some physi-
cists making the body that is subject one, either one of the three
or something else which is denser than fire and rarer than air,
then generate everything else from this, and obtain multiplicity
by condensation and rarefaction (187a12–17).39
Again:
There is, therefore, much to be said for those who make the sub-
ject different from these four [fire, air, earth, and water]; of the
rest, the next best choice is air, as presenting sensible differences
in a less degree than the others; and after air, water (189b5–8).40
In both these quotations, Aristotle says that some of his predecessors agree
that there is a subject, but they disagree about which being or beings is/are
these subjects. Thales may believe this subject is water. Parmenides believes
that if change were to exist, then fire or earth would have to be this subject.
So Aristotle says that his predecessors believe in a subject of change.
Again, we must take care in how we understand Aristotle’s ascription of this
belief. For we just saw that Aristotle characterizes his predecessors’ beliefs
about opposites in a way that is likely alien to them. Likewise Aristotle can
characterize his predecessors’ beliefs about the subject of change in ways
39῾Ως δ’ οἱ φυσικοὶ λέγουσι, δύο τρόpiοι εἰσίν. οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἓν piοιήσαντες τὸ [ὂν] σῶμα τὸ ὑpiοκε-
ίμενον, ἢ τῶν τριῶν τι ἢ ἄλλο ὅ ἐστι piυρὸς μὲν piυκνότερον ἀέρος δὲ λεpiτότερον, τἆλλα γεννῶσι
piυκνότητι καὶ μανότητι piολλὰ piοιρον, τἆλλα γεννῶσι piυκνότητι καὶ μανότητι piολλὰ piοιοῦντες (ταῦτα
δ’ ἐστὶν ἐναντία, καθόλου δ’ ὑpiεροχὴ καὶ ἔλλειψις.
40διὸ καὶ οὐκ ἀλόγως piοιοῦσιν οἱ τὸ ὑpiοκείμενον ἕτερον τούτων piοιοῦντες, τῶν δ’ ἄλλων οἱ ἀέρα·
καὶ γὰρ ὁ ἀὴρ ἥκιστα ἔχει τῶν ἄλλων διαφορὰς αἰσθητάς· ἐχόμενον δὲ τὸ ὕδωρ.
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that are alien to them: they may not possess the terms and concepts to
characterize this belief in the way that Aristotle characterizes it. Sarah
Waterlow puts the point nicely:
Yet the phrase [subject] is not entirely out of place in this brief ac-
count of the paradox, because it reflects a conceptual requirement
to which the earlier thinkers were no less sensitive than Aristotle
himself, although unlike him they could not see how it was to be
reconciled with the fact of change.41
Aristotle’s predecessors believe that change requires a subject of change.
They were unable to articulate this belief in precisely these terms and they
may have been unaware about why they believed change requires a subject
of change. But believe in the need for a subject of change they did.
So we can understand Aristotle’s characterization of the Monist as fol-
lows: the Monist argues that, if change were to exist, change must occur
between opposites and there must be a persisting subject of change. But the
Monist believes that, if there were a subject of change, the only candidate
for that subject was an opposite. In other words, the Monist believes that a
subject must undergo each change and was unable to clearly distinguish any
other candidate for this subject than the termini of a change. However, the
Monist argued that an opposite could never undergo a change, could never
be a subject of change.
So while the Monist agrees that A1–A3 are individually necessary condi-
tions for a change to occur, he was unable to see how any being could satisfy
A1–A3.42 If A1 is satisfied, X must come to be from its opposite. But since
the Monist understood this to mean that X must come to be only from its
opposite, he thought A2 could not also be satisfied. In contrast, if A2 is sat-
isfied, A1 cannot be satisfied. If X comes to be from some subject of change,
41Waterlow {84, p. 9}.
42They are unlikely sufficient as we also need an efficient cause.
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then this subject cannot be the opposite of X. Since the Monist thinks that X
can only come to be from one thing, if X comes to be from subject of change
and this subject is distinct from the opposite of X, then A1 cannot also be
satisfied.
This concludes how I interpret the argument. On this reading, it is plain
that a certain view about the principles lies behind the Eleatic Challenge. In
effect, the Monist assumes that, if X comes to be, X cannot come to be from
both a subject of change and X’s opposite, e.g. the sculpted cannot come to be
from both the unsculpted and some subject of change. Aristotle’s solution,
we will see, is to show that the product of a change can come to be from both
the opposite and the subject of change.
There is a deep and interesting question as to why the Monist thinks that
X cannot come to be from the unsculpted and some subject of change. The
issue is at the heart of Phys. I.2–3. Discussing those chapters would take
a dissertation in its own right. But let me here observe that Aristotle in
those chapters attributes to the Parmenides and Melissus the view that for
each being, there is one predicate that it possesses. So certain things are hot
and only hot. Other things are horses and only horses, but nothing is both
a horse and hot. Unfortunately, Aristotle never tells us why the Monists
accept this claim. He merely observes that these predecessors believe it
impossible for something to be both one and many, a belief that he rejects.
(See 185b25ff)
5.8 Aristotle’s Solution: Tools
There are two key elements to Aristotle’s response. First, unlike the Monist,
on Aristotle’s view of the principles, the subject and privation are one in
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number and two in form, e.g. one entity can be both shapeless and bronze.
Second, this view of the principles allows Aristotle to distinguish different
ways for the product of a change to come into being from the privation and
the subject. This distinction in turn allows Aristotle to distinguish two dif-
ferent ways of reading the first premise of the Eleatic Challenge. Read in
one way, he believes that the argument is valid but unsound. Read in an-
other, distinct way, he thinks that the argument is invalid. I discuss both
these elements in turn:
First, in Phys. I.7 Aristotle claims:
In every case, there must be something which underlies [is the
subject for] what comes to be; even if the subject is one in number,
the subject is not one in form, since being a man is not the same
as being an unmusical thing. (By ‘in form’ I mean the same as ‘in
account’)(189b13–16).43
Here Aristotle says the subject and privation are one in number but two in
form. By this, Aristotle means first that, say, being a man and being musical
coincide in one substance. Second, he means that what it is to be a man
differs from what it is to be unmusical. Similarly, what it is to be unsculpted
differs from what it is to be bronze. This difference is important. I will
explain why from the perspective of a music teacher.44
43διωρισμένων δὲ τούτων, ἐξ ἁpiάντων τῶν γιγνομένων τοῦτο ἔστι λαβεῖν, ἐάν τις ἐpiιβλέψῃ ὥσpiερ
λέγομεν, ὅτι δεῖ τι ἀεὶ ὑpiοκεῖσθαι τὸ γιγνόμενον, καὶ τοῦτο εἰ καὶ ἀριθμῷ ἐστιν ἕν, ἀλλ’ εἴδει γε
οὐχ ἕν· τὸ γὰρ εἴδει λέγω καὶ λόγῳ ταὐτόν·
44I here follow Irwin’s reading of ‘one in number, two in form’. According to Irwin, we use
concrete phrases like ‘the unmusical’ to refer to both property instances and the subjects
these property instances are in. Since there is only one subject that possesses this property
instance of unmusicality, Irwin claims we can also use ‘unmusical’ to refer to that subject
(Irwin {48, p. 515}) Subsequently, Irwin {48, p. 85} says “[t]he subject has different property
instances that are one in number, since they belong to the same particular subject but
different in ‘being’ (191a1–3) or ‘form’ (190a13–17), allowing us to refer to that subject in
different ways.” The instance of man and the instance of unmusicality are one in number
because there is one subject that has both property instances. For alternative readings, see
Code {24, 25}, Matthews {68, 67}.
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Let us suppose that the famous Terpander decides to teach Arion how to
play the lyre. If he is to make a musician out of Arion, he will expect two
things of his prospective student. First, he will expect that Arion can com-
plete the intensive music lessons. Arion won’t complete the lessons if he is
weak willed, sickly, distractable, and so on. Even if he were able to begin the
lessons, he would quit halfway due to illness or some other difficulty. Second,
he will expect that Arion is ready and able to start learning how to play the
lyre. After all, Arion won’t be able to start learning if he is still a child, so
young he has yet to sufficiently develop cognitively and physically to begin
learning anything at all. Similarly, if Arion has suffered some catastrophic
injury in his life, there is little that Terpander can do to teach him music. So
Terpander needs Arion to be able to both begin and complete a music educa-
tion. If Terpander believes Aristotle, he will think that it is only unmusical
men who are able to do both, i.e. that he can only make a musician out of
unmusical men. Not every man can learn music. It is only those who are in
the appropriate state that can do so.45
We may agree that Arion must be both unmsuical and a man to be a
suitable musical student. But this agreement assumes that Arion can be two
things, both unmusical and a man. This is one of Aristotle’s key responses
to the Eleatic. For the Eleatic believes that Arion could only be one thing,
only a man, or only unmusical, and so on.46
The second element of Aristotle’s response utilizes this difference be-
tween the subject and privation to claim that the first premise of the Eleatic
Challenge can be read in two different ways. Recall the first premise as I
construe it:
45Recall that the unmusical is not the mere absence of musicality. See Ch.2
46Kelsey {53} also argues that Aristotle’s claim that the subject and privation are one in
number, two in form is central to his solution.
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P1. If F comes into being, then F comes into being either from F or from O.
Aristotle’s crucial claim is that there are two different ways for one thing to
come into being from another (191b13–16). Thus he thinks that P1 admits
of two distinct readings:
P1*. If F comes into being, then F comes into being either unqualifiedly from
F or unqualifiedly from O.
P1**. If F comes into being, then F comes into being either coincidentally
from F or coincidentally from O.
So Aristotle thinks that one thing can come into being unqualifiedly or coin-
cidentally from another. What are these two different ways and how do they
differ from one another? Aristotle clarifies this distinction with an example:
Now a doctor builds a house, not insofar as he is a doctor, but inso-
far as he is a housebuilder; and he becomes pale, not insofar as he
is a doctor, but insofar as he is dark. But he practices medicine, or
loses his medical knowledge, insofar as he is a doctor. We speak
in the fullest sense of a doctor acting on something or being acted
on, or coming to be something, from being a doctor, if it is insofar
as he is a doctor that he is acted on in this way or produces these
things or comes to be these things (191b4–8).47
Suppose that Galen cures a patient. We can describe Galen’s curing a pa-
tient in different ways. We could say that the house-builder cures a patient,
the violin player cures a patient, the tired parent cures a patient. These
sentences are all true—assuming that Galen also builds houses, plays the
violin and has just had a child. But none of these descriptions picks Galen
out in a way that describes his ability to build houses. In contrast, ‘doctor’
47οἰκοδομεῖ μὲν οὖν ὁ ἰατρὸς οὐχ ᾗ ἰατρὸς ἀλλ’ ᾗ οἰκοδόμος, καὶ λευκὸς γίγνεται οὐχ ᾗ ἰατρὸς
ἀλλ’ ᾗ μέλας· ἰατρεύει δὲ καὶ ἀνίατρος γίγνεται ᾗ ἰατρός. ἐpiεὶ δὲ μάλιστα λέγομεν κυρίως τὸν ἰατρὸν
piοιεῖν τι ἢ piάσχειν ἢ γίγνεσθαι ἐξ ἰατροῦ, ἐὰν ᾗ ἰατρὸς ταῦτα piάσχῃ ἢ piοιῇ ἢ γίγνηται,
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both refers to Galen and refers to the ground of his ability to cure patients,
i.e. his being a doctor.
Here is a general formulation of the distinctions that Aristotle draws in
this passage:
1. X does F from being P only if (i) X does F insofar as X is P, or (ii) X does
F not insofar as X is P
2. X suffers F from being P only if (i) X does F not insofar as X is P, or (ii)
X does F not insofar as X is P.
3. X comes to be F from being P only if (i) X comes to be F insofar as X is
P, or (ii) X comes to be F not insofar as X is P.
Each of 1-3 states two different sufficient conditions for each analysandum
to hold. I take it that the anslysandum is the relation referred to by the left
hand side of each 1–3. Aristotle claim is that for each 1–3, (i) and (ii) specify
two sufficient conditions for the same relation to hold.48
We are now in a position to explain the difference between P1* and P1**.
Consider a statue. We can say that the statue came into being from some
bronze thing. We can also say that the statue came into being from some
shapeless thing. If the statue comes into being unqualifiedly from the shape-
less thing, then ‘shapeless’ must both refer to some entity that was turned
into a statue and refer to what grounds the ability of that entity to be turned
into a a statue. Similarly, if the statue comes into being unqualifiedly from
the bronze, then ‘bronze’ must both pick out an entity that was turned into
the statue and refer to what grounds the ability of that entity to be turned
into a statue. In contrast, if the statue comes into being coincidentally from
48It is possible that the analysandum is the sense of ‘from being’. Taken this way, (i)
and (ii) disambiguate two senses of ‘from being’. Since nothing is lost, and clarity gained, in
what follows, I assume that ‘being from’ has the same sense throughout, and that Aristotle’s
solution relies on distinguishing two distinct ways that the one relation can hold.
184
5.9. THE STRUCTURE OF ARISTOTLE’S SOLUTION
the shapeless thing, then ‘shapeless’ refers to the entity that was turned into
the statue but does not refer to what grounds the ability of that entity to be
turned into a statue.
5.9 The Structure of Aristotle’s Solution
Aristotle thinks that the Monist reads P1 as P1* (191b9–10). Read in this
way, he thinks that the first stage of the Challenge presents a valid argu-
ment, but an unsound one. The argument is unsound because P1* is false.
P1* assumes that there is only one way for F to come into being from F
and/or O, i.e. unqualifiedly. But this is false. A major and important upshot
of Aristotle’s own view of the principles is that there is another way for F to
come into being from F and/or O, i.e. coincidentally.
However, Aristotle is not merely content to show that the first stage of
the Challenge is unsound when P1 is read as P1*. He argues that even
if we read P1 as P1**, the first stage fails. He thinks it fails because he
believes that the arguments on each horn of the dilemma contain an invalid
inference. In other words, he thinks that the argument that F cannot come
into being coincidentally from what-is is invalid. And he thinks that the
argument that F cannot come into being coincidentally from what-is-not is
also invalid.
5.9.1 Second horn: from what-is-not
Aristotle discusses the second horn first:
(i) We agree with them in saying that nothing comes to be without
qualification from what-is-not, (ii) but we say that things come to
be in a way—for instance, coincidentally from what-is-not. (iii)
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For something comes to be from the privation, which in itself is
not and which is not present to the thing <when it has come to
be> (191b13–16). 49
In (i), Aristotle agrees that the argument on the second horn of the dilemma
show us that F cannot come into being unqualifiedly from what-is-not. How-
ever, he thinks that the argument does not show us that F cannot come
into being coincidentally from what-is-not. (iii) contains an argument that
F comes into being coincidentally from what-is not. This argument relies on
issues of persistence, and I will set discussion of it aside until the next sec-
tion. Here let me identify the structure of Aristotle’s response. Let us read
P1 as P1** and use an example:
1. If the hot comes into being coincidentally from the cold, then the cold
is the subject of change.
2. It is not possible for the cold to be the subject of change.
3. It is not possible for the hot to come into being coincidentally from the
cold. (From 1–2)
Aristotle accepts 2. He agrees that opposites cannot serve as the subject of
change. But Aristotle rejects 1. On Aristotle’s view the subject and privation
are one in number, two in form. So, for instance, there is one entity that is
both a man and cold. So Aristotle rejects the inference in 1. Even if the hot
comes into being coincidentally from the cold, it does not follow that the cold
49ἡμεῖς δὲ καὶ αὐτοί φαμεν γίγνεσθαι μὲν μηθὲν ἁpiλῶς ἐκ μὴ ὄντος piὼς μέντοι γίγνεσθαι ἐκ μὴ
ὄντος, οἷον κατὰ συμβεβηκός ἐκ γὰρ τῆς στερήσεως, ὅ ἐστι καθ’ αὑτὸ μὴ ὄν, οὐκ ἐνυpiάρχοντος
γίγνεταί τι· Both ‘unqualifiedly’ (‘ἁpiλῶς’) and ‘coincidentally’ (‘κατὰ συμβεβηκός’) are adverbial
phrases, phrases that could modify two different verbs: 1) ‘come to be’ (‘γίγνεται’) and 2)
‘being’ (‘εἶναι’). I presume it modifies the former. I also assume that Aristotle does not use
‘unqualifiedly’ (ἁpiλῶς’) to restrict his attention to unqualified becoming. Rather, the phrase
qualifies Aristotle’s acceptance of the Eleatic’s claim that something cannot come to be from
what-is-not. Aristotle accepts this claim when it is not qualified. He then turns to defend a
qualified way (piὼς) for something to come into being from what-is-not.
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is the subject of change, i.e. it does not follow that anything is a subject in
virtue of being cold.
5.9.2 First horn: from what-is
Aristotle’s solution to the first horn is harder. He claims:
Similarly, there is no coming to be, except coincidentally, from
what-is, or of what-is. But coincidentally what-is also comes to
be, in the same way as if animal comes to be from animal and
a certain animal from a certain animal. (Suppose, for instance,
that a dog comes to be from a horse. For the dog would come to be
not only from a certain animal, but also from animal, though not
insofar as it is animal or that is already present (191b17–23).50
This bit of text is difficult. Aristotle’s example is of animal coming from
animal and a certain animal coming from a certain animal. This is meant to
be a case where what-is comes to be coincidentally from what-is. However,
it is not entirely clear how exactly this is such a case. Let us first outline the
inferences in the passage:
50ὡσαύτως δὲ οὐδ’ ἐξ ὄντος οὐδὲ τὸ ὂν γίγνεσθαι, piλὴν κατὰ συμβεβηκός· οὕτω δὲ καὶ τοῦτο
γίγνεσθαι, τὸν αὐτὸν τρόpiον οἷον εἰ ἐκ ζῴου ζῷον γίγνοιτο καὶ ἐκ τινὸς ζῴου τι ζῷον· οἷον εἰ κύων
ἐξ ἵpipiου γίγνοιτο. γίγνοιτο μὲν γὰρ ἂν οὐ μόνον ἐκ τινὸς ζῴου ὁ κύων, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐκ ζῴου, ἀλλ’
οὐχ ᾗ ζῷον· ὑpiάρχει γὰρ ἤδη τοῦτο· Some have found the speculative biology unacceptable.
Ross {74, p. 495} suggests that we read the text as: κύων ἐκ κυνὸς ἢ ἵpipiος ἐξ ἵpipiου γίγνοιτο.
Aristotle would then be speaking of a dog coming from a dog, and a horse coming from a
horse. While this does not strike the ear as unusual, the example is of no use to Aristotle.
Aristotle is clearly trying to speak of the subject of change. Ross’s emendation requires
a) taking Aristotle as speaking of efficient causation, or b) taking Aristotle as still talking
about the subject of change. Neither is helpful. If Aristotle is speaking of efficient causation,
then we are left wondering how this example is meant to illustrate what is involved in, if
you like, material causation. But if we read it as b), then we are in no better position than
the text as we have it. We are then to imagine that Aristotle believes that the matter in
the generation of a dog is a dog. So I leave the text as we have it. Of course, it would be
useful if we had some explanation for why Aristotle thinks he needs to make his case in a
speculative way. In comments, Terence Irwin suggests that, for this change, it’s clear that
what comes to be isn’t the same as what it came to be from. Nevertheless, Aristotle points
out that we can still use the bland formula ‘animal from animal’ to describe the change.
This seems right to me. Aristotle wants to emphasise that while we can describe a change
as what-is comes into being from what-is, this does not mean that the product is the same
as what it came into being from. This animal from animal case is a perfect illustration of
this point.
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1. A dog comes into being from a horse.
2. A horse is an animal.
3. A dog comes into being from animal-horse. (From 1–3)
4. A dog is an animal.
5. Animal-dog comes into being from animal-horse. (From 3–4)
6. Animal comes into being from animal. (From 5)
7. Animal is already present in animal.
8. Animal comes into being coincidentally from animal. (From 7)
1 is clearly stated. 2 is required to infer 3 from 1. 4 is not clearly stated but
Aristotle wishes to show that when a certain animal (a dog) comes to be from
a certain animal (horse) this is also a case where animal comes to be from
animal. While 5 is not stated, Aristotle needs it if he wishes to infer from
the fact that when dog comes from animal, so also does animal come from
animal. 6 is clear. 7 is trickier. The point seems to be that if a horse becomes
a dog, we can describe this as a change in which an animal becomes an
animal. By saying that animal is already present, Aristotle tells us that the
description ‘an animal becomes an animal’ is uninformative. Even though
it is true, it does not tell us just how the subject of change changed (for the
horse was already an animal). In order for Aristotle to infer 8 from 6 and 7,
he assumes:
• If X comes into being from Y, and X was present in Y, then X comes into
being coincidentally from Y.
Since the animal comes into being from the animal, and the animal was
already present in the animal (the horse), then the animal comes into being
coincidentally from the animal. What allows Aristotle make this claim is
that he thinks that one enity can be both an animal and a horse.
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How exactly does this example allow Aristotle respond to the Eleatic
Challenge? Let us again read P1 as P1**. Here is the argument on the
first horn of the dilemma:
P1: If F comes into being coincidentally from F, then F is already.
P2: It is not possible for F to come into being if F is already.
C1: F cannot come into being from F. (From P1–P3)
Aristotle’s example shows that there is a way of describing the terimini of a
change that allow us reject P2. Allow ‘animal’ as the value of ‘F’. Aristotle
claims that it is possible for animal to come into being even though animal
is already. In his example, a dog comes into being from a horse. This is also
a case where animal comes into being from animal. So animal comes into
being even though animal is already. Key to this solution is that the change
is one only where F comes into being coincidentally from F. If animal were
to come into being unqualifiedly from animal, then animal would have to
become an animal insofar as it is animal. But this would be no change at all.
5.10 The Role of Persistence in Aristotle’s Solution
It may appear that persistence has little if any role to play in Aristotle’s re-
sponse to the Eleatic Challenge. His response turns on showing that P1 can
be read in two distinct ways, as either P1* or P**. By itself, this distinction
does not rely on the persistence of the subject of change.
However, persistence does play a key role in Aristotle’s solution, though
in an indirect way. Aristotle owes us a way of distinguishing what F comes
into being unqualifiedly from as opposed to what it comes into being coin-
cidentally from. Why claim that the statue comes into being coincidentally
189
5.10. THE ROLE OF PERSISTENCE IN ARISTOTLE’S SOLUTION
and not unqualifiedly from shapelessness? Similarly, why claim that the
statue comes into being unqualifiedly from bronze and not coincidentally
from bronze? He owes us some clear criterion to distinguish what the prod-
uct of a change comes into being unqualifiedly from as opposed to what it
comes into being coincidentally from.
Aristotle does offer us such a criterion, a criterion that relies on the per-
sistence of the subject. Recall his solution to the second horn:
(i) We agree with them in saying that nothing comes to be without
qualification from what-is-not, (ii) but we say that things come to
be in a way—for instance, coincidentally from what-is-not. (iii)
For something comes to be from the privation, which in itself is
not and which is not present to the thing <when it has come to
be> (191b13–16).
I discussed (i) and (ii) in the previous section. Here note that (iii) offers us
the criterion I asked for:
CRITERION 1: If Y is not present in X after X comes into being, and X
comes into being from Y, then X comes into being coincidentally from
Y.
Privations satisfy this criterion. A statue comes into being from shapeless-
ness. Since shapelessness is not present in a statue once it is created, then
a statue comes into being only coincidentally from shapelessness. Similarly,
hot cocoa comes from cold chocolate. Since the cold is not present in that
fresh cocoa we make, the cocoa comes into being only coincidentally from
the cold.
CRITERION 1 speaks of what the products comes into being coinciden-
tally from. It also entails a claim about what the statue comes into being
unqualifiedly from:
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CRITERION 2 If Y is present in X after X comes into being, and X comes
into being from Y, then X comes into being unqualifiedly from Y.
I here assume that there are only two ways for X to come into being from
Y. So if X comes from Y but does not do so coincidentally, then X comes
unqualifiedly from Y. Thus CRITERION 2 states a criterion for what it takes
for X to come into being unqualifiedly from Y.
Let me illustrate CRITERION 1 and 2 with an example: suppose that we
melt an ice sculpture of Arion into a pool of chilled water. We would like to
know what the pool unqualifiedly comes into being from. There are two can-
didates. 1) The ice-sculpture of Arion. 2) The portion of water that composes
that ice-sculpture. We speak truly when we say that the pool comes into
being from both. However, according to Aristotle, one of these entities has
by its nature the properties that allow it be turned into a pool. How do we
decide whether it is the ice-sculpture or the portion of water that can be so
turned? Aristotle provides a decision mechanism: he tells us to look at what
synchronically composes the pool of water. Does the portion of water or the
ice sculpture synchronically compose that pool? It’s the former. Thus it is the
portion of water that has the properties to be turned into the pool of water.
Hence, the pool of water comes into being unqualifiedly from that portion of
water. However, the pool still comes into being from the ice-sculpture. But
this is explained by a deeper fact. Namely, the ice-sculpture stands in the
appropriate relation to the portion of water, a portion the pool unqualifiedly
comes into being from. Hence, the pool only comes into being coincidentally
from the ice-sculpture.
Now CRITERION 2 does speak to issues of persistence: if X comes into
being from Y, and Y is present in X after X comes into being, then Y persists
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through this process. For instance, if our pool of water comes into being
from a portion of water, and that portion of water is present in the pool once
the pool has come into being, then that portion of water must have persisted
through this process. Similarly, if our cup of hot chocolate is made from some
chocolate, and that chocolate is present in our cup of hot chocolate, then that
chocolate must have persisted through this making.
So in order to distinguish P1* from P1** Aristotle clearly assumes that
the subject of change must persist through whatever change it is subject for.
How are we to understand the significance of this assumption? It is striking
that Aristotle offers no defence of it. He just doesn’t see it as requiring a
defence. Both he and the Monist accept that the subject must persist if
change is to exist. The Eleatic could identify no suitable persisting subject,
so concludes change does not exist. Aristotle responds by arguing that if we
recognize that subject and privation are one in number, two in form, then
we can identify a suitable persisting subject. But this offers us no reason to
accept the initial assumption that change requires persistence. Anyone who
denies this initial assumption will find no argument here that they should
accept it.
Of course, we may like Aristotle to defend his claim that the subject per-
sists. But we can at least explain why he focuses so little on the claim.
His main response to the Eleatic Challenge requires that he distinguish P1*
from P1**. He uses his own view of the principles to do that, i.e. his claim
that (1) the subject is one in number two in form, and (2) the subject persists
and is present in the product of the change. His main focus is the distinction
between P1* and P1**. In Phys. I.8, he takes (1) and (2) as given and so sees
no need to defend either there.
192
5.11. CONCLUSION
5.11 Conclusion
Aristotle claims that a correct understanding of the principles is required to
respond to the Eleatic Challenge. We saw that several interpretations of the
Challenge leave an argument that is obviously invalid. On my interpreta-
tion, the Monist presents a valid argument when P1 is read as P1*. This
explains why Aristotle takes the argument so seriously. Aristotle uses his
own view of the principles to do two distinct things. First, he shows that
P1* is false. Second, he shows that his particular use of the principles is
immune to a version of the Challenge that directly attacks the innovation
he introduces. This provides a comprehensive defense of his own view of the
principles.
I have also shown that both the Challenge and Aristotle’s solution as-
sumes that the subject of change must persist through whatever change it
is subject for. But Aristotle’s solution does not make any theoretical commit-
ments about persistence. He does not claim that there is a diachronic cri-
terion of identity for each persisting subject. Perhaps Aristotle does believe
this. But his solution does not turn on this claim, and reading the solution
has being particularly focused on such criteria is not helpful for properly
understanding it.
So persistence does play a key role in Phys. I. We have seen that Aristotle
uses it to advance his search in several ways. For instance, we saw in Ch.3
that he uses persistence in Phys. I.6 to argue that opposites cannot be the
only principles of nature. Here in Phys. I.8 he uses persistence to distinguish
two different ways for a product to come into being from something else.
Perhaps it is striking that Aristotle treats persistence in what may appear
a naive way. He just doesn’t see any need to argue that change requires a
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persisting subject nor does it occur to him, at least for the purposes of Phys. I,
that the persistence of the subject requires any explanation. Nevertheless,
persistence does play a key role in Aristotle’s search for the principles of
nature.
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